# Interview with Richard Thomas Kennedy

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR RICHARD THOMAS KENNEDY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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[Note: This transcript was not edited by Ambassador Kennedy.]

*Q: Today is September 27, 1995. This is an interview with Ambassador Richard Thomas Kennedy. This is being done on behalf of the Association of Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Mr. Ambassador, could we start off by giving me something about your background—when and where you were born and a little about your family?*

KENNEDY: I was born in Rochester, New York on the day before Christmas, 1919. My mother, I suppose, thought I was a little gift from heaven. Later I suppose, she thought somewhat differently as I grew up into a normal young man, minding his own business and not necessarily following all of the tenets of his parents. In any case, we were, I would say, of quite modest means.

*Q: Your father did what?*

KENNEDY: He was an officer, a junior officer of a small machine tool company, but you'll recall about 1928 or 1929 machine tool companies as a general matter went bankrupt, as did his. He then worked with General Motors for a great many years—indeed essentially, except for a period of government service, essentially at General Motors until he retired at

something past age 65. He was an accountant at what was called the Northeast Electric Company in Rochester, New York where I was born. He assisted the transfer of the Northeast Electric Company to the Delco Appliance Division of General Motors, when Delco bought Northeast Electric. And he remained with General Motors for essentially the rest of his life, except for a period of government service as the Finance Director for the Works Progress Administration (WPA), during the middle Roosevelt years. What happened to me—I grew up in a nice little neighborhood—went to the little neighborhood Catholic school a couple of blocks away. Was considered to be a pretty good student. Although, I suppose like all little boys, not necessarily not a good little boy all of the time. Having fun in classrooms inevitably resulted in some additional work, which probably was good for me in that case. I left there and went to a Catholic boys school, Aquinas Institute, which has just completed its 75th year, maybe 100th anniversary.

*Q: The name of the Institute?*

Aquinas Institute in Rochester, New York. We were noted, at the time, for having a very good football team. We used to send a lot of people off to Notre Dame. But those were early days you know. Now, I suppose you have to be a junior professional before you can get into college. But it wasn't like that in those days. Having finished there four years later in 1937, I went to the University of Rochester which I guess at the time, I never had thought that I'd be able to do, simply because of the cost involved. Because in those days tuition was $300.00 a year; $300.00 a year was a whole lot.

*Q: A good salary was $3000.00 a year.*

KENNEDY: Well $300.00 was a whole lot. It went up in my senior year to $400.00—nearly broke my bank. However, fortunately for whatever reason, I was able to generate an academic scholarship which contributed something and I was able to borrow some money from the bank—which was a scary experience, going in to see some junior vice-

president sitting behind his great desk in the great vaulted rooms at the old banks. I was totally impressed, believe me. But, anyway, so I finished college in 1941.

*Q: That was a great year to finish college.*

KENNEDY: Yes, I finished college in 1941.

*Q: What were you specializing in?*

KENNEDY: Economics and International Relations.

*Q: Why those?*

KENNEDY: Why those? Well, economics because I was interested and in the Economics Department with all of these pseudo business studies, because there was not a business school: things like economic statistics—accounting—up to advanced financial accounting—cost accounting. I remember three of us were interested in taking a course in cost accounting, but the course was not going to be given that year because there were only three students who would be signing up for it. The three of us went to the professor, who became a friend of mine later, and asked him if he would conduct it as an out of class seminar for credit, which he did. So we studied cost accounting, essentially on our own, meeting with him for a hour or two in the afternoon at some point during each week. So that was the reason. For the International Relations business, because I guess I was—at that age you really have a fairly good appreciation for the world as a whole and you think that you can perceive the grand scheme of things almost better than anybody.

*Q: Of course.*

KENNEDY: And so I perceived the grand scheme of things to be one in which economics and economic well being were the essential ingredients of political stability and that this extended beyond our own borders to really encompass the world. And I remember ruminating on, because I was fascinated by the origins (and most people were in those

days), of the Great Depression. Because, that's of course, when I grew up. I grew up in the Great Depression. No one comprehends that anymore. No one understands what the Great Depression was really like.

*Q: The Great Depression really had a much more profound influence, really than World War II, on a couple of generations.*

KENNEDY: No one today, or not very many people today, comprehend what it was really like. They didn't know what it meant for middle class people to wonder whether they were going to lose their homes. Whether they were really going to be able to feed the family well for the next few months. And that's the way it was, that was true. And I can remember — just vaguely of course, because I was so young, but I can remember my father having been laid off when that company went bankrupt. Things were pretty tough. My mother was a person of great inner strength, as was my father. They were very different people, but they were both very, very strong internally. They had great faith in themselves—great faith in the system and great faith in the people around them. That's something, that I look around today and wonder what happened to it. But anyway, to go back—when I was taking these things I felt that the Great Depression had it's origin, at least in part, in the banking collapse of the great Credit Anstaltz collapse in Austria, and in part that was true. It was certainly one of the precursors, there were many, but that was one of the precursors. And so I thought that one ought to know more about this, one ought to understand more about this. At the same time, in the last couple of years—1939 or 1941 the world was changing in dramatic ways, Europe was being engulfed in a cataclysm and what relationship did all of this have to what the United States was doing. As we all did in those days and I suppose kids do it today, we'd sit up all night and have a “bull session” about these things. Great pontifical thoughts, I mean this was the great thought of the age and gosh we were smart. I remember, indeed, I was coming from a speakers bureau—as senior, we'd go out and give talks to ladies groups and things—and we had a debating group and we use to go and have debates among ourselves. We'd each take sides and we'd go to high schools and things like this and it was great fun. But always we were

consumed by these really very, very complex and difficult problems that were facing our country and the rest of the world at that time. And you recall, this was the time, I think, of the height of the power of the isolationists.

*Q: Oh yes, America First.*

KENNEDY: And I remember all of those fellows very well. All of those things convinced me, I guess in a way, that that's what a world was in the world of economics, but also it was the world where I would have to go to work, you know, so I would know something or do something useful like accounting. So I put it all together and the international relations business all fit into it. My University at the time was one, I suppose there were others, of the old-fashioned ones. At the end of the senior year, you were required for the degree, never mind your courses, you were required for your degree to complete a series of comprehensive examinations.

*Q: I remember them well.*

KENNEDY: I think they've all gone away now, too hard on the students. But again, all this stuff fit together in my view, and I remember the examinations turned out to be things that fit together. In any case, having gone through all of that, the time came to leave college, and I remember being ecstatic, because even before commencement I had a job. And you know, a job in those days was hard to come by—let me tell you. I got $100.00 a month. I was a trainee in the cashier's division in the Equitable Life Insurance Society, one of the great institutions. They had a system by which you had to move—you could not stay at your home—you had to go to another city for your training. So I moved to Springfield, Massachusetts. That was really the first time that I had been away from home for any protracted period in my life. I remember going back to these “America Firsters”, Burton K. Wheeler...

*Q: Senator from Montana, was it?*

KENNEDY: Burton K. Wheeler,— in Springfield in winter time they had a kind of regular symposium kind of thing, every Sunday afternoon—I think it was Sunday, yes I think so, in the Civic Center and I went down to the Civic Center—I subscribed to the series and listened to Wheeler and—I probably would be more reticent now than I was then—I didn't like what he said and I said so. You know, so he's a US Senator, who cares?

*Q: Well you were 21 or 22 years old...*

KENNEDY: If you're 21 years old, who cares, right? So anyway, that very day—I think it was that very day, it might have been that following week, I can't recall now—at this meeting there was an announcement made before the meeting was over about the attack on Pearl Harbor. Now this is 6 months after I left college.

*Q: That would be December 7, 1941.*

KENNEDY: That's correct. It was 6 months after I left college. I've always said that most people have things that occur in their lives that are dramatic and change direction; mine came very, very early and completely changed my life, totally. Because, well, in a matter of a month at Christmas time I went home and I said “you know I really think I ought to go in the Service”. My father who had been a second lieutenant in World War I, as all his brothers— all five of them all of them were in the service, said “Well, don't rush, there's plenty of time”. So I said “Well, I don't know, I'll think about it”. I went back and stayed only a month I guess, and decided no sir, I was going to go home. And to make a long story short, I enlisted in the Army. And it was interesting because a number of my high school classmates were in the same group of enlistees getting sworn in. Now I enlisted, you know we were all running down to enlist. It was a different view of life in those days; there was this kind of unabashed patriotism really. We were proud to be Americans and we were proud to stand up and say “I do”. Interesting vignette, and you know your life does change. I didn't get to be a naval officer because when I went to 90 Church Street to check that out I was qualified in all respects except that I didn't weigh enough; I'm serious, I didn't weigh

enough. This young jock ensign sitting behind the desk said (and I think this is funny—I've always thought it was funny and I thought it was funny at the time and I said so. I thought it was ludicrous) “Well you know, you are obviously a great candidate,” he said, “but the Navy does have its standards and you don't meet the physical standards, you don't weigh enough”. However, he said “I know that they would love to and want to enlist you,” and I said “Excuse me, sir, you mean I'm not healthy enough to sit behind your desk with one stripe, but I am healthy enough to go out before the mast with probably a strip down here on my sleeve, you think that's the way it is?” I said, “That's funny, thank you very much —I'll see ya sometime” and I just walked out. You know, I just thought it was absolutely ludicrous. I've got another story about that later. Anyway, so I enlisted.

*Q: In the Army?*

KENNEDY: In the Army. The day of the enlistment—after we had been sworn in, we were told to go home and come back at 6:00 or something and the train would be ready and they would take us on our way. I went to Camp Upton, New York which was the place where Yip-Yip Yapank, Irving Berlin from World War I, same place. Same place my father had gone. Before leaving, however, this young corporal came in (no, he was older) and says “Hey, is there anybody here who would like to go to Floyd Bennet Field, we have a job open at Floyd Bennet Field for a clerk. Needs to have following qualifications”. I fit all of them and I said “Gee that's okay, I'll do that.” And he said “How fast do you type?” And I said “Well, I don't type at all”. “Oh” he said “well that won't do, I'm sorry”. Now, if I had known how to type at that time, I'd have gone to Floyd Bennet Field and come out of the Army as a Sergeant, maybe a Staff Sergeant typing like mad in the clerk's office. Because I couldn't do that, I got to have the glorious opportunity to become a trainee in an armored division. I learned how to be a communications expert, relative communications operator when we used to use keys to communicate. Then I went to Fort Knox to become an electrician, a mechanic—knowing how to repair all of these radios and build them. While I was there, I was urged by the company commander or something, who was, you know, just a caretaker for all of us kids that came to school. We went to school from 2:00 o'clock

in the afternoon until 10:00 o'clock at night, because they had other people who went from 6:00 in the morning until 2:00 in the afternoon. And he urged that I apply for officer candidate school, which I did and very soon thereafter I was urged to go over and take a physical examination, and guess what? I didn't weigh enough. However, a young physician (he was young, he must have been at the intern level, right out of medical school, you know they were sweeping everybody up) said “Look, you're a perfect physical specimen, except you're 10 pounds to light”. I only weighed 125 pounds and I was 6 feet tall. Now I had always been that way, that high. It was the basic metabolic structure. That's the way I was. So he said “I'll tell you what, I don't think this is a problem for us. I want you to go back, go to the mess sergeant and get two quarts of milk and a half a dozen bananas.”

*Q: My brother got into the Navy in the same way.*

KENNEDY: I did it three times. Going back and forth in a taxicab, so that I would not have to stop at the bathroom. The third time he said “I think were okay.” I looked at the thing and it said 100 and whatever. He said “ Oh, I think you misread it”. That's how I got to be a officer candidate and ultimately became a young officer through 90 days of the closest thing to purgatory that I hope I will ever experience. They tried to cram four years of learning in 90 days, day and night, in addition to which they decided to make everyone coming out of there a human being of super strength. You know, I understood why. You gotta be better than any of the men, and you've got to be able to do whatever they do better than they do. And they've got to know that. Well, anyway, I came out of there all dressed up in my Sam Brown belt, boots and breeches as a young cavalry officer and went to Fort Riley, assigned to an armored division. And in a matter of three months, roughly, yes three months, I was on my way to Fort Patrick Henry where I spent a month waiting for the ship to take me ultimately to North Africa where I ultimately joined the first armored division.

*Q: The North African Invasion was in November of 1942, so when did you...*

KENNEDY: I got there in the spring of 1943, early summer. And then went to Italy and spent the rest of the war climbing mountains from Naples to Como.

*Q: Which division were you...*

KENNEDY: First armored division. Went to Monte Casino—watched the bombingand watched whole organizations be destroyed in their efforts to take Monte Casino. Interestingly, just a couple of years ago now, time goes so fast, my wife and I were in Warsaw and a meeting of the nuclear suppliers was held. And it was held in what had been the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact. And out in the lobby was some memorabilia from the Polish Army which had taken it over after the Russian's left, and there was a particularly beautiful plaque with a sword stuck in the side of the mountain and my wife said “I wonder what that's all about? and we looked. And it was celebrating the Polish Corps which was destroyed at Monte Casino while I was there.

*Q: There is a very beautiful Polish cemetery on the slopes of Monte-Casino.*

KENNEDY: Yes, I know. I was there and watched the Polish get massacred along with everybody else. Because that was so much fun, I then got to go to Anzio. Everyone should have an experience of this kind. You live under the ground like a mole, and if you do that you have some empathy for the poor little animals, you know, when you go get these gadgets to flush them out of your lawn. I wouldn't do that, because I lived under there for so long and I know what it's like to be flushed out. So I don't like to do that. Anyway, we spent a lovely month there and then went on our way. Finally went all the way to Como. At the end, chasing Mussolini—missing him. So, at this point I'm what, 24 years old I guess, yes. The war was over, I could go from stories on that forever because there's so many stories, some of them funny. Most of them, kind of humorous. The wonderful thing is with the passage of time the bad things all pretty much go away and the sort of good things, the light things, stay with you.

*Q: Give me one.*

KENNEDY: When we got to Como another company had gone into the town, we had a task force. We had been way down near the pole (there's another one, several of these) but while we were there the battalion commander and I—he was always “Kennedy, get in the god damned jeep!” I'd get in the jeep and we'd go somewhere. We were going down the road and all of a sudden these P-41's, I guess they came along, so we jumped. Finally we said “You stupid son-of-a-bitches can't you see we've got a star on this god damned vehicle?” That incited them, they came back and this time they were really going to get us. The two of us jumped out of the thing, ran like hell and wound up knee-deep in swamp water. And we had to get down. By the time we got through we were absolutely saturated. And those guys went away, they'd done their job for the day. Probably racked up another enemy vehicle kill. Another time we had the column, you know we had these panels on the back decks which were supposed to alert...

*Q: They're colored panels which have different sort of coded...*

KENNEDY: This alerted the airplanes not to attack you, right?

*Q: Yes.*

KENNEDY: Well, one of these god damned panels got under a railroad bridge. So, they couldn't see any panels and attacked! I'll never forget, one sergeant—everybody was peeling off, diving inside the tanks, getting out, running like hell—finally the sergeant said “Shoot some purple smoke, they'll like it”. I'll never forget him saying that. And I laughed, they were about to kill us.

*Q: What was you're feeling about General Mark Clark?*

KENNEDY: Well, you know, I'm at the end of the chain. I'm a young lieutenant and he's got four stars gleaming. And wherever he went he had his escorts. And I will never forget him,

coming up from his headquarters, which was back there somewhere, I mean way back. And he would come up and when he would get to the rear areas of the forward divisions, he would dismount from his limousine and get in his jeep and stand with his hand on the thing and drive up through the troops. And I thought to myself—come on you “phoney-baloney character” what the hell are you doing? They were all like that. They were all showman, a lot of them. Most of them, most of them showman, and he was one.

*Q: Clark was one of the” Imperial Generals”.*

KENNEDY: He was one of them. Anyway, the other funny story—after we got to Como I was told to go down and get us some place to sleep and I'm hungry. So I went to a hotel, a nice little hotel. Still there, right on the little park, right at the foot of the lake in Como itself. I went into the hotel and I said— I could speak Italian a little—so I said “We would like some rooms, seven including one suitable for the commander, and we would like some sandwiches and some coffee and some milk.” Yes, sir. I came out of the hotel and, as I started to get in my jeep, this voice said “Hey Lieutenant, wait just a second” and I turned around (this is mid-western English), this young American with an Italian kid, the Italian kid having a machine gun, and he said “I need to talk to your commander.” I said “Wait a minute, tell that ape to put down that machine gun and then we'll talk about whether you see the commander or whether you don't.” He says “Don't worry, he's mine.” Turned out this kid's one of the OSS guys who had come across from Switzerland and were chasing —still trying to intercept Mussolini. Which is what we did the whole long day. We went 96 miles that day. I remember the liaison officer came around about 4:00 o'clock that morning; it was just barely getting light and said, you know, your mission is get to Como, intercept Mussolini who is en route between here and Como and get there as fast as you god damn can. And I said Como, that's the playground of Kings. And that's exactly the way it was remembered in those days. So we took the guy. Subsequently, we acquired the commander, acquired a Porsche which happened to have belonged to the Commanding

General, General Pomsel—Because it's such a funny name I've never forgotten it—General Pomsel.

*Q: German Army.*

KENNEDY: He was the German who commanded this base section. So the Colonel felt that vehicle was sort of his style. So he rode around, you know, waved to the populace. All of a sudden we are ordered to move in battle formation. Actually, the whole corps and all of the Army artillery was all moving at the same time. All going over near Ochera, north sort of and I guess east of Milan. Between Milan and Torino. Because there was a big organization called the Mountain Division—actually it was almost as big as a corps populated almost entirely by people who had served in Crete; paratroopers— most of them had been wounded.

*Q: These are Germans?*

KENNEDY: Germans. Well, they weren't going to give up.

*Q: One of the elite units.*

KENNEDY: They were not going to give up. So we were all ordered over there to, first, give a show of force and then, if they didn't come out, you know, “blow the living day lights out of them”. Well, the Colonel wasn't going to give up his car. He said “Kennedy, you and the driver take the car, we will put you in the middle of the headquarters company. So it's raining and we come to a Bailey bridge where all traffic has to go one at a time across this Bailey bridge. So I come along driving this vehicle and I'm looking straight ahead straight into the eyes of the corps commander, all three stars. And I thought to myself, “Dear God”, I never batted an eyelash except to salute. I kept right on driving, never turned my head, saluted and kept on driving. Anyway, those are funny things. So the war was over ultimately. I was unencumbered, 24 years old, I guess at that point maybe getting on 25, and I'd been overseas for so long I could have gone home the next morning.

*Q: It's a matter of points.*

KENNEDY: Yes that's right. And I had enough points to go home yesterday. But I decided that I wasn't going to go home. The division was going to either remain in part in North Italy which was glorious, of course, and beautiful or it was going to go to Germany. And I decided that I would never again have the opportunity to go to Europe.One of the two things I enjoyed most in college as the history of art and the history of music; on the side I did those things because I loved them. And all during the time in Italy, if I had a chance, I'd stop for thirty seconds to look at the cathedral or maybe a little church that we were passing. So I decided to stay. The division moved to Germany, and as I said I'd never have the chance again. How did you get to Europe? In a ship and it took you at a minimum, probably 10 days to get there and you know, it would take you 10 days to get back. By the time you get there to have a week or two in Europe, it was a month. Who could do this?

*Q: Part of the culture of the times was, in the pre-war you had to really be wealthy and have a private income to go to Europe. Either that or be an absolutely foot-loose student. Those were the two people who got there.*

KENNEDY: Absolutely. Even students had a great deal of difficulty because even steerage was expensive, relatively. So that's why I stayed. Never regretted it. Saw Denmark, all of Germany. Went to school in Paris and finally, a year later, I came home. Having had my year in Europe. So then, meanwhile, while I was there I had been encouraged to—I became an S-1.

*Q: S-1 being?*

KENNEDY: The administration and everything. Personnel, everything came under the S-1. And I was the agent of the Wiesbaden Detachment of the United States Forces European Theater which was under General Eisenhower. They had a special detachment

in Wiesbaden; the headquarters was in Frankfurt, but they had a special detachment in Wiesbaden. And we had something like 100,000 troops under us. There were all kinds of things, you know: the war crimes group, the people who were there trying to uncover the huge depot in the art museum in Wiesbaden where they were collecting the art that had been stolen by the Germans, all those kinds of things, a huge signal operation, I mean all kinds of stuff. Anyway, I had a beautiful big office, I mean really— fireplace, they'd come in to light a fire every morning, got used to that sort of thing. So, I came back—well while I was still there I was encouraged—well you know, it doesn't cost you anything, why don't you apply for a regular commission in the Army. By this time, I was a young Captain, and I thought I was really something else. I really did think I was something else. I had hand tailored uniforms—never, never again had that status.

Funny joke there too, you're causing me to remember things that are lodged somewhere for no apparent good reason. It proves what they say that you never forget anything, all you have to do is try to recall it. In any case, I'll never forget I went through this whole exercise, I mean a real exercise—interviews with all of these stern looking colonels, you know. I had been, in that connection, the junior officer on the General Court-martial which was the Court having jurisdiction over that whole region of Germany. I used to get up at 5:30 every single morning and drive all the way from Wiesbaden to Darmstadt—got to know the German countryside and the Rhine—absolutely wonderful, absolutely glorious. Even at 5:30 in the morning. Anyway, these stern-faced colonels—I'd gotten used to them pretty much. I got through all of that junk and I went through all of the physical stuff and then there was a guy I was supposed to see, a psychiatrist. So I opened, I knocked on the door and he said “Come in”, so I opened the door and nobody—nobody. I turned around and here he is sitting up on a ledge behind the door, with his knees forward—obviously trying to see what kind of a reaction he'd get from me and I laughed myself silly. I said “Doc, what the hell are you doing?” I was supposed to be startled or something and I wasn't.

I came back as all good young men did finally and resumed my life—went back to the Equitable Life. Things were going beautifully, I got married. We moved to Phoenix because just before I was to get married, I was ordered to go to Phoenix—even before I finished the course. I had been made assistant cashier. I went to Phoenix—nice man who was chief, I got to know all of those people very well and liked it. So I went home, got married and brought my wife to Phoenix and time went on—it was probably a year—and all of sudden I got a telegram saying “You have been appointed Captain, US Army. If you are prepared to accept this commission, report to so-and-so immediately.” What to do? So we did. And 30 years later, I retired. But after all of that time, or during that time, I did all sorts of things. I was appointed in the Finance Corps. I was a finance officer once, in all that 30 years, once. And that was only because the finance officer had a heart attack and I kept my mouth shut because I had another job (which I'll come to if you want) in Iran. All of the finance officers are issued disbursing symbols from treasury which can be activated by the Chief of Finance, if needed. All of a sudden the Commanding General called me and said “Kennedy, I understand you're a finance officer?” and I said “Yes sir.” He said “Well, you just became the finance officer of this command in addition to your other duties.” And I said “Well sir...” and he said “Thank you very much, Kennedy. Count on me for support.” That was the only time that I ever served as finance officer.

*Q: Well to go over in somewhat of a summary—what type of assignments did you have in the Army? I do want to talk about Iran because that's pertinent.*

KENNEDY: What type of assignments did I have? Well, first I was ordered to the Office of the Chief of Finance and did a job in what was called the Management Division which involved completing a brand new system for paying the troops. Involving all types of new hardware and things. Can you believe this was Address-O-Graph stuff? You know how long ago that was.

*Q: Address-O-Graphs are little...*

KENNEDY: Little plates.

*Q: Little plates that were manually fed in, but it was better than doing each one by typing it.*

KENNEDY: Immeasurably better. Remember, there weren't any computers then. From there, I was sent to the Harvard Business School for a couple of years. Enjoyed that. That was another funny story—they were brutal in their way of treating students. Always with a smile, they gave you more work than was humanly possible to do and demanded that you do it. The readers who would read your weekly essays were just unpleasant. They see a little “buzz word” creep in, in your little prose, it was circled with “Oh, come now”. Just make you feel like a fool. At the end of the first year, we'd had our examinations and I thought I had just done miserably. Some several weeks later, some three or four, I was working for the summer at the Raytheon Corporation and in the mail (my wife was at home with her parents for the summer), in the mail came this thing, I literally—and I will never forget this, I can see myself in the living room of our little apartment house—I was literally afraid to open that envelope. When I opened it I had absolutely incredible grades. Distinction—high pass. And I said they can't read. They were looking for certain things I guess, and not necessarily the so-called answer. But more importantly how you got there and what the reasoning process was. Did you understand the problem, that was the point. And something that I have never, ever forgotten and I use it frequently. At the end of the second year, they had these examinations that were absolutely awful—terrible things—five hours long. I remember one, they said were going to give you this stack of material about this high (this is the day before the examination), they said you can do anything with this that you want—you can consult your friends—you can have meetings—anything you want, we don't care what you do with it, but remember, we haven't told you what the question is—so don't get too far off the track, just remember that, but do anything that you want. So I went through it. It's perfectly obvious what was going on here, this god darned outfit is expanding so rapidly it's about to go broke. It happens to companies often. And you could see it. So I prepared all kinds of charts—

I had a wonderful analysis. Went to the examination—now you've got a whole bunch of notes of telephone conversations—doodled notes back and forth between the partners —notes between them and their bankers. And the question was “You are a graduate of a well known business school and you're located in New York—you're father has asked you if you would give some assistance to this company, Mr. Jones, or whoever they were. They were in the specialized leather goods business. Would you help them look through their problem and see if their is some way that you could be helpful to them? What is your answer to your father?” So I wrote and I wrote and wrote about all of the problems that this company had and why and what they were and everything. And I wound up and I'm a half an hour early—I was always crashing to try to get my last sentence in before the bell—now I'm half an hour early and I've got nothing to do. I said there's something drastically wrong —drastically wrong. All of a sudden it dawned on me just three or four minutes before the end of the exam, it dawned on me—I wrote “Regretfully I would decline. There is no way that I can influence them, they will not listen. It is perfectly obvious that nothing you tell them would have any impact, because they know that they are on the right track, and you can't convince them otherwise.” I got everything back—”Perceptive, Distinction.” What is the real problem is the name of the game.

From there I went on to teach school at Fort Harrison. I taught a variety of things—accounting, management concepts and so on. Then I was ordered to the Assistant Secretary of the Army's Office for Financial Management, and I'm a young major at this junction. And I think this fellow—if he is not God, he is very close to it. He's got a great big office, and when he goes someplace he's got his own airplane—I mean really. However, I just followed along and did my thing. I was In charge of making sure the Army's general accounting system was adequate and meeting the standards of the General Accounting Office, and I got to know all of those people very well personally.

Then I was ordered to... (my father told me once that it was obvious that I could not keep a job, number 1 and number 2, I obviously wasn't very smart because they kept sending me to school.) Then I went to Fort Leavenworth, the Command and General Staff College...

*Q: Benning?*

KENNEDY: Fort Leavenworth. At the end of which they said “Well, we think we would like you to go to become the Deputy Controller of USAR PAC in Hawaii. But it's not settled yet.” And I said “Well look, time's running here, what else is there?” And the only other thing was a brand new job that nobody had defined yet. Which was to be the advisor on essentially financial matters to the Iranian Military Establishment, the Minister of War who was in effect the Defense Minister. My wife and I sat down and talked about it and said you know, if we ever want to go to Hawaii, we'll go, but if we ever wanted to go to Iran we wouldn't. Why don't we go to Iran and see what—you know—it's a fascinating part of the world—going back to my economic worries days. It's part of a whole world of oil, and it's an area in which there is a great contest among the powers, and I said it should be excitement. Something we've never done, never, never seen. So she said, “I'm game.” So we went.

*Q: I have you there from 1959 to 1961?*

KENNEDY: Yes, about three years. What did we do?

*Q: First place, what was our presence there at that time and what was the view that you were getting from people in the military, our military, your reading of the situation in Iran at that time?*

KENNEDY: Well, the situation from a military point of view, the situation was that—you remember the Russian's had at one point attempted to take a piece of Iran.

*Q: Yes, this was the first sort of “pull back” right after the war.*

KENNEDY: The actual time that I went was immediately after the Shah's return from—he was in exile so the military was engaged in what was a major build-up of Iranian forces. The old—I was assigned to the ARMISH—which was the old, there were two old, old missions—the oldest ones of anywhere. GENMISH which was the arrangement Norman Schwarzkopf created the Gendarmerie mission.

*Q: His father, the father of the...*

KENNEDY: That's right, he was—Norman Schwarzkopf was the hero of the New York State Police.

*Q: New Jersey State Police.*

KENNEDY: Maybe. Yes, that's it. So he was the father of the GENMISH, following which was the ARMISH—which was the Army mission of only about 80 people all together. And they were actually integrated into the Iranian Army. I was Senior Lieutenant Colonel of the Iranian Army. I wore the Iranian Army patches on my shoulder. The military's attitude was...

*Q: You're talking about the American Military?*

KENNEDY: Yes, the American Military's attitude was gung-ho, get this job done because we've got to be in a position so that the Iranians can successfully at least delay a Russian assault. Remember the old concept of the Russian great desire to have warm water ports. The idea was to, as I say, position the Iranian Army in ways to prevent a major Russian —Soviet push to the warm water ports, the Persian Gulf. And that was the name of the game. Now, I was there because Eisenhower had promised the Shah not just a major increase in the military establishment, lots of tanks and equipment, but as well— and I can't remember the precise amount now but it seems like—22 or 26 million dollars in cash. Now that doesn't sound like much but, again, in those days it was a lot of money and this was cash; this was cash money and it did not go into the General Accounts of the Iranian

Treasury. It went directly into the Iranian military. Now anybody who knew anything about Iran might not know very much, but I did know that the basic theory is that everybody skims something somewhere along the line. My objective—the reason they created the position was to try to instill a sense of financial responsibility and to do everything I could to assure that the money was reasonably disbursed and used, as well as to do everything I could to see about how we could get out from under this by rearranging their whole budgeting structure and so on. When I got there, or very soon thereafter, the guy who was sort of the programmer for all of the military equipment got sick and left—so I got that job too. Before I had gone I had been quietly asked to see Orrie Taylor—Morris Taylor, who was then Deputy Assistant Secretary, no he was the Economic Counselor of the Embassy. I was asked to go and see—I can't remember who they were now—privately. The military didn't like this.

*Q: These are Embassy Officers?*

KENNEDY: No, no. They were State Department Officers, they asked me to come in and they wanted me to sort of establish a close working relationship with Taylor, who was the Economic Counselor and then he had an assistant who came a little bit later who later was the Senior Executive Secretary, was an Ambassador, I don't remember, in some Middle Eastern Country someplace. Irish name. Nice young man. They asked me to sort of speak, because there was a clear split between the Embassy, on the one hand, and the MAG and mission business, on the other—not an uncommon situation. I, being of unsound mind, undertook to go over very soon after my arrival, a matter of days to introduce myself to these people. And I came back later that afternoon—as I came back a fellow by the name of Hardenburg who was the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief of the MAG, Colonel Kuhn, whose claim to fame was that he was the guy who commanded the troops in Little Rock.

*Q: During the desegregation crisis in 1958 or something.*

KENNEDY: That's right. When they called up the federal forces. Anyway he said “Colonel Kuhn wants to see you.” He's shouting out of the window,” so I said “All right, I'll come up.” So I came up and the Colonel says “Now, I thought I told you that any relationships between this organization and the Embassy would be handled by my office and by the General.” And I said, “Yes, you told me that,” and he said “Well, what were you doing over there?” and I said “Doing my job.” he said, “You have no business doing this.” And I said, “Excuse me, Colonel, let me be sure we understand each other” (as I said I was a Lieutenant Colonel, and I was some real hot-shot. I didn't know what the hell I was doing.) I said to him “Colonel, please I know how to do my job, I know what it is. There is no one else here that does, or there wouldn't be any need for me to be here in the first place. So either I'm going to get to do it or I'm going to go home. I don't care which. We brought nothing with us my wife had the clothes on our backs and a couple of suitcases—that's it. We've got nothing—we don't even have a place to live yet. So I can leave tomorrow. It's okay with me.” That established a working relationship in due time. I would never do that again. I don't know what prompted me to do it, but I did it. Q: What was the feeling that you were getting of the military group towards the Shah? It had just been restored.

KENNEDY: Strongly supportive. No question about it—strongly supportive.

*Q: What about the Iranian army? How did they feel about it?*

KENNEDY: Well, they had a long way to go, believe me. And that is what these guys were working very hard on—they worked very hard. Really hard. There was one difficulty and that was the financial one. The guys in the MAG—the mission who were engaged in planning big training programs—failed to take into account that it was going to cost money to do this. And the money was going to—a lot of it was going to have to come, not all of it I mean the Americans put up a lot of it—out of the Iranian military budget. And where the heck was it going to come from? I remember having this debate with them. I said “Look you can't, you just can't have field exercises of this magnitude all year long.” You just can't do it. You couldn't do it at Fort Benning. But we got to understand each other very

well, and by and large, the whole thing worked out very well and there was a relationship established between us and the Embassy which was very different that had been the case before. Where there was—they were sort of at war with each other quietly.

*Q: What were the problems between the Embassy and the American military at that time?*

KENNEDY: The Embassy had concerns about the general economic situation. They were being largely guided by the AID mission people who saw great problems in the economic field and that the military build up was something that was causing great economic strain and would cause even greater economic strain as it continued. And the concept of you have to do this if you're going to create a kind of buffer in between the Russians and the Caspian Army and between the Russians and the Persian Gulf was something that they didn't particularly buy because the military was just a drain on the economy. My position was somewhere in between that, that you've got to do the right thing with the military but you've got to do it in some economic way if you can—some economical way if you can. So, I used to sit there and cast up budgets all of my own and try them out on the Iranians, and by and large, we began to see ways in which things could be done. I taught school everyday about modern financial management methods. I'll never forget that because they kept saying “Why don't you give us your manuals,” and I said, “Look, I'm not even sure the manuals are any good for us, much less you. But what we've got to do is you've got to design a system which you understand, which is associated with your activities—we'll talk about how to do that and you'll write the manual.” That worked very well. A young man, Ali—I can't remember his name—he was Ali, a young major who was my interpreter who was very good, very good. So the difficulty, the difficulty was the age old difficulty of the drain that the military was causing against the economy. Well, ultimately, that was not the case because when the Shah undertook his white revolution who do you suppose knew that beforehand? The military. The military provided the cadres to go to villages to set up little medical aid stations, where there never were any. The military provided school teachers. They would bring into the military by conscription young people out of high school and turn them into school teachers and send them as sergeants or corporals out to be school

teachers in villages where they didn't have schools. So you had to look at the culture and the culture involved a very important component.

*Q: We're talking about money and resources, and part of the culture there is, as you said before, everybody takes something off the thing. Now how, with the American system up against that system, how did you work within that system?*

KENNEDY: Well, I concluded, I think in a very pragmatic way that for me— well for the Americans in general—to overcome several centuries of inbred culture would be foolish. You couldn't do it. So what you wanted to do was create a system which made it more difficult for that sort of thing to happen. But don't concentrate on that—concentrate on a system which is dedicated to providing the resources necessary to do the job. Then any major funneling off causes the job to not get done. And that causes problems for the management. That was the concept that I developed. As I said, if you go looking at the 25 cents, nickel and diming that was going on all of the time, you'd be a total failure. I said don't do that—focus on how do you get the job done, what resources does it take to do it, define the resources. We had a very elaborate way to do that—well, not so elaborate, not really. We developed a whole new chart of accounts, which made the Finance Ministry crazy. They were just upset as hell. I said “Look, we can do this because this is managerially organized. When we have to report to the Finance Ministry, here's a cost-cutting arrangement. We drew these things and combine them in different ways and report to the finance ministry in the codes they want. But meanwhile, we'll run the business this way.” The military liked that. Now I don't know—well all I can say is that by the time I left we weren't providing anymore cash number 1, and number 2, the military budget was almost stable—slight increases—increases that were clearly defined. I can sit down and figure out—I knew how much hay it took—what hay, that was oil (laughing). Animal feed was another one, because they had all these animals. Anyway gasoline was the biggest problem, and of course, they had two or three armored divisions consuming gasoline like it was going out of style. It was a simple managerial approach to getting the job done and making sure that accountability rested on the senior commanders to get the job done, so

that if someone was stealing very much they wouldn't get the job done. There wouldn't be enough matter, there wouldn't be enough gasoline. And if you had calculated in the beginning the amount of gasoline it was going to take—the room that there was for major syphoning off was dramatically short, that was the whole point of the exercise. But don't go out and try to get every nickel and dime—you won't do it. You couldn't do it with a police man lurking outside my house—if I didn't pay him he didn't look after my house.

*Q: You left there in 1960, how was the Iran when you left, in your opinion?*

KENNEDY: Well, I thought it was going extremely well. I thought it was doing extremely well except that—and this was my own view then and I've never changed my view—except that the Americans with their ever-willing desire to see everything change—were persuaded to push the Shah into—in my judgement—into a lot of changes that were actually good—but too soon and too fast. You're trying to change not just social level, you're changing an entire culture. The whole social system was being changed. The Shah went too fast and lost control of it. And I've always thought that the Americans were in some—they can't be blamed for it, I mean the Shah could have said no—but he was being pushed constantly and execrably by the Americans to do more— beyond what I think was sensible. He alienated much of the landed class who, after all, were his principal supporters. He began alienating some of the military—that's the reason I went back there later—he began alienating some of the military because we were taking irrational views when the Shah came and looked MacNamara in the eyes and said “No thank you very much, I'm not interested.” That shook MacNamara up.

*Q: He was not interested in what, more military assistance?*

KENNEDY: No. MacNamara was going to tell him how he was going to substantially cut the military and certainly that he didn't need any frigates for the Persian Gulf. I was brought into that exercise...

*Q: This was during the...*

KENNEDY: This was 19—what year did I come back 61?—it was 1962. I was brought into that exercise by—I was back in Fort Monroe, was Chief of the Management division for that command and I was ordered to Washington to participate in a Joint Chiefs of Staff planning group to go to Iran. The name of the game was we would do a joint planning exercise with the Iranians from which would emerge a force structure and then from that we would determine the level of military assistance. Julius Holmes was there by that time as the Ambassador. I did get to know the Ambassadors personally—each one of them well. Which sometimes irritated my seniors because they felt that somehow or other I might be somehow disloyal to them—I was not, never. That didn't bother me any. I guess I had undertaken a world unto myself. I was engaged in this exercise—we were there for more than a month—longer—I can't remember now. We wrote up a very, very extensive study showing the forces that it would take to stop a major incursion through Meshed coming down through the plain into the desert, or down through Azerbaijan through Tabriz and what it would take to do all that. And I said “But gentleman, none of this has anything to do with anything. If you don't give the guy his three little frigates you aren't going to get anything, he's not going to agree with you. And if he doesn't need the god damned frigates then it's irrelevant, it's absolutely irrelevant. He's got those Admirals that he's got to take care of. He's got to take care of those guys. And if he doesn't, all the game playing we've done here is useless.” To make a long story short—I will tell a secret I suppose—General Twitchell was the chief of this exercise—we had gone back to try to get the Shah to agree to all of this. After it had been agreed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—got back and there was General Twitchell, me, Eddie Brusard—Colonel Brusard had been the Chief of the Arab mission—and Ambassador Holmes quietly said “Come in for a minute please.” So I went in and he said “ Now I don't want you to be disloyal, I'm not asking that, I simply want an answer to a question.” He said “ If I “, well he told me that Grace and Yatsevitch had already been up to talk to the Shah and the Shah said “No. Thank you very much, but I'm not interested in that proposition.” So he said [Ambassador Holmes], “ If I were to

send a telegraph back saying I must have the three frigates that the Shah has requested included in this package—without it we will not have an agreement, with it we will have an agreement exactly in the package as it was produced by the team and by the Secretary of Defense—how long would it take me to get an answer and what do you think the answer would be?" I said "Mr. Ambassador, if you phrased it clearly in the terms that you just put it—my guess is you would have an answer in about 72 hours and the answer would be affirmative." He sent that telegram totally back-channel obviously—directly to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and I was wrong—he got the answer in 48 hours and the answer was affirmative. And that was the end of the exercise—that's all the Shah wanted—and I told them that, I told them that before we ever went over there. I said " Look, this is all foolish, the key to this exercise is the Shah wants those three frigates and if he doesn't get them he's going to have a problem with his Navy. And those Admirals they don't look like much to you—but they are powerful political figures. You've just got to satisfy them."

*Q: This often is one of the things one has to realize—where power is and how you keep them happy.*

KENNEDY: And all the hard logic in the world isn't necessarily the answer—you go through all of the hard logic and say this is ridiculous. But then ask yourself what does it cost to get what you want. Is it worth it? Ultimately it was clearly was worth it.

*Q: This often depends on equipment that we have in the United States. Logic says we should get rid of this airplane or something, but the logic is that the airplane is produced in Senator so-and-so's back yard.*

KENNEDY: Whatever reason. Whatever good reason. In any case, I got through with that and, when I got back, I was then assigned—instead of going back to the beautiful place—the Continental Army Command at Fort Monroe. Had a lovely little house...

*Q: In Norfolk, yes.*

KENNEDY: I had a lovely little house, but instead I was transferred to the Army General Staff as a strategic planner and my desk mate was Alexander Haig. He left after a year.

*Q: You went there, you went to Strategic Planning in—when?*

KENNEDY: When I came back that was 1961, the end of 1961. It was in 1962 that I went back to Iran and that exercise in the spring. When I got back again late in 1962 in the summer, I guess, I was transferred to the Army General Staff Strategic Planning, that was in 1962. I was there for a year, largely concerned with NATO affairs, and then I was moved to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His personal assistant, who was Sol Horowitz, later became Assistant Secretary of Defense. I worked in Sol Horowitz's office for a year including a two month junket—junket that's the wrong word—to look at defense presence exclusive of the military commands, but the presence of military people in the Embassy structure—from Peshawar to Athens—everything in between. Great story there. We went to Jeddah and then we were going to go from Jeddah to Dhahran only we were going to stop in the capital in Riyadh. The chief of activities out in Dhahran had sent his C-54 out to pick us up in Jeddah, take us to Riyadh and go on to Dhahran. There was an Admiral in our group—Admiral Black who was a carrier Admiral—nice man, very nice man. He came from—he was the MAG Chief in Norway and he had been detailed to this exercise. In the morning we were all ready to go and he said “Look, I've got a deal for us, the MATC has an around the world C-130 flight it's in Jeddah and going to Riyadh tomorrow, and it will be a lot smoother ride in that C-130 than in that C-54 over that awful desert. It's terrible.” An airplane going over that desert—it will just kill you. Well, we thought that was great, what they didn't know was the guy that was in charge of that enterprise was a—he did a lot of other things on the side. Anyway, we all got in the C-130, which was not fit at all for passengers, and we flew. It was better than the C-54 would have been, but when we got to Riyadh we landed not out in front of the terminal where the C-54 would have gone but way over a mile on the other side, over where some sort of maintenance sheds

were. We got out of the airplane and you could see the terminal through this haze with its dust and sand in the air—you could just see through it. It's clear why you have mirages. And there's nothing—nothing but sand. The Admiral comes down and looks around and says “This certainly doesn't look like Norway.” I thought that was probably the height of understatement. I've never forgotten that. I use it all of the time, “This certainly doesn't look like Norway.” Subsequently, I went from there to the National War College; spent a lovely year and I wrote my thesis on the Shah's dark revolution and it was well received. It was a pretty good paper actually. I left there and became the West African desk officer in ISA.

*Q: You were there from 1965 to 1969 at ISA.*

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, let's talk about ISA. ISA stands for what and what was it? We're talking about 1965 through 1969.*

KENNEDY: ISA was International Security Affairs. It was the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense in the days before they loaded it up with more Under Secretaries and more Assistant Secretaries. It was a very powerful institution in the sense that it I think commanded considerable respect in the diplomatic and national security community at that time. I had been there very briefly before—Yes—At the end of the time when I participated (I think we talked about that) in the effort to help straighten things out in Iran. When I came back, I spent several weeks in the Office of Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS, preparing a presentation of the work and findings of the committee that had gone to Iran, and I was part of it. Then I was put on temporary duty in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for ISA.

*Q: Who was the Assistant Secretary at that time?*

KENNEDY: John McMilliagan and the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, I believe, at that time was the brother of the National Security Advisor. I can't remember isn't that terrible.

*Q: Well these names can be added.*

KENNEDY: He later became Assistant Secretary of State.

*Q: William Bundy?*

KENNEDY: Yes, that's exactly right. I had found it an interesting and challenging atmosphere. So when I was asked if I would like to undertake this after the War College, I said yes. During my time at the War College I had two things in mind. One was the possibility that I might do that, although that was not certainly by any means clear. And also on the theory that I had been to Europe, I had lived in the Middle East there were three areas to which visits by the classes might go. And I decided that the most unlikely for me to travel to in the future would be Africa, and therefore I decided that if I, could go I would like to go on the trip to Africa. I must say that I found that simply fascinating. And I have never regretted doing that. In any case, ISA had a very, very major part to play in arms control issues, which in those days were not on the forefront if you recall.

*Q: No, this is high Vietnam.*

KENNEDY: It had a major role to play in Vietnam, of course. It also supervised the Office of the Assistant or whatever he was called—the Director I guess he was called of Foreign Assistance, which was the military aid program. I guess it was called military assistance, the Office of Director of Military Assistance. He was a Lieutenant General or Admiral or something like that. It had a major role in NATO affairs. In particular, I recall one because in my earlier incarnation for a brief time—a year or so—I had been in NATO affairs in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, in Strategic Plans. I knew a lot of those fellows too. What was its role? Its role was, in a very clear and positive sense, they called it the other guys State Department, that's what people spoke of it as. It had a role in the planning of security affairs and in the implementation of security affairs all the way from treaty negotiation exercises and in particular NATO matters, down to military assistance matters.

Military assistance, of course, in those days reached around the globe. It's unlike today where there are competing interests in the Pentagon—there are in a sense two ISA's; one of them is called ISA, the other one is called IMP, International Security Policy—it's never very clear to me how one separates policy and planning from operation; since they obviously should be continual. And, indeed, the Army staff—and I don't mean to suggest that this is right in all respects but it worked well on a balance—always functioned with a Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of plans and operations. So the two things were integral and related all aspects—so it was in those days in the ISA of John McNorton. The Deputy, William Bundy, was not the principal Deputy as I recall; it might have been Paul Nitze who was the principal Deputy—he was there in any case and subsequently became the Assistant Secretary when John McNorton was killed in an airplane accident. Nitze became the Assistant Secretary shortly thereafter—I can't recall these things very well now—but shortly thereafter Will Bundy went to the State Department as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, therefore Vietnam. Which had been one his principal concerns in ISA. Subsequently, Nitze became Secretary of Navy and Paul Warnke arrived on the scene as Assistant Secretary. I've had the occasion to know Paul off and on since. Indeed, just saw him the other day and recalled that we had not been serving—as it were— together in a great many years. He laughed and said it is a great many years. His Deputy became the fellow who is now the Deputy Director of ACDA and was for some years a lawyer, as I recall from Philadelphia, nice fellow, a good guy.

*Q: I'd like to have you focus more on kind of what you were...*

KENNEDY: What I did?

*Q: Yes.*

KENNEDY: All right. Well, everything African. It was at the early stage; as you recall, the early 1960's was the great movement towards independence. All those great African patriots appeared on the scene. N'Komo and Muzorewa, Houphouet-Boigny—he was

a different breed of character, he was more or less sensitive—the rest of them, I must say I felt were perhaps well motivated but not necessarily. In any case, we were seeking major programs including security, and in those days the most accurate voice security program was the Congo which was, among other things, my beat. There were many programs, I think most of them were associated with helping the Congolese—that great leader [Mobutu] who has been there ever since and is rumored to have more resources in Switzerland than the rest of the country. The Belgians obviously had major a interest in the situation, it having been their colony and indeed an area in which they had a huge investment and lots and lots of Belgians living here, and the effort war to find out how we and they could bring in the Italians, because the Italians had a considerable interest in oil in the region, I think at Cabina on the coast. They had a considerable interest, I can't remember the name of the oil company but the Italian oil company ENI or something, I don't remember. They had a particular, considerable interest, and the idea was to see how we could merge our interests and particularly how we could maximize, if you would, the impact of whatever assistance in whatever categories we might be able to provide. And how we could in a sense integrate these things so that we're getting more “bang for the buck”, so to speak. That was what we were trying to do. As to the rest of the continent, well everybody talks about Africa—there are 50 Africa's, I suppose. They're all different. Interests are obviously going to be different. It's to be recalled that in those days Rhodesia was still Rhodesia and people—Mr. Smith—were trying to continue to keep it Rhodesia.

*Q: This is Ian Smith.*

KENNEDY: We had are own views in fact. I suspect in the long term we were right, but in the short term it was hard to see how that was going to play out. We had concerns about South Africa.

*Q: With Rhodesia, what were the short term negative consequences as you saw them? Because we're trying to go back to that period.*

KENNEDY: Well I think—I can't recall anymore what policies and so on were, but I can tell you what my own impressions were, for whatever they might be worth. I think a lot of them would naturally reflect what the general policy line was to the extent that from my perspective it seemed to made sense and, if it didn't, I would try to express my view. I think the short term problem was the possibility of flight both of personnel and capital, and I think early on that was a problem which seemed to be a real one. There also was a component to that, the natural interest on the part of the outs to become in's and to swallow up the whole place—gather all powers of government into their own hands without any conception of how to do it. No background—no experience whatever or almost none, and so that seemed to me to be a short term negative for the country. It's something that had to be thought about as the inevitable course of history unfolded itself. Nonetheless one didn't want to seek guidance in many respects. Which countries and economies collapsed, I did watch that process in the Congo from the time that I first visited it in 1963, or 1964. That was just after Independence the rebellions were still going on. Even then you could see what was then Leopoldville: a beautiful, beautiful place beginning to show the signs of deterioration. I was upset because I thought here was an enormous continent with huge diversity with all kinds of potential at that time largely, I thought, in the agricultural and mineral areas—so it wasn't the United States at that time. Those are the beginning stages of development and, if you do it right, you build infrastructure as you use your resources to acquire a strong capital. I don't think we handled that very well—maybe it's not possible, but I remember that was the “take-off” theory. I never did think that would work out—it sounded great.

*Q: It sounded great, this was an economist, Walt Rostow. Well, tell me, again I'm trying to catch the spirit of the times—you're a military man in the Pentagon, looking at the Congo...*

KENNEDY: Let me say something about that—there was then, I don't know whether it still exits but there certainly was then—I think there was a feeling in the State Department, at

the time, that military officers were, by and large, pretty narrow in scope—didn't have the big picture, didn't understand...

*Q: I think this is inaccurate...*

KENNEDY: They didn't have the concepts of global concern and they were probably too blunt and I think that's fair—they probably were. They were not accustomed to double speak and certainly not the ultimate language of diplomacy which always seems to be a somewhat—well, I'll come to that some other time. I think there was that sort of feeling. Now you had people like Mac Godley who was in the Congo and his private little crew. He got these people together—I found them in Vientiane seven years later—the same crowd. Well, that's not a bad way to do things. You get your team and it works.

*Q: Were referring to the CIA, I mean this is diplomatic speak.*

KENNEDY: They were in connection with that other agency and their ability to produce resources in connection with the rebellions. Godley had a substantial respect for the military. My predecessor, whose name I can't recall now, was considered part of the team — as was his military attach# who I came to know, who became a neighbor, who is long gone—I don't remember or almost remember—but there was that sort of feeling but as a general matter you didn't see much of that. Now, I guess I knew better and in fact, by and large, would expect more—because of my experiences in the Iran situation. Which I think I have probably recalled for you, I came having been invited to come in and talk with some of the people in the State Department who were worrying then about Iran—and I do mean the word worry in the real sense. And asked not to be disloyal to my boss but to, in any way possible, try to establish a relationship with the economic counselor in the Embassy—which I did. And I became totally accepted as a member of the team.Somehow they thought—they did think that I had have this sort of relationship and understood these things—in a way somewhat different from the normally hard-headed , straight-arrow military type. You know what? You really don't want a bunch of Italian commanders

running the Embassy. On the other hand you don't want a bunch of Embassy commanders running your battalions. In a sense, therefore—and I'm not trying to impute anything to my own competence or anything of the sort—I was welcomed into the circle and when I would visit which I did a couple of times a year to the barracks—I would always be welcomed, not just by the military attach# which was normal, but rather by political counselors and the Ambassadors—several of whom I came to know— many of whom I came to know and highly regarded and respected. I remember Dean Brown—I have a funny story. We had a task force on the Congo and I remember one day he said, “Kennedy this is all backwards, you're writing the tables and were doing the analysis. You shouldn't be writing these tables—but you do it well.” I remember that. Another time—we were walking down the hall—somebody came running out with a “Roger-Channel” message.

*Q: Roger Channel being a...?*

KENNEDY: A “Roger-Channel” being a private channel or an off-line channel—double encrypted, dealing with intelligence matters through the Ambassadorial channels. This message apparently conveyed that (we had been worrying about an impending invasion from Angola of the troops going into the Katanga) and word came that they had by air identified a column. I can't remember precisely—but it was like four men on foot and three men on bicycles.

*Q: A spearhead.*

KENNEDY: Brown looked at me and said “My God our task force out numbers them.” Well, to say how did we relate—it was in that kind of daily contact and with the best officers. Some of those fellows I'm still in touch with—they call, they write.

*Q: Was there any feeling at the time—I mean there was a big debate on should we keep the Congo together or Katanga seemed it had the mineral resources, there were very large industrial companies, particularly in Belgium, but also with American interests involved—to*

*say “The hell with it, we've got almost a tame situation here where we can run it and use it —milk it—develop it—whatever term you want.”*

KENNEDY: There were a couple of problems with that, as I recall. You know it's been 25 years ago. A couple of problems with that. One, whereas the mineral thing is still there—the copper and the diamonds and everything else is still there and still to be exploited—but you had to get it out of there then, so Benguela railroad, I think, you had to protect. It ran through other parts of the Congo and through Angola, so you had to have the vanour security force involved and, of course, the vanour had their own domestic affairs and activities. So they were, I don't know, I would guess that they were not wildly enthusiastic about seeing the Congo or the Katanga split off. The other problem was, what are you going to do with the rest of it? As a total entity it could conceivably be economically viable ,and therefore, in those days people thought economically viable, therefore probably politically viable. Without the Katanga, the rest of it was insupportable, so therefore people would see that as the potential for great instability—for the potential of instability didn't arise only from that category but from the others that I said—inability to govern. And that's not a condemnation, it's simply a reflection of the facts—people say “Oh that's racist.” No, it's not racist, it is simply saying that some people had the experience, some people had the training and because of those things and a measure of competence that allows them to step in and do a job of governing. Everybody doesn't have that and if you wind up with a large group—a large group being the principal group of people who would come into your governing situation without any experience, without any training, you're going to have trouble. The best of them are going to have trouble. Even if you've got a handful of pretty good ones, and so the worry was that all of these things together would lead to greater and greater instability—well that happened to be true as we saw. There was also I think, a worry although it became much more important much later, I think, that as the situations gradually would become politically unstable there was almost—it was almost a given that socialism, if not communism, would raise it's ugly head and indeed it did.

*Q: We're talking about the Soviet Union.*

KENNEDY: That was the general security situation—exactly. We were not—it was obvious even in those Congo days over covert low level efforts of intervention. The Soviets were I'd like to think, calling it playing games from time to time. We were being serious and they were more or less serious, knowing I think, that the basic cards were on their side of the table. They didn't have to do very much to try to offset that basic information for moving left, left, left—we had to do a great deal more. I think that was the General's strategic geopolitical view of the time.

*Q: While you were there in ISA, were there any plans at any time to say well we might have to put troops in? Were we looking at having contingency plans?*

KENNEDY:Oh, I'm sure there were contingency plans on top of contingency plans, but that doesn't mean anything. That's just—if you go down to the Joint Chief of Staff I'm sure that if you go in room 26 you will find file cabinets full of contingency plans for the most unlikely things in the world. But you know that's their business. People don't understand that. Of course, if there wasn't a contingency plan you ought to be worried.

*Q: But there's a difference between contingency plans and really being concerned and saying "At a certain level, we may have to put troops down there."*

KENNEDY: I do not think so. I do not think so. That was one of the concerns that we felt was essentially a European concern. The French were there—large activities—which, of course, they always did. They've got the troops and reinforce them from time to time in their areas of West Africa. The British less so; the Belgians were prepared and, from time to time, brought troops in to try to help quell serious disturbances. I don't think we ever did, but what we did do, of course—and I don't think there is any secret there anymore—is engage in covert action in the Congo. We did a lot, a great deal, but not by way of putting in troops. We ran all the airports, helping the Congolese Air Force. Here's a funny story

that I think I can recall: Among other things I would be called upon from time to time to try to help make sure that the little Congolese airport would receive C-28's—little trainers—I think they had six. There was an urgent need, according to Godley, and he was very good. Mac was excellent at phrasing his needs with this sense of urgency that would curl the hair on the back of your neck—the world is coming very close to cataclysm. In any case, he was very persuasive and I was frequently being called upon to try to figure out how we were going to get some more C-28's. The Navy had them. The Navy believed that they had a genuine concern for them because they were the basic training aircraft. And they weren't about to give these things up and I can't recall all of the details—it was too damn complicated. Anyway, I finally was able to pry three othere things out. These were things that were not on the top drawer of the concerns of the Secretary of Defense. He was concerned with 26 Soviet Divisions and Sector A. We were able to pry three of there things loose—had them moved and this took an effort, had to get money to do this and get people to agree to do this. The Air Force finally picked these things up in C-130's and flew them someplace where the other agency was able to equip them with some machine guns under the wings and these things were now ready for combat. So they were dismantled and packed into the C-130's and flown over to Leopoldville and the Western International Ground Maintenance Organization—WIGMO, I remember it well, was a fantastic organization, not very big in numbers but in competence outstanding, they could build airplanes which later they did—they put these things in great shape and sent them off to the Eastern Congo in the region of Bukavu where problems existed and these guys were going out to contribute to helping get the tribesman to quit doing bad things. Nobody ever heard from them again. I've always thought someday somebody is going to run across a tribe of pygmies out there in the bush somewhere which has a culture based upon this incredible thing which came down from the heavens and made a big hole in the ground—knocked down trees and set itself down as kind of a monument.

*Q: I've heard the same type story about things going to the Congo and the great efforts to put patrol vessels on Lake Victoria and they kind of went there—they were put together by Seabee's and within a very short time they sank.*

KENNEDY: Well, at least they sank. We don't know what happened to these. There were lots of little stories that were sort of humorous. In the end, totally aside from what happened in Shaba and that was long before my time—totally aside from that destabilizing situation and totally aside from the fact that Mobutu was obviously playing games of his own and milking the country dry totally aside from all that—on balance we did maintain, by hook or crook, a certain measure of stability and that was the whole purpose of the exercise. To maintain a measure of stability—try to create a pattern of governance that would be effective and an economic climate which would help bring the country up by its boot straps and essentially restore it to a substantially economic viable not only economically viability, but an economically-genuinely-productive economy. That was the point of the exercise and, to the extent that was the point of the exercise, I think for some years we succeeded, but not with the long-term effects that I might have hoped might result. There were different attitudes—elsewhere in the continent if you look on the North African Mediterranean littoral, the whole war was different there. There we remember we lost Wheelus Au Bare—a major, major impact upon our security posture. We invested greatly in Morocco in an effort to keep that a viable entity—Western oriented. There we were successful. Even to this day they are reasonable successful. Algeria—by that time Algeria, of course, had achieved independence and was going through post-independence trauma. Egypt was coming off the Suez crisis.

*Q: That was in October of 1956. In the time you were there you also had the 1967 war which was later known as the Six Day War.*

KENNEDY: Indeed we did. Then we had the much bigger one later. I was in the hospital at the time. That obviously had an enormous effect upon Egypt. I've read some things about that which I think are probably reasonably accurate. It may well have been the

beginnings of the insurgency of legions even though that, by and large, destroyed the military establishment. If you were to take the continent and break it into pieces—you could break the North African littoral conceptually in one group—our view, that is the United States view, was based upon direct security concerns which oscillated at the relationship with Europe and the Middle East which of course also was being used in the context of Europe. Then you've got East Africa where there was not only Rhodesia but also Mozambique, major colonial activities continuous to South Africa and Southwest Africa, and then on the west it ran down through the French-British colonies down to the former Belgian territories and then Angola. I think—there were differences—they were all different. Our attitude about South Africa was ambivalent. South Africa we perceived as being an important geopolitical concern for us because of the transfer around the Cape. A major uproar about a carrier coming to make a port call at Cape Town—they had to keep the carrier off—couldn't bring it in because of policy having to do with the apartheid problem.

*Q: Well, we had obviously a mixed crew with many black or African Americans and we could not bring it into a port where they would not be treated equally with the whites.*

KENNEDY: That was helpful because that gave us a reason, I think. Even if that reason hadn't existed we would have had to have found another one.

*Q: Well, what about Kagnew Station and could you tell us about what you did?*

KENNEDY: Well, I suspect it was very, very highly operational. In the sense that we're not sitting there and making grand speeches—plans.

*Q: What about one last thing maybe on the African side, what about Kagnew Station, does that show up at all on your...*

KENNEDY: Oh, you bet. Kagnew Station—I have no way now recalling and I'm not sure that I was ever fully aware what it did then. I've learned subsequently that it was a major

loss—a major loss. That also has to be put in context—it was a major loss, given the technologies of that time. As the technologies exploded, if one looked, one could see that maybe it wasn't such a major loss, and, after all, it could be made up.

*Q: We're talking about, it was both a communications station, a relay station and a collection station?*

KENNEDY: Oh yes. My recollection was that the relay station was not such a major problem. For one thing, people were already talking about Diego Garcia, and you could move there. Also there were the facilities in the Mediterranean—Crete.

*Q: Well there's Nea Makri, I think, in Athens. That's for the Navy anyway. And Crete also had a facility for collection.*

KENNEDY: My recollection is those considerations went into play a major effort was made to keep it but, by the same token, contingency planning was underway for what happens if we lose it? Losing it, I think, was inevitable. I don't think there's anyway to buy it off.

*Q: You were looking at Africa at the time. Were we definitely tilting toward Ethiopia versus Somalia as far as equipment participation?*

KENNEDY: Yes. Yes. And Kagnew Station had a major impact in all of that.

*Q: I recall almost everything that we did was all centered around Kagnew Station. I was the Intelligence Research Officer for the Horn of Africa in 1969, and Kagnew Station was the focus.*

KENNEDY: Oh yes. There wasn't any doubt about that and military assistance, for example—well, economic assistance as well in Ethiopia—was a major cut above all the rest of Southern Africa area except Diego. That's my recollection. There were major programs in Ethiopia. Major programs in Libya and Morocco in those days. Those were

major programs as contrasted with the Congo. The rest of them were relatively small modest things—nothing at all—not even police type things in South Africa.

*Q: In 1969 you moved over—a very important switch—you went to the National Security Counsel where you served...*

KENNEDY: Before that happened—I don't remember what year that was, 1967 maybe—I was approached by my leaders in the Army personnel operations, and they said we would very much like to request your release from ISA to become the Controller of—what was it called?—MACV.

*Q: This is Military Assistance Command Vietnam?*

KENNEDY: Yes. That was General Westmoreland. I talked to the exec officer at ISA, and they said “Well gee, we're not going to be happy about this, but on the other hand we're not going to step in the way, because that's a major career move for you and we wouldn't step in the way, but that decision is going to have to be up to you, we're not going to encourage it.” I said “All right.” So my wife and I talked about it—I remember this because we were actually looking at little cassette players to record messages so that we could send them back and forth to other each and that sort of thing—and I had looked over my uniform stock and then one day my father-in-law had a minor stroke. He had had a couple of previous ones and he was clearly not well. I got to thinking—I remember this very well, because it was a wrenching decision—he, I was persuaded, was really not very long for this world and, if something happened to him, my wife was there with him alone—no one else in the family left—and I just thought that was putting a burden on her that wasn't conscionable from my point of view. So I told the people in personnel, I said “Thanks very much, but I can't do this.” They said “Well, you know, that's okay. We've got a lot of people that would be delighted.” And I said “I'm sure you do and they'll all get to be General's and I won't, but that's okay.” So there's a lot more to living. So I didn't go. Eight months later, my father-in-law died, as a matter of fact he died on the Fourth of July. So my basic

information was correct. So I continued to serve in ISA, and the time came that I should be leaving and I got a call from Al Haig, who you recall from my previous conversation, was my desk mate in the Operations and Strategic Plans office in the Army staff and he said”What are you doing?” and I said “I'm about to move out and I don't know to what.” So he said, “Well, let me get back to you,” and then I got a call asking if I could come over and have a chat with Mr. Kissinger and I did.

*Q: He was that time National Security Advisor.*

KENNEDY: One month later, I was invited to join the staff.

*Q: What month was this?*

KENNEDY: I recall 1969, it was in the summer.

*Q: So the Nixon Administration...*

KENNEDY: Brand new. You'll recall that, at that time, there were a number of people who were there who left quickly. One of them was Morton Halperin. I was not privy to any of that except to know that he had gone—I knew that because I came to occupy his office for a temporary time while they converted mine. My office was the one occupied by Richard Allen who subsequently became the first National Security Advisor of Reagan. I remember that because I went over, and they said this will likely be your office, and it had an executive sandbox in the office—I found that very impressive.

*Q: What is an executive sandbox?*

KENNEDY: A sandbox, a little child's sandbox sitting on the floor. For what? I don't know. I concluded I didn't need it, whatever it was for.

*Q: When you went there, what did they tell you your job was going to be?*

KENNEDY: Well, you have to understand how that place functions—you learn what your job is by imputation. You inferred what is was from vague comments made in passing, on one hand, and by things that other people with whom you would have interface would say like “now I guess I'm supposed to bring this to you.” Well, why not? What my job was supposed to be war planning and analysis. There was a person—Bob Osgood—very, very, fine man who was supposed to be the broad planner, but what I ultimately—within a matter of a few weeks or months—ascertained was that I was supposed to somehow make that system work. The system was a very good one. It was based upon the one that General Goodpaster had originally created in the Eisenhower Administration. And I think he was as a matter of fact, instrumental in designing it for Kissinger. It was a very highly articulated system which was based upon two principles—one, that the President deserved and the seniors deserved the broadest possible input to their decision-making and, two, that this input had to be distilled in a way that it would retain all of its basics and flavor, but be readable—readable in the sense that you could understand it and, secondly, that it was brief enough that you could expect busy people to actually consume it. So, in time, every paper that went to the senior groups which Kissinger chaired—Kissinger chaired them all—or to the President either as a memorandum or as a National Security Document, all of them, would come to my desk and I would be in the exercise from the beginning. As documents and paperwork were developed, they would come to my desk, and I would ask many questions and also make certain that in all cases the views of all the principal officers were clearly articulated and not in any way biased by the writers—in other words, the views of the Secretary of Defense or Chiefs or whoever.

*Q: You're talking about the writers in the NSC, were doing this...*

KENNEDY: Or the Departments.

*Q: Yes. But I mean people that were below the people whose views these were?*

KENNEDY: Yes. That's correct. So that was one thing I did. I was sitting in my office, contemplating what I don't remember, when I got a call from Haig to “Get over here right away.” You've got to understand Haig which I did, and I got to know him extremely well. So I went over there. My office was in the old EOB and, of course, they were in the basement of the West Wing. He said, “Get down there in that situation room, take a pad and pencil.” Those were my instructions. How does that grab you? So I get down there, and I found myself with General Wheeler (he was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time), Richard Helms the Director of the CIA, Alex Johnson who was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and who else—whoever at the time was the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Well, I didn't know what the hell I was doing there. I walked in and they looked at me, but didn't pay any attention and kept on talking. Kissinger wasn't there. Kissinger came back and it became evident that what they were talking about was operational matters. So that's how I sort of became Executive Secretary of the Contingency Planning Exercise Company Organization, and from then on, I became increasingly the executive secretary of everything—not the executive secretary of the NSC because Kissinger never had an executive secretary he didn't want one. I was the secretary and the planner and the note taker for the senior review group which was a political exercise of the contingency planning exercise—the WASAG—the intelligence group. The one thing I didn't do was—there was a group involved entirely with the arms control exercise, SOLE or whatever they were calling it then yes SOLE—I was aware of that and I would look at the papers, but I didn't have anything to do with it. I was also the person responsible for the preparation of the papers for the National Security Council meetings and to make the reports of those meetings and to issue—from all of these meetings—whatever instructions were to flow out to the departments—implementation of the decisions made. So that's what I did.

*Q: Who controls the paperflow controls everything. But you came there basically, I take it, without your own sort of personal agenda and maybe this is why you would be a good person for that.*

KENNEDY: I had no agenda. I had no agenda.

*Q: You think this is one of the reasons why...*

KENNEDY: I don't have any idea. I really don't have any idea—but I didn't have any objectives. I think I wrote fairly well—I was supposed to be—Kissinger himself may have said once but I'm not certain but somebody said that I was—the devil's advocate. Before things came to the table I was supposed to have looked into what—remember that phrase they used to say—"What are the hookers in here," try to determine what could be done.

*Q: Well, I would think that you would be under tremendous pressure from people who would say, "Well that isn't what we decided," or "What do you mean by questioning this?". We're talking about very articulate, very strongly-motivated people.*

KENNEDY: Strongly biased.

*Q: We were talking about how you dealt with the pressures that were put on you because you were writing the action papers, and the action papers of course are the ultimate. You had people coming at you—could you, did you get support, I would assume, from Henry Kissinger?*

KENNEDY: Of course. The one thing about which I never had any doubt was that I had the confidence and support of Henry Kissinger and Al Haig, and I think fairly soon when Haig would depart—go off on a trip somewhere which he did often in connection with the Vietnam business—I would be asked to go over and sit in Haig's office. In other words, being Kissinger's temporary aid. That obviously conveyed a sense of cachet and people recognized therefore that if I called up and said, "Henry would like the following..." that there wasn't any sense in calling up Henry because Henry would say "That's what he said, that's what he said.".

*Q: Could you give me your impressions of how Henry Kissinger operated. And we're talking about the NSC.*

KENNEDY: Well, gee, I'd like to think about that awhile. How he operated? He obviously intended and succeeded in dominating the whole process. Now he did this in a very quiet, low-key way, very, very shrewd, very astute. He used the NSC staff as a sounding board and as a vehicle for expanding his own reach and used the staff as a means of controlling the whole process, and I don't think there is any doubt that he did control the whole process. There was one simple rule that he said to me—I remember when he said it—he said “Richard, one thing I want never to happen, two things really, two things I want never to happen—I don't want a paper to go to the President which does not fairly represent the views of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and whoever else is a principal in the matter. I don't want them to say that the paper that went to the President over my signature didn't fairly represent their views—that's the first—and secondly, I don't want ever to be told by the President 'Henry, you didn't tell me.' I never want to be in a position, nor should any of us be in a position, of having failed to be sure that the President knew everything that he needed to know concerning decisions he had to make. I Don't want to be in a position of 'But Henry you didn't tell me.' “Now I took those two restrictions very, very much to heart and I must say that I had the opportunity unfortunately to look through some papers recently—well not recently, a couple of years ago— because of Congressional inquiries, and I must say that we scrupulously observed those rules, scrupulously. Now what Henry would put on as his personal note to the President was another matter. Sometimes I would know, other times I wouldn't until he had done it. He had thought about it. When a paper was ready for discussion, we would have a kind of pre-briefing discussion and many times he'd say this thing isn't ready, “I don't understand this problem, and if I don't understand it, I'm not going to conduct a meeting, go ahead and cancel it.” He'd do it once in awhile. The name of the game of course was to avoid that, and the name of the game was also to keep the process moving. Now that's very hard to do when you've got a fellow like Henry Kissinger, who is conceptualizing 24 hours a day.

I think he was conceptualizing in the middle of the night. That's different from having to sit down and come to a conclusion or a decision, that's different and particularly different from having to bring together the proponents and antagonists, if you will, who were in the government in a way that you could elicit from them something of a consensus, but a consensus that was based upon a clear perception of what was in the national interest. That's what the name of the game was, I think, and it's not because I had anything to do with it. My role was always very small, but I believe worked very, very well. In subsequent administrations, I found it didn't work very well and I think that the reason was twofold, perhaps one, that the individuals who were the security advisors didn't perceive the necessity. For, however evolving and however broad their own thinking and scope may well be, there has to be an orderliness about the whole thing. I think that wasn't perceived. The extent to which order in a system generates the kind of decision-making which is based upon a thorough going collection, analysis and distillation of the facts, I think is not as widely understood as it should be.

*Q: I would think though that you would have order, you would see the papers go up to the President through the National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, which you would write up and then you were supposed to, essentially, tell people what to do after they came back?*

KENNEDY: Right. The process though was simple. A.) I would be present. B.) The President very often—sometimes the President would decide right there at the table—he had thought about it and everybody had a chance to express themselves and what they said didn't surprise him because he'd already been briefed on what they were going to say or what their views ostensibly were from that papers coming from them. More often than not, he would say, “Well thank you very much, I'm going to think about this and I'll let you know my decision.” In such a case, I had a meeting with Kissinger and would say the President's views are essentially the following. I would sit down and craft this into a draft of a decision memorandum from the President, and Henry would present it to the President—

sometimes there would be some admonition, most often not and the President would sign it.

*Q: Now the President says he wants to think about this, but you, then, you would go back with Kissinger and say well the President is probably going to go this course, or would you... KENNEDY: Well, the President and Henry would have discussed this.*

*Q: So this would be sometime later?*

KENNEDY: Well, it may be the next day, or maybe that day—later.

*Q: So, did you sort of keep particular files of ones that...*

KENNEDY: Oh, of course. Yes, sure. Sure. From the review group, from the special action group I would draft my impressions of what the decisions were and, if these were agreeable to Kissinger, out they went.

*Q: Well now,...*

KENNEDY: There was another thing I should tell you. Kissinger said at one point “Richard, don't forget that the fellow that writes the cable is the fellow who really articulates the decision.” He said “Therefore, one of the things I want to be sure you do is you must clear every single instruction cable arising out of one of these decision meetings.” And I learned very, very clearly how wise he was because the cables were being written by people who didn't necessarily agree with the decisions and very subtly would withdraw from those decisions. So, I would have to change them. That did not necessarily endear me, however, to the people I was dealing with who were of the order of Bill Sullivan, and Alex Johnson and the present Ambassador in Moscow, Tom Pickering, and these guys would smile and very soon you didn't have that problem anymore. Well, what can I say? All I can say is that it worked, and it worked very well. It made enormous amounts of—many decisions, many times on the Vietnam front this was almost always handled—not always but a lot

of it was handled in the Washington Special Action Group, this was on-going, continual. And it ran the gambit of secondary policy making to operational decisions which, of course, have their own policy implications. Then occasionally there would be a major exercise or looking at a major direction of policy which would be something for the review group—the senior review group very possibly for a decision by the President. They were—it's been a long time, but my recollection is that they were consistent. They weren't what you've seen I think—or what I've seen maybe from the outside where you at it differently perhaps particulary in the last 2 or 3 years of the Bush administration—a not wholly coherent and consistent approach. Jumping like this—that's unnerving to me whose sense of order is important.

*Q: Well, you have your sense of order, but you were dealing with two people who, probably more that anybody else, certainly in the present day, have been psycho-analyzed to death. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, two very secretive people, on many different levels devious is a term that...*

KENNEDY: Let me say something about the President. My impression of the President, for whom I had the highest personal regard, was—and you're right he'd been psychoanalyzed until we're all blue in the face and I've read more books about Nixon then anybody else since I was in college that he didn't quickly trust people. You had to earn his trust. He had to be satisfied that you were thinking sensibly and correctly. He wanted to be certain of what I suppose was loyalty—I mean anybody wants that, right? Well, he'd been around the wars long enough to know that there's loyalty and there's loyalty. And, so some people thought—any maybe he was—he had a almost paranoid fear that people were not trustworthy and there were people he could not count on. Maybe that was the case, I don't know that. I can only say that, because of the situation in which I would find myself very frequently indeed, as time went on in these negotiations between both sides of the issue of Vietnam with the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese and with the Chinese and the Russians and everybody else. And the fact that I would really frequently would be sitting in Henry Kissinger's office or behind Henry Kissinger's desk and therefore, would

be called upon to see the President. Somehow or other—I don't know how, maybe it was because, I don't know, I had no hidden agendas—I became one of those people he trusted. I could tell you lots of stories.

*Q: I'd like to hear some.*

KENNEDY: Well, for example, it was Thanksgiving and Henry was in Paris, and Henry would frequently send back these very lightly personal reports to the President which I duly, without comment, put a little ticket on, “Henry wanted to be sure that you had this, Mr. President,” and I'd get it to him at night. It was Thanksgiving, I had been at the office. I was home, and indeed I was across the street with some friends and my wife for dinner, just the four of us; we were old friends—and the phone rang, and it was the President —now, this impressed my host—so I went and I'll remember this until the day I die— I went in and there was a little tiny note pad. It was in the hallway with almost no light, just a little overhead thing that conveyed almost no light, just enough so you wouldn't trip over the carpet and the telephone. I answered the telephone, and he said, “Colonel, you know, I think I read Henry's latest over again, and I think we need to give him a little encouragement; we need to see if we can buck him up a little because I think he feels down and tired.” And I said “Well, Mr. President, I must say that that too was my impression in reading. I think that, if he were to get a word of encouragement from you, it would be enormously appreciated.” I thought that was diplomatic as hell— I was learning. And he said, “All right, let me give you some thoughts.” So I scribbled as he was giving me these thoughts. He thought I was in the basement, in the office, so he said, “Do you suppose that we could get that off to him right away?”, and I said “Yes sir, I think so. I'll put it together and we'll get it off.” He said, “I really appreciate that.”

So I sent for a car . A car comes and picks me up and takes me down, and I work this all out and make sure that I've got it all squared away and the phone rings and it's the President. “Yes Mr. President.” He said, “Have you got that off yet?” and I thought to myself, “Oh, no”, and I said “Yes sir, it's gone.” And he said, “Oh, that's a shame. I just

thought of something.” And I said, “That's no problem Mr. President, we'll just signal him that an addition is coming. Don't worry, it will be all put together in Paris.” So he gave me that additional thought and I repeated it back to him and he said “Yes, got it right, exactly. I hope this is going to make him feel a little better, because he's been working awfully hard.” and I said “Yes sir and I know he's going to appreciate it.” So I quickly attended to the thing and sent it out. Actually, I did send it in two pieces, because I was assuming that Bob Haldeman would probably see it.

*Q: He was the President's Chief of Staff?*

KENNEDY: Yes, who also was a fellow who was never anything but courteous, kind andconsiderate to me. People said he was an ogre. I never found that to be the case, never found that to be the case. I found him to be very, very smart, very hard-headed guy. When the two of them would be away—I'll tell you another story. The President is gone now, bless his soul.

I had been at the office until about two o'clock in the morning. I had a kind of fetish when the evening would come and seven o'clock would arrive and the phone would quit ringing and the phone was from the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Chairman who could call all of the time, or Alex Johnson, Elliot Richardson, whoever, those were the phone calls so you took them. You didn't say no. I always did my best to listen. The staff had their own problems, people were away and we had to keep the process going and so I'd try to help make sure that they felt comfortable. Anyway, seven o'clock or thereabout, things would quiet down and at that point I would sit down and start to try to go through all of the paper that had come to me that day. Lots and lots of which had to go to the President. A lot of it was not of earth-shaking consequence, simply requiring that his attention be drawn to it, because of some law that he had to do it. In any case, I would go through all of this stuff, so sometimes it was pretty late before I'd get home. I didn't want the stuff to pile up. Some years later I visited the Office of the National

Security Advisor—well, indeed it wasn't that many years later—and I saw this stuff, all this stuff, going out.

*Q: We're talking about a few rather small piles...*

KENNEDY: I'm talking about piles you could hardly see over and that meant that an awful lot of stuff that was supposed to have been decided, or that people were waiting on, was sitting there. I didn't accept that, I didn't believe that.

*Q: No.*

KENNEDY: If I didn't want to deal with it when I had it, I'd set it behind me, and before I go home, I want that stuff out of there. Whatever needed to be done with it, I wanted it done. Well, so it was two-thirty or so in the morning and that was not uncommon. I was dead tired, and I didn't get up—I woke up about seven o'clock. I guess I was in the shower. Seven-thirty my wife knocked on the shower door and said “Dick, the President is on the phone.” I said, for God's sake, why didn't you tell him I was on my way to the office?” she said “Because you're not, I couldn't lie to him.” So, he said, “I'm going to be in the office in a matter of a few minutes, do you suppose you could come over?” I said “Yes sir, can you give me about thirty minutes and then I'll be over?” Every morning he wanted me to come over and this was something that Kissinger would do or Haig would do, and if they weren't there, then I did it which was one the reasons I think that I did establish that kind of rapport. I think he knew that I wasn't there. Shelley Buchanan, I can't remember what her name was then, Shelley was one of his secretary and she kind of grinned when I arrived. He would go over to the office in the old EOB—which he liked— it had a fireplace and he put his feet up on the ottoman and stretched out. I remember, also, I was asked to go up to Camp David. We had received another one of Henry Kissinger's epistles “the sky is falling”, and I was called up to Camp David, so I hopped in a helicopter and got up to Camp David—you know, anything I wanted I got; never had that before or since. Never will. Went up to Camp David, found Haldeman, Ehrlichman and the President sitting

around the fireplace, fire going, and he said “What did you think of Henry's views and did you bring me some thoughts about what we ought to say to Henry?” I said “Yes sir.” He looked at it and he said “Well, that's very good, let me tell you what I'd really like to say.” So I quickly scrubbed things down, and he said, “Well, you can stay the night up here if you want,” and I said, “No sir, with your permission I'd like to get back, I'd like to send this off.” He said, “Well you can do that from here,” and I said “Well, I'd also like to have dinner with my wife at about nine o'clock, if that's okay.” He said, “Oh, of course.” I got back, and Haldeman came on the phone and said, “Dick, please don't change a word of what the President said.” I said, “Bob, I wouldn't think of changing a word of what the President said.” Anyway, there were lots of things. I remember he went to Florida. He was peripatetic. The President liked food. He was in Florida and we were having trouble with Malta. Do you remember Dom Mintoff?

*Q: Oh yes, the Prime Minister of the little island of Malta.*

KENNEDY: Yes, right. He's a wild man.

*Q: Sticking it to NATO, right?*

KENNEDY: Right, and making all kinds of deals with the Libyans. Well, Mr. Mintoff would call, this was on a Saturday, and he called and the White House operator put himthrough to me and I said “Mr. Prime Minister, how nice to hear your voice, what way may I be of help?” He said “I need to talk to the President.” I said “Oh yes sir, well the President is in Florida. Let me see what I can do. Can you hold a moment or can I get back to you?” he said “Oh no, I'll hold.” So I said “Mr. Prime Minister, I'm sorry but the President is just not available, but I know that if you were to convey any message to me I could get it to him later in the day. I'm terribly sorry, but he's resting.” It was only about eight o'clock in the morning. From where he was calling from, it was three o'clock in the afternoon. He finally did give me the message. I called the President and just left word. The President later

said, “Thank you for not interrupting me, I don't see how I possibly could have tolerated Dom Mintoff on Saturday morning.”

*Q: Did you have any problems with Henry Kissinger because he was accused of never letting the right hand know what the left hand was doing and you're in the position where you have to know what was going on?*

KENNEDY: Well, that took a little time, too. I was not, at the very beginning, aware of everything that was going on, but in due time I became aware because he would personally make certain that I was. You're right, I couldn't have functioned if I didn't, but it took time. He often didn't let the right hand know. There was a substantial aura of secrecy surrounding the place. I do I think that was bad? No, I don't really think so. For one thing, it's one thing to have open government and open covenants openly arrived at, it's another thing to recognize that if you know where you're going and you know what you're going to do there are going to be people who will be substantially in a position and would do anything—witness what we do today—who would do anything to get it. I'm not sure that's good government. It has a tendency to anarchy and one of the things you have to do is, first of all, you've got to make sure that you've got enough people who are in the coup, and I think he did that, sometimes a little late but he did that. In some of those SALT negotiations, I don't think he passed on as much as he should have and in some of the Vietnam business I don't think he passed on as much as he probably should have, but in due time he made it all available. Meanwhile, he was, in an sense, keeping control of the action and if he didn't do that I'm afraid, in some instances, the results would never have been achieved. Because there were people, just directly in opposition, who would do everything if they knew he was doing A or B, do everything they could to unseat him. And I don't think that makes any sense.

*Q: I want to ask you a bit about Alexander Haig, Larry Eagleburger if he was there at the time, how they operated and about the relationship with William Rogers and the Secretary of State and a bit about how the Vietnam War was viewed.*

KENNEDY: I found Secretary Rogers to be an able and consummate gentleman. He clearly was a close friend and associate of the President's. I think that he, as is so often the case, even up to the President, found himself in a kind of competition with the White House. I didn't think then, nor do I think today, that that is healthy, but it was a fact. Also, I thought that he was dedicated to—what shall I say—the primacy of the Department of State in the international world and he believed himself to be the President's designated spokesman and operator in chief. As to the internals of the Department, I can't really say—that is a long time ago—but I cannot recall hearing disparaging comments about him either as to his management style or as to his relationship to the bureaus and the personnel in the Department. That, I would say, is not universally the case.

*Q: No, it certainly isn't.*

KENNEDY: I cannot recall—here again, I was not there, but you do hear things, I don't recall hearing any—in all cases I had to deal with him in many situations, and as I said, I found him a consummate gentleman. Understanding, reasonable, sometimes at least bemused as to what was going on—that he realized was taking place beyond his grasp—and I would have to say in some instances I felt a little bit uncomfortable on my own side and sympathetic to him on the other side and knowing that he was not fully aware of some things that were taking place. By and large, that was not my style, let me put it that way—it was not my style but none the less that's the way it was.

*Q: I have the feeling that with Henry Kissinger you almost had the feeling that he could be not really out of control but just couldn't stand it if he didn't feel he knew what was happening at any time. Henry Kissinger wanted to be there to make sure that nothing was happening that he didn't know of—I mean this is a caricature.*

KENNEDY: Well, let me just say I know that was a popular view of the relationship of Henry and the Secretary, but let me just say that I have seen advisors since, a number, many some of whom have been long-time friends and I have to tell you that I don't discern

much difference. It may be the human condition, of particularly people who reach that level and I don't mean necessarily the very top of the bottle but it extends down to those sort of in the ambit of power who tend to be a bit paranoid: a little bit worried about what does somebody know that they don't, or what are they saying about me when I'm not there. But, as I say, that's the human condition. I don't think it was any different except that Henry perhaps tended to be a little more concerned about how he was perceived than some people might be. But not so much different as to pick him out of the crowd. I think Rogers was probably not very different, but his style was totally different. I don't think that very many Secretaries of State have generally—not in recent years anyway, certainly since my understanding of them going back as far as Rusk seen Presidents without the National Security Advisor there. This, by the way, was not a function of simply “ego tripping” or protecting one's facts but, I think primarily, a function of having to know what's going on and, if the President decides something, the National Security Advisor of all people ought to know it. I think it was not unreasonable.

*Q: One of the things, as you were talking, there's something also within the system that the National Security Advisor's position is what he or she can make of it, whereas, if you're Secretary of State you're Secretary of State, and so the National Security Advisor really has to work harder to make sure that they're involved than say the Secretary of State.*

KENNEDY: Let me give you an example of how that in a sense works, I'm not sure of all of it and I'll come back to it, but let me give you an example. When Mr. Clinton arrived on the scene and appointed Tony Lake as the National Security Advisor and Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, my recollection is he made it abundantly clear who was in charge and that was the Secretary of State. The National Security Advisor was specifically identified as a person who was a facilitator not a policy maker, one who was not in any sense to be seen as interrupting or in a channel of reporting to the President, that he was a staff person engaged in facilitating the process but not being a fundamental policy maker. I think that is what Mr. Clinton assessed to be the case. But that didn't last very long, didn't look very well, and I don't think it ever will look very well. Mr. Haig initially

started out with this assumption. I will tell you that he in the late days of transition, indeed immediately before the inauguration, he asked me to ...

*Q: You're talking about the transition to the Reagan Administration.*

KENNEDY: He asked me to draft a National Security Decision Document (NSDD) for the President outlining the role of the Secretary and putting all control of the National Security Council system, that is the process, in the hands of the Secretary. I labored mightily, I will tell you, over a weekend, and I drafted something and turned it over to him, but I said “I don't think this will work.” And it worked. For, ultimately, the center of power must be the President, and who's just down the hall? Who does he see a dozen times a day, or picks up the phone, and I think that's always going to be the case so long as you have such an individual. The individual himself can be self-effacing and, in such a case, you could wind up with a circumstance such as that in the beginning of the Clinton Administration. I think Tony Lake—I think, I'm outside now, but my impression is—Tony Lake tried mightily to make that system work that way. Dick Allen—I don't think he attempted in any way to interpose himself. The problem was it didn't look very well because somebody has to be the full crew to make this whole interagency system work and it doesn't work very well now, but that's another story. But seriously, I think that's the inherent nature of the problem and I think it will always be such a problem. It didn't seem to be in the very earliest days of the NSC system and yet you had very powerful people involved. George Marshall clearly was not a “shrinking violet” and I don't think anybody would get in the way of George Marshall, simply because his own personal stature was so enormous that, no matter what system he had, he would transcend it. That's probably unusual; it wasn't the case of people like Stettinius and others. I think partly his personality, but partly it's the way the whole system has to work. Now, if you would ask me what I think about how it might work better, it is ultimately a function of the human beings involved. Two groups, one the people at the top who may get along enormously well, and then the people below them—I've seen this in other institutions as well—who are contesting all of the time as to who's in charge. And this creates a tension between the institutions which ultimately infringes upon

the relationship of the top people. That's a problem. That's a very serious problem. There's only one way I know to deal with that, and that's the old military way, “you cut it out or you leave.” Simple.

*Q: Well, I want to go back, since you mentioned it, to this memorandum that you drew up when Haig—this is ahead of the story but we might as well get it in— about when Haig took over the State Department that sort of hit the front pages of the papers.*

KENNEDY: He was the vicar. He made himself the vicar of the President for National Security Affairs.

*Q: And that didn't fly at all. Well, that wasn't a question of flying.*

KENNEDY: That wasn't a question of flying or not flying that was a question of the press which has a wonderful ability to sense a circumstance in which they can play games. This story made every newspaper, that's the way they do their 15-second sound bites.

*Q: Yes get in between people and get them into a contest.*

KENNEDY: Create, if you will, a contest. It may not exist.

*Q: Well, moving on then what about with Rogers. From the perspective of the NSC, was Rogers someone who had particular strengths in any aspect of the foreign affairs area where you, at the working level of the NSC, felt this is really a close call, let's leave it there, leave it in his hands or not?*

KENNEDY: Well, first of all, he was a good lawyer and as a consequence had a good appreciation for the international legal framework. Now, some would argue that is an impedance, I don't think so. I think one has to look at the international legal framework as a basis for much of what one contemplates doing. So I thought that was something which he could certainly bring forward. But beyond that, so far as I know, he also understood international nuclear commerce, but at that time of course, commerce was a kind of—as

far as the State Department aficionados were concerned—trade, messy, “that's not our bag,” which is unfortunate, the same attitude remains I'm afraid in a very large measure, just because they don't think very far. They think big thoughts, but they don't think very deeply. As to Arms Control questions, I don't think he knew very much. And, by and large, to that extent I think left it to people like Jerry Smith and others who were the Arms Control experts. I don't think he had much understanding of or background in the culture, if you will, of the Department but seldom does the Secretary have that. I'm not sure if that's good or bad. I guess I can't think of anything in which he was a strong individual, an individually strong player. Now I think he had his views about Vietnam, and he certainly had his views about what we did in our big Arms Control negotiations with the Soviets. But here, as you know, things were being run on at least two tracks simultaneously so what he knew, and therefore what he influenced, may or may not have relevance at any given time. Ultimately, he understood that. Let me just say that one of the things that amused me in that period I came to know fairly early on—although in the beginning I was terribly naive, terribly, I didn't know much of what was going on myself, I didn't have any idea of what was going on or how it was transpiring until I began putting these pieces together in my own mind and adding one and one and coming out pretty regularly with two which told me something. In the White House there was a notion that, by a number of techniques, they could totally cut out people and that wasn't true. I found this out because the techniques used prevented the US establishment from getting a hold, but it didn't prevent foreign establishments who were using the same techniques we were using.

*Q: Well, I've heard—I was interviewing, I think, George Vest at one time who was doing the Helsinki accords, and he was hearing things sort of through the Danes from the East Germans about what Henry Kissinger was trying to do to undercut him because he had more interest in SALT or something like that. And so he was essentially getting his information from, at that time, our almost sworn enemies, the East Germans, about what was happening. These lines of communication, as you say, don't shut down they just take different paths.*

KENNEDY: I can recall a specific care, well more than one. When my friend the Director of the CIA would come to me and say “You know, I understand Henry is about to undertake something, I don't know what, but I think you should know that we're going to have to turn something off if the world isn't to know before the Americans know. So for God's sake keep this in mind.” One involved an airplane flight which would have alerted the NATO air controlling system or air defense system which would have immediately been flashed to Colorado Springs. So much for a secret trip. There are ways to deal with that, but you can't keep everybody out of the loop. It won't work.

To get back to the point, however, I think that made it difficult in the relationships on the one hand on a personal level, and it made it difficult on the coordinational aspects on the process level which relies on substance, you know. So I think that was a kind of influencing factor, as I look back on it from this great distance. I had the greatest admiration for both of these gentleman, both of them, and still do.

*Q: Well, now again, we're talking about strictly the NSC time when you were there. How did Alexander Haig fit into this operation?*

KENNEDY: Oh, Alexander Haig was pretty early on, clearly the number two boy who also had a personal relationship with the President the President for whom I had always had the greatest personal admiration and personal affection and felt terrible about the awful mistake of not disclosing right up front that goofy burglary.

*Q: Watergate.*

KENNEDY: He was very careful. He was, I guess the word is careful. He was very careful in whom and to whom he expressed himself. One had to somehow earn his trust, and it's never clear to me how you did that. I ultimately did, I never quite understood how that happened. He [Alexander Haig] clearly had the President's trust. He also, I think, had an independent set of pipelines to the Pentagon which might involve the Chairman.

*Q: You're talking about the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

KENNEDY: Or the Chief of the Army Staff independently of the leadership of the Pentagon. He liked and admired a lot of the people in the State Department but not universally, and he, like Kissinger I think, believed a lot of the paper coming forward was not very useful. As a matter of fact, a lot of it just wasn't. Sorry about that, but it just wasn't. That, by the way, is a function of the operating style of the Department and if you think every junior grade officer is a policy maker, you probably aren't going to get very good papers. Because every junior grade officer is not a policy maker nor should he be. That's a kind of an ethic or cultural notion. I just heard it expressed, just the other day as a matter of fact, “you've got to involve the lower levels in the policy making process”, if you do that you're never going to get any policy.

*Q: Sounds good but...*

KENNEDY: Oh, it's the great “everybody's involved” thesis. Well, there are two kinds of involvement: one is maybe I invite somebody in here to listen to our discourse in the sense that that adds a kind of dimension, background, so-on and that's quite different from then having to sit down and write a policy paper on how the government ought to be organized. You see? That's the difference. In any case, what more can I say, he was extremely strong in that staff and, as I say, clearly the number two-man. Sometimes Kissinger worried about how far back he was.

*Q: I was going to ask about the relationship with Henry Kissinger.*

KENNEDY: The relationship was up and down. But, at root, there was a great personal respect and personal admiration and a warm personal relationship. No question about that. But, they could have violent differences of view and did. I won't go into some of those things.

*Q: Well, could you, do you have any example of where they really had opposing views? I think it adds a dimension.*

KENNEDY: Well, I think certainly over the Vietnam issue from time to time. Haig, and I think not only Haig, believed that in some ways President Thieu was being badly used and felt that the Paris negotiations were not of the kind of toughness that he would like to see. Kissinger, I think, was basing his premise on two grounds: one, pragmatism I mean what's possible—and the other on the clear necessity to get out of Vietnam at a reasonable time. Haig was not so persuaded that getting out was the most important thing, and I think the President changed from time to time his own view. So, I think that was the kind of circumstance in which they frequently would get into debates. I can tell you, as well, that on more than one occasion, to my personal knowledge, the President would receive a personal communication from Paris, for example from Kissinger, expressing great discouragement and dismay over the fact that the other same side seemed to be intransigent and weren't prepared to negotiate seriously and clearly—we're going to have to make new concessions or something.

*Q: You're background was military or is military, here you were dealing with this problem of Vietnam, I mean you're sitting there as sort of the coordinator in all of that...*

KENNEDY: Of which I had assiduously avoided.

*Q: I understand, but I mean it was all-pervasive. How did you feel at the time as these negotiations, you were seeing what was going on about Vietnam and where we should be going and all....*

KENNEDY: Well, retrospectively, I think it was perfectly obvious to me that we couldn't go on forever, that the President was right and the presumption that we had to get out but we had to do it with honor, that was a basic tenet of my own belief. At the same time, I felt, looking at that honor situation, one had to take a very strong stance with the

North Vietnamese because otherwise they would push you around. Once we began the Vietnamization Program—and Vietnamization was one aspect, troop withdrawals were the other—Once we began that process, I was persuaded a) that was going to help solve—not entirely—but help solve the domestic crisis. I shall never forget it, ever. It was indeed a crisis. It was the kind of thing in which insurgency was abolished, and I was old enough to remember the days of the bonus march and the extreme dark days in the early 1930's when—even then I believed or certainly by the time I got to college and looked at it, even then I believed that democracy was by way of being endangered. And I thought at the time that the situation domestically was becoming so serious and so intense that the government had every reason to fear being torn apart. So, on the one hand, we had to do something and on the other hand, I was actually committed to the principal that, if were going to get out we've got to do it with honor, which meant that we had to protect ourselves and Vietnamese friends from what I believed then and later was proven right, to be an all out onslaught. Because I didn't think—not for one minute did I ever think—that the truce arrangement was ever going to manage to—they were not going to give up. What reason did they have to do so? The reason that they had to do so was given to them by way of a multi-billion dollar aid program, all kinds of political sweeteners and, in those days, it was popular. Aid solved all problems. A few dollars here, a few dollars there solve all problems. I didn't agree with that then, and I don't agree with it today. Although, I hear that today. I'll tell you something funny. I listened to Brian Atwater, who is obviously a very smart fellow.

*Q: He's the head of AID.*

KENNEDY: Yes, he had a big—there was a huge big conclave at the National Academy conducted by the science advisors and he was one of the speakers and told about how we had to have this aid program and how it was doing all of these wonderful things and how this is the way that economic development is fostered. Everybody was supposed to write questions, so I wrote a question. The questions were not identified as to the source and were read out, and they would answer it. And my question was “I recollect from the 1960's

immediately, in the period following the decolonization, that there was an economic theory called trickle down.

*Q: Walt Rostow.*

KENNEDY: That's correct. Walt Rostow's theory. And I said, “you know it had all of the logic and trappings of a sound economic notion, the only problem was that it didn't work. Billions of dollars were spent, and it didn't work.” So I said, “what basis do you presume that it will work now?” Guess what the answer was?

*Q: What?*

KENNEDY: We've learned a lot since then. I don't think so. In any case, getting back to this point, I think the President was firmly, absolutely committed to that principal. We must leave but we must do it with honor. That motivated everything he did. And he was being pushed by Laird.

*Q: Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense.*

KENNEDY: Right, he was being pushed by Laird to speed up the troop withdrawals and he himself would wish to do that, I think, but he also was being pushed from the other side by saying look we've got to protect the South Vietnamese. Sooner or later, these two things had to be reconciled and they never were, in my judgement.

*Q: Well, to follow through, I want to come back to several things, but to follow through with Vietnam...*

KENNEDY: Yes. We had a warm, heart-warming statement from Geneva that now we have reached this agreement with North Vietnam and the war has been avoided. I remember two previous instances in which that kind of statement was made on the same basic ground, by the way. One in Munich.

*Q: We're talking about 1938, I guess.*

KENNEDY: That's right, and how well I remember. I was just coming into the days when I would become a soldier, and the second instance was in what year was it—the year in which the Vietnam accord...

*Q: I think this is 1954.*

KENNEDY: And Kissinger said in, I think, a weak moment, “Peace is at hand.” I didn't think that then—I had learned from Munich—I don't think so today in respect to the Geneva statements about North Vietnam. I think the same, the natural human tendency to try to come to an agreement.

*Q: When you're talking about North Vietnam, you're talking about Korea? Everything goes back to North Korea here that we're talking about.*

KENNEDY: Yes. The basic human interest is in trying to avoid what people would see as a cataclysm. Naturally. Particularly in the case of the North Vietnamese and I think, personally, that the same thing is true today with the North Koreans. They understand very well the natural psyche of the Western World and use it.

*Q: You hang on long enough...*

KENNEDY: Scare them to death. Hang on long enough and you'll win the game. I think that's the basic principle which they believe. Well, we're digressing here.

*Q: No, not digressing, because I think this is very important. I want to get this feeling about the times on the record.*

Mr. Ambassador, when did you leave the NSC?

KENNEDY: I left in 1975.

*Q: Did you leave after the fall of Saigon?*

KENNEDY: No, immediately before.

*Q: From your perspective, how did you see both the peace accords and how it played out during that time?*

KENNEDY: Obviously, if those were the accords reached, they were the accords that we had to do what we could to implement properly. I had, internally, misgivings. And I don't think they were a huge secret. But also my upbringing told me, look, you're not going to agree with everything that your leadership may think is the right course, but you have an obligation of loyalty to pursue it and do your damnedest to make sure that it works. And so I thought that's what my basic job now was to do. And I tried to do whatever I could, working with people like Bill Sullivan.

*Q: Assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs.*

KENNEDY: Who was a very able man. Very able. To try to do everything we could to make it work. I'll tell you an example. I don't know whether it's classified or whether it isn't. I don't have any idea. We went to North Vietnam. I went with Kissinger. From there later we went to China. We went to North Vietnam, the ostensible purpose of which was to consult over the program of economic aid. I think the North Vietnamese were continuing to push the notion that this was reparations.

*Q: They continued to do this for a long, long time.*

KENNEDY: And the United States, of course, said absolutely not. We are prepared to enter into an arrangement for long-term economic development and growth. But we are not, in any sense, providing reparations. Well, you draw your cards and call 'em as you see 'em. This was one of those great things: we could say one thing; they could say the other, and each of us could then say that his view was what was true. We went to

discuss this. And I remember because, among other things—and I can't remember the specific details—but the demarcation line had been established and reaffirmed, and it was agreed that there would be no military traffic moving south across that demarcation line. (Something of that sort; the specifics I can't remember.) We had pictures, identified by time and date, of lines of tanks and armored personnel carriers moving south across this line. So these were laid out on the table. And Le Duc Tho, Pham Van Dong, the whole group of these guys were sitting there. Everybody but the great leader himself.

*Q: Ho Chi Minh was dead by this time.*

KENNEDY: Yes, but somebody else was in charge.

*Q: Giap, who was the commander in chief of the..., was he there?*

KENNEDY: No, I don't know whether he was there or not. But there were a whole bunch of these guys. We laid these pictures out and said, look, article so and so says so. And here we have evidence that this is taking place. We would like an explanation, please.

I shall never forget these guys sitting there, totally blank faces, totally blank. They looked at the pictures, looked at each other, and, as though they'd had a rehearsal, the answer was: nothing; we don't understand what your problem is. Now this is not exactly the words, but this is the substance. I've never forgotten it. We explained what our problem was, and they said, oh, but article something or other says that we are responsible for provision of foodstuffs and medicines in the northern portion of South Vietnam, which we can more easily reach. How did you think we were going to get it there? These vehicles are transporting food and medicines.

*Q: Tanks and armored personnel carriers.*

KENNEDY: Now, right then and there, I said to myself, these chicaners honestly believe that they can sell us this notion, or, alternatively, they are committing the ultimate insult

by knowing they can't and still going ahead and saying it. I thought, geez, what are these guys doing? From that moment on, there was never a doubt in my mind that, when the time came, from their point of view, they were just going to sweep up and take over. There was never a question in my mind.

Fortunately, that agreement was never implemented. My understanding is that, even to this day, they keep citing it as an example of our perfidy, that we had made these promises and we had never carried them out. Now really. I don't know this, but I gather that they, over time, have matured, if you will, and have somehow become less intransigent, less doctrinaire than in the past. But, nevertheless... I think that [Senator] McCain is probably right now, though.

*Q: We should recognize them.*

KENNEDY: Well, we should do something.

*Q: It's silly.*

KENNEDY: Let me just say that some people are still raising a great difficulty over missing in action. You'll never find them. God, there are missing in action from World War I.

*Q: Oh, absolutely.*

KENNEDY: I mean, really.

*Q: It's a political issue.*

KENNEDY: Particularly. It is annoying to me, when we're prepared to go through all this charade with the North Koreans. The number of missing in action in North Korea exceeds the amount still missing in action in Vietnam. There's something strange in the logic and rationale here.

*Q: We're talking about really a 1990's political issue, which has nothing to do with missing in action, or very little to do with it. One last question on Vietnam. We may come back to it.*

KENNEDY: Let me just say, too, a lot of people reading this or thinking about this may well say, well, gee, this guy is engaging in revisionist history. And that may be true. It may be true. Much of what I'm saying may well reflect 20 years' worth of maturation of thought. I don't know. I can't answer that. This is my recollection of what I thought...

*Q: And this is what we're getting.*

KENNEDY: And that's the best I can say. I'm sure that there were instances in which I neither portrayed these views in any overt way, and certainly not in any way other than to support the basic process that was under way. I'm confident of that.

*Q: In the NSC, did you have a cadre of people who had served and were knowledgeable about Vietnam?*

KENNEDY: Yes.

*Q: Obviously, you were kind of sitting at the center, and stuff was coming in. This had to be a major topic of conversation all the time. What were you getting? Was there a change in how our Vietnam experts within the NSC staff were seeing things?*

KENNEDY: There were different schools of thought, at least three. Now totally forget about Tony Lake and Roger Morris; those fellows had left. But still there were at least three kinds of schools of thought. One was, in Kissinger's immediate staff, there was Haig, on the one hand, and Winston Lord and a couple of people, on the other hand, who tended to look at things slightly differently, Haig taking a very firm, hard line; they taking a line more toward negotiation. Then there were the people who were in the so-called analysis staff. I never did fully understand what they were trying to do. Everything was a numbers-crunching sort of exercise. But they always wanted to be sure that their views were primary. Then

there were the people who worked directly for me, as well a couple of little cells of specific people working on the Vietnam business under John Holdridge, Dick Smyser, and, for a long time, the recent ambassador to Mexico, John Negroponte.

*Q: Negroponte.*

KENNEDY: Negroponte, who worked for me for some time and who then was essentially working directly with Haig. We were all of essentially the same mind, that we needed to, in a sense, bridge that gap between those who were taking a hard line and those who were looking for negotiation, making sure that negotiation did not neglect the essential hard-line attitude that we believed had to be maintained. That was essentially the way we saw it.

Now, out in the bureaucracy, holy mackerel, you could find any opinion you wanted, on any day of the week.

*Q: You're talking about within the State Department and...*

KENNEDY: Defense Department, particularly.

*Q: The CIA and all that.*

KENNEDY: Yes, you could find any opinion you wanted, at any time of the day or night.

*Q: In a way, this emphasizes your comment before, that it's nice to have policy written at the lower level, but at a certain point, you've got to get to a place where you say this is it, and this is how we do it.*

KENNEDY: And that has to be decided by people of mature judgment and sound thinking. I don't mean to suggest that young people don't have that. What they don't have is the kind of experienced background that gives them a kind of wisdom, as opposed to intelligence. There's a difference. I remember Bill Sullivan was aware of this, and Marshall Green, both, as I said, able people, really.

Kissinger was concerned, and, I must say, rightly so, on a number of grounds, that when decisions were made around the table, and it was decided we were going to do A, B, and C, at point X on whatever the subject was, the cables would not necessarily reflect the decision, for the cable writers weren't present. His view was, and I must say it's a perfectly natural thing again, his view was that the cable writers were persuaded that whatever the current policy was was right. I mean, they'd formulated it. They'd been putting that out in their cables for weeks. So did you think these guys were going to sit down suddenly, having been told we'd made this decision, and write a cable reflecting that? They're going to try to do that, but in the context of what they had been believing and putting out all this time. So the consequence would be, at best, a mixed message, at worst, a gradual return to the original message. And that's, again, a perfectly natural thing. I observed it. And I'd call Bill and I'd say, hey, Bill, you know, golly. And he'd say, oh, geez, you know.

That's another thing that I also observed. I know that micromanaging is a bad word, okay. But so is no managing. There tends to be a view, in government and elsewhere, that managers don't get into the nitty gritty. I think, if you don't, you aren't managing. And you lose control. So that was an interesting thing. I remember that.

*Q: Oh, yes, fascinating.*

KENNEDY: Of course, that generated another huge burden. There were lots of papers coming across...

*Q: In a way, because you weren't committed to anything, this meant... You have to have somebody there who's trying to get what is...*

KENNEDY: All I did was faithfully record what had been said and decided at the meeting, and then, when the cable came over for clearance, make sure that it said what was... And not just then, but the succession of cables, because if you waited a little while, inch by

inch, it'd be walked back to where it was. That's just natural. The only way to deal with that, of course, is that the seniors have to be involved in doing it. But they don't.

*Q: What was your impression, we're talking about '73, '74, and part of '75, of the South Vietnamese government and the South Vietnamese army? Here you were, again you were sitting there, you were getting reflections. You were the implementer on this, but it's very important how one felt about this government and its military force that we were trying to prop up. Was there a change in attitude? How did you feel about it?*

KENNEDY: Well, at a distance, and only at a distance. But from talking to a lot of people who had been intimately involved both in respect to their government and in respect to the military forces, I, at least, had a couple of conclusions.

One, that the government, as all governments do, had a tendency toward self-service, and sometimes was unwilling to make sensible compromises, which led us later to ultimate compromises that were less desirable than the ones that the other guys had refused. That's a little inconsistent with the notion of self-service. But I think that it was based upon the notion of self-service that they refused to accept some things. And they were wrong. They just made some fundamentally wrong decisions.

I think, by that time, the inherent corruption that had been rampant earlier was essentially gone. My recollection, and it may be all wrong, but my recollection is that, by this time, the corruption, at least at the higher levels of the government, was essentially gone and that they were really focused. The military was a mixed bag — some good, some not so good. I simply had no personal contact. From people who were there, you'd get glowing accounts of, you know, these guys are really gung ho. But then, underneath, you'd also hear some, well, you know, I'm not sure how good they'll be if we're not around. That led me to recall my earlier experiences with the military in Iran, where I had the same sort of feeling. There, I was intimately involved and knew them. When they were being guided by the American advisors, there was one set of conditions. But I wasn't at all sure that that

was going to obtain if those advisors weren't there. If they really had to go out, I wasn't sure of that in my own mind, which meant that we had to redouble our efforts. That's sort of where I came out.

*Q: This is what I thought. I'd take how you viewed the ultimate fall of Vietnam, as far as what was happening before you left, your impression of Graham Martin, and then turning to some of the other foreign-policy issues with, obviously, China, but also Japan, Nigeria, Chile, and dealings with the Soviet Union. And we're really at about the end of that particular phase of your career. What was your impression in the NSC, your impression and maybe Kissinger and other people, of Graham Martin, who was in Vietnam at the very end?*

KENNEDY: My impression of Graham Martin was one of an intellectually honest, straightforward fellow, who was a consummate crisis manager, and someone who, I thought, got along extremely well with the military leaders, who, in the circumstances, obviously had a kind of disproportionate influence on events. But my impression was that Graham managed that relationship extremely well, to the good of the country. What did others think of him? My impression was that Kissinger was very high on him, thought very, very well of him. And I don't recall anybody having a different view. They all thought that Martin was first class.

*Q: Martin made many trips back to the States. Would he come by the NSC?*

KENNEDY: Oh, I'm sure he did. I know for a fact that he'd see Kissinger. Indeed, my recollection is (and my recollection's getting faint) that he, on perhaps more than one occasion, would meet with the WSAG or the senior review group, in a kind of briefing and discussion session, not a decision-making exercise, but rather getting, for the principals, their impression of what he was about, and his impression of what they were about.

*Q: With the fall of Vietnam, you were still with the National Security Council.*

KENNEDY: No.

*Q: By this time, you'd moved over to...*

KENNEDY: I left on January 20, 1975, to become a commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). So the fall of Vietnam had not yet occurred, is my recollection. That's right, I think it was 1976.

*Q: Seventy-five.*

KENNEDY: Late '75.

*Q: Spring of '75, I think.*

KENNEDY: Was it that early? Okay.

*Q: Yes, I think so. Let's go back to talking still on the NSC for the time. Our policy with Chile was very controversial at that time. They had had a split election, so it wasn't a majority, but Allende came in. He was coming in out of the left-wing side of the politics and was causing us concern. There were allegations, and I guess some truth to them, at least at the beginning, that we were trying to destabilize them. As far as what finally happened, we probably weren't as involved. But certainly we were not a friendly force in this. What were you getting, from the NSC perspective, about Chile at that time?*

KENNEDY: Just exactly what you said — a potential additive to an already unstable situation, particularly in the southern cone. After all, Argentina was having its own problems, and a lot of this was thought to be the result of extreme left-wing agitators. And we all know what happened in Argentina. The situation obviously developed into a repressive situation, for a whole host of reasons. And the concern was, something of this sort might arise in Chile. What we were looking for was a center-of-the-road, democratic society and institution. And we didn't think that Allende was going to bring that, either

himself or on account of the opposition, which would do whatever it could to destabilize him, perhaps even overthrow him, and create yet another right-wing military dictatorship.

*Q: Do you recall any sort of activist sentiments or actions within the NSC to say, well, rather than our sitting back and watching this happen, we've got to do something about this?*

KENNEDY: Oh, I think, yes, there was a lot of discussion about what ought to be done. There were some discussions having to do with a covert action. And I don't mean in the direct sense, but rather the propaganda effort and so on. There was discussion of this, I'm confident. I can't remember very well, but...

One of the things I think I should tell you is, I took my responsibilities to maintain confidentiality and security of classified materials, of whatever character, and there were all kinds of them, I think I was privy to everything, I took my responsibilities terribly seriously, and when I walked out of the place, even for a weekend, I left it all behind me, and I wiped my brain about as clean as I could do it. So my memory isn't as good as it might be. I really did block it out.

*Q: I understand. We're trying to capture some impressions and all this. Do you recall any sort of debate on what to do about Chile? Were there people saying, one, let it alone, two, we've got to stop it, three, a third way or something?*

KENNEDY: Yes, I remember discussions of this kind. As I say, it was in that context that ideas such as let's see what could be done about influencing thought by propaganda efforts were undertaken, or were discussed at least.

It seems to me it was in this period also that we had, and it might have been with Peru, that we had the tuna-fishing problem. That was a serious problem, which seemed to possibly provoke low-level military action. I'm confident we looked at the bigger picture,

and certainly did not want to see our relationship with that whole part of the continent kind of come apart.

*Q: Because Ecuador and Peru were both in this. I think they declared a 300-mile limit, which covered most of the traditional fishing grounds of our very powerful fishing interests on the West Coast.*

KENNEDY: Yes, that's right. Well, all of those things were going on, I think, in roughly the same time frame. And I think there was this concern that we didn't want to see something happen that was going to destabilize that whole southern cone. Moreover, as I said, we didn't want to see something develop as it had in Argentina. Well, unfortunately, as we know, that's exactly what did happen.

*Q: In Chile, with Pinochet coming in. What about the dynamics within the NSC? Let's say the idea would be raised about, well, maybe we can do something to help the propaganda to help destabilize. This would obviously end up in the lap of the CIA, the only people who could disperse the money and all that. Was there a CIA representative on the NSC who would listen to ideas that came out of the normal thing, and say that's all very fine, but it just won't work? Was there somebody like that?*

KENNEDY: No, that's not my recollection of how it worked. These discussions would occur either in the context of the senior review group, which had been created by Kissinger to replace the original review group, which was at a lower level, or in the context of the Washington special-actions group, which was the so-called crisis-management operation. It just happened that the parties were the same. In all such cases, the director or deputy director of the CIA participated in the discussions, so that he was in a position to express precisely those sentiments: “We can't do it,” or “It won't work,” or “If we do it, we're going to have to do other things alongside it to make it work. And here are the costs and benefits, from our point of view.” Now that having been said, if in fact he was persuaded that there was something they could do, there would be another meeting, and he would come back

with propositions. Now these would not come up in the context of the special-actions group, but rather in the context of the intelligence group, again, for the most part, the same members, the same participants.

*Q: Who would be the members?*

KENNEDY: Kissinger would be the chairman. The deputy Secretary of State. The deputy Secretary of Defense. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The director of CIA. I think you've got it. And I was always present at those meetings. I was the note taker, and arranged to call the meetings, and arranged for or actually provided Kissinger with his own talking points and analysis. So that's the way it worked. There would almost never be a final decision taken at a meeting. Kissinger would usually sum up the meeting, saying, well, there seemed to be views along these lines. Everybody would say, that sounds correct to us. And then a decision as to what would be done, in the context of that discussion, would come out later.

*Q: Something was given to the president, I assume.*

KENNEDY: That's right, which may or may not have been the case, for obvious reasons.

*Q: Again, just on Chile, do you recall what was the outcome of what we're going to do about Allende?*

KENNEDY: I think, to the best of my recollection, it was a more or less passive approach. It was perfectly that we hoped that he'd go away. My recollection is that there were some efforts going to be made to try to help make that happen, if you will. Looking for alternatives, opposition groups in Chile that could be encouraged. That's about it, I think.

*Q: I think that's pretty much the way it seems to come out. I think we gave some financial support to...*

KENNEDY: Oh, yes. Yes, we did this.

*Q: To some of the things. And actually there had been some killings and all. So Pinochet sort of came out of right field, I guess. He wasn't particularly our boy or anything else.*

KENNEDY: No, no, no, I do not think he was our boy in any sense. However, it's also my recollection that, at the time, it was felt that he was a desirable alternative to what people saw coming down the road. Now whether that was, in retrospect, a sensible conclusion or not, I think historians have to decide. But, in fact, the one thing that did not happen, it's my recollection again, in Chile was the kind of dirty war, if you will, that eventuated in Argentina. And I must say that that's a benefit of the Pinochet result. I do not for a second suggest that the United States would and did suggest that Pinochet was the solution to all problems. I don't think that's the case.

*Q: You've mentioned Argentina a number of times. Was the Argentinian example something that everybody was thinking we just didn't want to have? This was part of our thought process?*

KENNEDY: I think so, for the simple reason that it seemed clear that things were going to get worse, not better, in Argentina. It was obvious that the economy was suffering. The body politic was becoming enormously disaffected, but at the same time, essentially unable to do anything to change the situation. As to the situation, I know that, talking with many of our own people and visiting the place many times after I left the NSC, our own people were terribly disturbed by the disappearances and so on.

*Q: This was in Argentina.*

KENNEDY: In Argentina.

*Q: Part of the dirty war.*

KENNEDY: At the same time, it was also the case that the kinds of things that the opposition was doing were calculated to bring about precisely the results they were seeking to avoid. So, yes, I think there was a feeling, God, if we can prevent this, we ought to do that. And, by and large, I think that did happen in Chile. A repressive regime, of course, Pinochet's, but I don't think anything like the kind of situation that developed in Argentina.

*Q: No, I don't think so, either. Then what about in Africa? The Soviet Union was...*

KENNEDY: All over the place.

*Q: All over the place, doing things. What was your impression of how we viewed Africa from the NSC?*

KENNEDY: Well, I think that, at the time, we viewed Africa in essentially an idealistic way. I remember, for example, discussions about Rhodesia and South Africa. There was concern that the Soviets were doing everything they could to destabilize anywhere they could, to in fact co-opt some of the leaderships, as in the case, for example, of Ghana. I think there was concern that people like Nkrumah were gradually becoming the handmaidens of the Russian establishment. And I think there was some basic reason to suggest this was the case, because, after all, the Soviets were, perfectly obviously, putting a great deal of effort into Africa. I think this may well have been, and I don't know this, but I think probably this was a basic piece of the Soviet effort to colonize the world, the basic premise that they were working from, expansion in all directions. They saw a kind of benighted society all over the continent. And we thought that they clearly saw this as an opportunity for their kind of messianic approach, together with all manner of subventions and dirty tricks. The effort was, as we could do it, keep them out. At the same time, we were continuing the notion of trying to build economically viable societies, social and political institutions that would be viable over the long haul. Again, a lot of this coming from the earlier period, from the days of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, where

there was this general feeling that somehow we could do a lot to help bring about a better situation and bring about economic development in a major way.

I remember a particular example that I've not forgotten, which involved Guinea. I was still in the Pentagon, head, at the time, of the Africa Bureau, the regional office, whatever. And there was a desire to expand the efforts of a very small American MAP (Military Assistance Program) training team to actually do something I thought quite intelligent, recognizing, however, fully that behind it was the influence of one of the important aluminum manufacturers, who desired to get their hands on the bauxite. I mean, let's face it. I was not unmindful of this. But, even so, it seemed to me a sensible proposition. If bauxite's there, and the Guineans would like to take advantage of exporting bauxite to improve their own economic well-being, that seemed sensible to me. Now if you get it from there to the ocean, it can be moved, and then it goes to smelters somewhere, again in Africa, and again that's economic development, I thought. The problem was, you didn't have a road to go from the bauxite mines to a port, nor was there a sufficient port. So the idea was, well, maybe the Americans can help. And whenever you did that, the State Department always turned to the military (who otherwise they didn't much like) to get it done. Okay, so they did. And we wanted to get a dump truck company to help build this road. I remember this very well, and I knew the MAP business very well, and it was, as any such program becomes, a very highly bureaucratized operation, all kinds of countervailing interests applied. Well, the answer was, we needed, I don't know, 15, 17 dumps trucks or something. Where are we going to get these dump trucks? So I called on the military establishment to find out where we get them.

And the answer was, “Well, we can deliver those in two and a half years.”

I said, “No, you misunderstand. I'm talking about two and a half months, not two and a half years.”

“That's impossible, because the only place they could come from is from the active Army.”

And I said, “Come on, fellas.”

Well, the answer was, absolutely we would have to get a specific directive from the Secretary of Defense, ordering it. Well, that wasn't going to happen, for a whole host of reasons, service connections and so on.

So I called up the Mack Truck Company. I said, “Could you put together 17 dump trucks?” They don't make dump trucks. What they make are truck chassis, with engines and so on, and then you get the bed, whatever it is, a dump bed, from a manufacturer who produces that kind of stuff. We deliver the chassis, he puts the stuff on, and we do it.

Well, to make a long story short, it also happened, I knew, that the AID program had built, in Conakry, a small vehicle rehab facility. I checked, and they would be perfectly capable of assembling dump trucks, if they got the chassis, which could be broken down, even, and the bed. They could assemble as many as two in a week, or something of the sort. So I said, gee, it looks sensible to me, why don't we put this all together in a package? But we had to have special procurement authority, sole source. So I remember we put together a memo for the Secretary of Defense. Ultimately, the secretary approved, and so we got this whole thing going.

Now that, it seemed to me, was the sort of thing we were trying to do, because, first, it made good use of the AID facility that was there, second, it got the trucks, even though they were all different colors. You can always paint them. Some people were very upset about that, “Look at these trucks, God.” I said, “But they're trucks. We wanted 17 trucks, and we got them.” And you get the road built, which then allows the bauxite to flow down the road to this port, which they already had (I can't remember the name of the little place). They were already working to make that port an effective offtake facility. And then you'd move the stuff to another location on the continent, where it would go to a smelter. Now I thought, geez, you know, that's economic development.

Well, it all worked out pretty well until, of course, Mr. Toure got into one of his rages and locked all our young people...

*Q: This is Sekou Toure.*

KENNEDY: He locked up all our young soldiers and refused to let them out of their barracks. It was at the same time that he locked up the ambassador's wife and family. So that, of course, ended the project.

But that was the kind of thinking that people were trying to do.

Now I mentioned Rhodesia and South Africa. Here, the problem was to try very hard to keep the Soviets out from what could be a very, very difficult situation, where a whole way of life was going to be changed for thousands and thousands of people who were the economic backbone and the political backbone of these societies, at the same time, recognizing that the native populations had a major stake that we needed to recognize and also recognize that it was that stake that the Soviets were going to be pushing on. So that's the way we kind of thought about it, I think.

But let me just say one other thing. I also remember, and it was just before I went to the NSC, going into Mr. Warnke's staff meeting in the Defense Department and reporting that, that morning, we had three coups to report. So we also were mindful of the fact that instability was a way of life. The Congo business continued, as you know. Indeed, that was a major matter of concern. The Nigerian civil war was just then beginning. The Nigerian civil war in particular had its effect here in the United States politically, because there were religious overtones, as well as terrible human-rights abuses on all sides.

So, if I were to add it all up, there was a feeling of compassion, a feeling of we've got to be sure that whatever we do, we try to keep the Soviets' hands off, and, lastly, do all this in as low key as possible. We can't let this get in the way of our most urgent concerns, such

as the Indian subcontinent and NATO and the big relationship with the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

*Q: And China, of course.*

KENNEDY: And China.

*Q: Was there an Africa person on the NSC? How did this work?*

KENNEDY: Yes, there was an Africa person, a very bright young fellow, who subsequently, I thought, lost his way, Roger Morris. He was very junior, and he became, what shall I say, I don't want to denigrate him, but he became much too satisfied with his own brilliance. And, if you recall, he was one of those who left the staff. This was not long after I had arrived. [Morris resigned in April 1970 over the US invasion of Cambodia, but was kept on by Kissinger until the fall.] I remember because it was in those early days of my being there that we were working very hard (we had been, while I was still in the Pentagon) on the Nigerian problem, particularly in how to deliver relief supplies, food in particular. And for whatever reason (I never knew nor did I care to), I think it was Elliot Richardson who said that he would be unwelcome on a trip to Africa. As a consequence, I went to Nigeria instead of him. I didn't know what the problem was, but he was disinvited. He was disinvited as well, simultaneously, to the chiefs of mission meeting in Africa, where he would normally have been expected to be, but he was disinvited. I don't know what caused this, except that he had become very brash. That was not like him. I didn't think that was his style at all. But he became very brash, very impressed, as I said, with his own brilliance.

*Q: Did he move over to into Congress, a congressional aide or something?*

KENNEDY: No, no, no. No, I think he may have come from there. [Morris joined Senator Mondale's staff in the fall of 1970.] He left and wrote some books. He wrote one very recently. I have no idea what he does. He does write books.

*Q: I was thinking that this Biafra thing, this was part of the Nigerian civil war.*

KENNEDY: How well I know; I went to Biafra.

*Q: An interesting thing that happened was that we had a policy, which we maintain today, which is not a bad one, that Africa is so rent with tribal disputes that let's do everything we can to keep these boundaries intact.*

KENNEDY: That's right, inviolate boundaries.

*Q: That might not make sense, but once you start unplugging that bottle, the genie is out and it's absolute chaos.*

KENNEDY: There's no way to put it back.

*Q: Yet, at the same time, the Biafran cause really attracted what I like to call the glitterati — it was the Hollywood stars and the Beatles. And people in Congress became very strong for the Biafran cause. It became a real burden for us.*

KENNEDY: I think that was almost inevitable, given the American psyche, because, however it was being done, and I think some of it was being orchestrated, there was a continuous inflow of information about atrocities. I think they were all true, but under normal circumstances, I don't suppose they would have attracted quite the attention that they got.

The Nigerian government, meanwhile, seemed either incapable or undesirous of doing anything significant to try to alleviate the situation, and, indeed, seemed to be supporting the Hausa, the Muslim majority of the, what is it, northeast, northwest, against the Biafrans, the Biafrans claiming that all they wanted was the opportunity to live in peace, with their own religious beliefs and so on. And this, of course, incited the churches. I remember the enormous efforts being made by various church relief organizations,

Catholic Relief Services, OXFAM, all kinds of people. I remember, indeed, acquiring a bunch of airplanes, huge, big, old, prop-driven airplanes, to be able to deliver relief supplies, particularly food and medicines, into Biafra. I think that the Nigerian government brought a great deal of this on itself. I never did have a doubt in my mind that there wasn't a way that you could resolve the problem without the kind of civil war that actually occurred.

*Q: How did Henry Kissinger, from your perspective, view Africa? One had the feeling that, for a long time, this was just a distraction.*

KENNEDY: As I said, I think that is probably correct. My recollection of the situation was, we were mindful of the interests of the Soviets, who had an interest in destabilizing as much of the continent as possible, keeping other people out of it, gaining whatever advantage could be obtained from minerals and the like control, and, ultimately, political domination, if you will, by insertion of political leadership, either certainly supportive of the Soviet viewpoint or in fact Soviet puppets. We were mindful of that.

We were mindful of the increasing disorganization in the continent, as the farther away from the colonial period you got, the more disorganized all the countries and institutions, except for Rhodesia and South Africa, became. There was, of course, our continuing interest in economic development, and, if you would, some sort of social/political development in order to kind of bridge the tribal differences so that you had some sort of a unified (although that's a strange word in those contexts), but some sort of unification of viewpoint, in the hope that, indeed, you would see the kind of economic development that could only arise out of or concomitant with a political maturation.

Well, all those things, in the context of let's keep it in the low key so that we don't let things African impinge upon our relationships vis-#-vis the Soviet Union, in the bigger context, the arms control, the Cold War concerns, our concerns with Western Europe, NATO, the European Union, China, the gradually developing relationship with China, and then, of

course, behind it all, Vietnam. So, yes, I wouldn't say we ignored it. I would have simply said that was not in the forefront of policy making. Policy making was essentially focused on keeping things from getting out of hand.

*Q: Moving to China. There had been the big opening to China, which you talked about. Were there discussions at all about the long-term aspects of relations with China? Here is a place that has a quarter of the population of the globe, plus the Chinese are highly industrious people and...*

KENNEDY: Very intelligent.

*Q: Very intelligent, but they'd been sort of going off in, you might say, the wrong course at the time, which was keeping them down. But, at the same time, the potential there is tremendous. Henry Kissinger seemed to be using the China card as a riposte to the Soviet card. But now, the China problem is much more with us, you might say, in many ways, than the Russian problem. One can argue on this. But were there discussions about whither China in the next 30-50 years?*

KENNEDY: Sure, sure. But you should understand that the opening to China, Kissinger's visit, was a very, very closely guarded secret. I don't think there were more than four or five people on Kissinger's staff who were aware of it, and in the rest of the government, there weren't a half a dozen people, I'm confident. I remember at one point, as plans were being made for Kissinger's visit, this was being done in ways that, when I realized who and how it was being done, I thought, to say the very least, were naive, and that also could actually jeopardize the mission, particularly its secrecy, and that I thought some professional input might be useful. I quietly suggested this, and it was not a universally (well, universally, there were only two people involved), it was not considered the greatest idea that they'd ever heard, until I suggested that there were a number of things that were going to happen. And at least one of the people that I specifically had in mind was inevitably going to know this. Therefore, it seemed to me better he be on your team than

off doing something different that could disrupt the whole exercise, because of his view of what security was.

*Q: Who was that?*

KENNEDY: The station chief. And so, finally, I did arrange... He came back and...

*Q: This was in Pakistan.*

KENNEDY: In Pakistan.

*Q: Yes, absolutely.*

KENNEDY: It was done very well, and, I think, in no small measure, because he helped make sure that it got done right, and that all of the potential interruptions he could block one way or another, you see.

Well, anyway, that was only to go to say that the whole thing was being done in a very secretive way. In retrospect, I think that was the only way you could do it. Impossible to do it otherwise, because, otherwise, the number of people who would oppose would come out of the woodwork and make it impossible.

*Q: Oh, absolutely. No, the government at a certain point has to make its actions..., because there are people who always are against what you're doing. And you really have to do this, come up with a decision and then defend it, rather than as it's developing. The thing can get off track so quickly.*

KENNEDY: Yes. Well, you were asking...

*Q: About the potential, looking at the long...*

KENNEDY: Were people looking at the longer picture? Oh, yes, without any doubt. I don't think there's any question. Indeed, there were, I think, two major aspects. One, the

relationship with the Soviet Union. And, sure, it was perfectly obvious that there could be a card played here, because the relationship between the Soviet Union and China was not the best, and we had an opportunity here to work a relationship that would be in our mutual interest in this regard. It had to be in our mutual interest. I'm sure the Chinese saw it that way. But, on the other side, we were talking about, as you said, a country with a quarter of the population of the globe, and, as I suggested, enormously intelligent, enormously capable and industrious.

So where are they going? You'd like to have some influence on where they're going, not to the extent of trying to tell them what to do, but trying to participate with them in what they're doing, and, in the most indirect sense, develop a broadening of political and economic thought. And I think, by and large, that happened. Now whether we had anything to do with it, I don't know. But I don't think what we did had a deleterious effect. I think that was motivation, no question about it. I remember Henry saying this on more than one occasion, quietly, you cannot go on having as a totally separate pariah state a quarter of the population of the globe. You can't do this. It doesn't make any sense. So, if you take that..., what do you do? And the answer is, somehow you've got to reestablish a relationship.

Let me also say that another influencing factor, of course, was Vietnam. The Chinese could be helpful, because they and the Vietnamese had a long history of being unhappy with one another. The Soviets, on the other hand, were doing what they could to assist the North Vietnamese. And the Chinese didn't like that. So, again, there was a measure of mutual interest here.

Now it was also recognized at that time that, after all, you are Communist brothers. You don't carve each other up. But you can try to bring influence on them, or you can slow down any efforts you're making to help them, in ways that could be beneficial.

*Q: What was your feeling about the Soviet Union at this time? In many ways, this was the great game that Henry Kissinger was playing. Was there ever any concern that maybe he was getting so involved in the intricacies of the game with the Soviet Union that maybe we were getting too close to the Soviets, or getting too much like the Soviets, or anything like that?*

KENNEDY: No, I don't think that was the case. I do think that there was clearly a kind of empathetic reaction developing, where Dobrynin, on the one hand, and Kissinger, on the other...

*Q: Dobrynin being the Soviet ambassador for many years.*

KENNEDY: They could have very candid conversations. I don't think that's bad. On the other hand, it seemed clear that, in many cases (and I think Paul Nitze referred to this in his book), the relationship between the NSC and the Soviets was closer than the official relationships between our governments, as reflected through the US Embassy in Moscow, as contrasted with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. I'm not sure about whether that was good or bad. I think only history will be able to discern that, over time. But it's a fact, it's a fact, that some of the arms-control decisions I don't think could have ever been achieved any other way, for, and I engaged in some of these things myself, it was perfectly clear that the bureaucracy, left to itself, would never be able to pull itself together to break the logjam, on either side, on either side.

*Q: This again is almost the secrecy angle, or decisions that can be made, because when we're talking about Henry Kissinger, we're always talking about he had the immediate ear of the president, who usually backed him up.*

KENNEDY: Any everybody knew that. That was the important thing. And that was true of the staff. And, whenever that's true, it makes life a lot easier. I found that out in the State Department. If, indeed, you are seen to have the ear of and the full support of

the leadership, you can do a great deal. And you don't have to go back and ask, Can I do this?, you know whether you can do it or not. And people know that that's the case. Therefore, when you speak, you're just inevitably going to be listened to. Now I think there's something to be said for that. I think it's the only way things get done.

*Q: There's nothing innate in a bureaucratic organization, only if it works.*

KENNEDY: Bureaucratic organizations usually work, at a certain level. Beyond that, they don't work at all. But you have to have them, otherwise you'd never get the visas written, you'd never get the procurement authorizations done, and you'd never get licenses issued. But if you're talking about strategic decision making, bureaucracy won't work.

*Q: You were sort of the general administrative officer of the NSC. Did you have a problem of watching your young hotshots within the NSC who might be calling up and saying, this is the NSC calling, this is the White House calling, and pushing ahead and upsetting a lot of people and all that? Was this a problem?*

KENNEDY: Yes, sure. I'll give you an example. Some of those young hotshots used to get very upset. They'd write papers saying, “Laird thinks so and so.” So every paper I read, and if I didn't like it, it didn't go. And that upset them. I'd call them up and I'd say, “Excuse me, who is this Laird person you're talking about?”

“Well, God damn it, he's the Secretary of Defense.”

And I said, “Good. Write the paper over and say, 'The Secretary of Defense believes.' Have just the kind of courtesy that a person in your position ought to demonstrate.” It used to drive them crazy. But that's inevitable. You have some of that now.

*Q: Oh, this always happens. Somebody has to sit at the side.*

KENNEDY: Somebody has to say, no, that won't do, fellas.

*Q: That won't do, and let's keep this. Because there's nothing like a very bright young person feeling a secondary power. Caesar had the same problem, and I'm sure Charlemagne did, too.*

KENNEDY: I'm absolutely certain that that's the way it is. When I was quite young, I probably felt this way, too. Young people, because of their education, and because they don't have any experience that they have to worry about, have a natural feeling of omniscience. They simply know that they know, and that they're blessed with this knowledge, as contrasted with these other people who can't see it quite as clearly as they can.

I always tell a story. I was very good at spelling when I was a little kid, very good, and I used to win the spelling bees all the time. My mother, one day, asked me to spell the word omniscience. She said, “I want you to spell this word.” What I had learned was, except in extraordinary cases, if you can parse the thing into syllables, you can spell it. And so I spelled omniscience.

And she said, “Very good! What does it mean?”

I said, “Gee, I really don't know, I don't think, what it means.”

She said, “Well, I want you to look it up and tell me what it means. And then I'm going to tell you it's the one thing you will never have.”

I have never forgotten that, ever.

You go to college campuses, and, God, the young people are bright. They really are. But there's something to be said for wisdom, which comes with having gone through this play two or three times, and recognizing that there are not all that many new things under the sun, on the one hand, and on the other hand, recognizing that, indeed, it takes a whole lot of players to make a team, and if they're all playing individual baseball, then they won't

win. So that's something that they need to learn. And you can't teach that; they just have to experience it. So, yes, that problem arose from time to time.

On the other hand, I can tell you that, in some cases, it operated the other way. Now I know this to be a fact, because I was asked to do what I could to prevent it. On more than one occasion, a meeting would occur, agreement would be reached upon what course of action should be followed, and, of course, this involved, inevitably, the State Department issuing a telegram to its far-flung activities, saying this is the way things are going to be: A, B, C, D. Unfortunately, the telegrams would not necessarily fully represent the conclusions, which sometimes were different from the then-conventional wisdom. Again, that's a perfectly natural thing. You know, somebody who's been immersed in something, doing something. That's one of the problems with policy making in this government in the bureaucracy. Once you're in it, obviously, the correct policy is what you're doing. That's inevitable, you know. But, a few times, it became a bit embarrassing, because it seemed like there were two tracks being run.Sometimes people find themselves moving in a somewhat different direction, because in all probability they weren't participants in the meetings themselves, and they are not necessarily persuaded, having been used to putting words together in particular conformations to reflect, with all the nuance, the existing policy. A change, however 'nuancey' that change might be, over time, gets lost, as instruction after instruction goes out, until finally you take a look six months later and you're back where you were before the change in policy occurred. That's a fact. That's the way bureaucracies function. And so we were asked to make certain that, in certain particular cases where it really would matter, the State Department draft the cable and send it over for clearance. I was usually the guy to whom it came, since I was a participant in the meeting. I knew what was said, and I knew what was expected. So that helped, because that immediately put the attention, probably, of somebody who was actually at the meeting on this drafting exercise. Otherwise, it would be in the normal course, well, here's what we've got to do, debrief, this is what we do is go ahead and draft it and get that out, but without ever seeing that result. This helped do that.

*Q: In early '75, you went to, what, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency?*

KENNEDY: Yes, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It was a brand new commission. It arose out of the breakup of the old Atomic Energy Commission, the idea being to separate the so-called promotional activities. This was a notion that you can't promote at the same time you're doing regulation. I think it's a silly concept. But, however, it was prevalent at the time, and it continues to raise its ugly head from time to time. So the idea was to separate the regulation of the nuclear energy business from the promotion business. And so the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was created as a health and safety agency. And so I went over there.

*Q: We're going to be coming back, because you were involved in international nuclear, although this was internal, so we won't dwell too long on this, but just to get a feel. Why you?*

KENNEDY: Why me? I don't know why me.

*Q: Obviously, you were a manager, but you didn't have a particular background in nuclear stuff.*

KENNEDY: Well, yes, I did know a lot about nuclear. I didn't know anything about nuclear power, but I did know a lot about nuclear. I had been to all of the schools on how do you make bombs. I knew all of that. And I did know, and I was responsible for reviewing, the regular stockpile requests and production requests and testing requests every year. So I knew all that side of the business. I didn't know the nuclear power business. Why me? I don't know, except I had had a serious heart problem, with bypass surgery, that, after great success, then failed. The Saturday Night Massacre occurred while I was in the hospital.

*Q: This was when President Nixon fired...*

KENNEDY: When the president fired a series of senior Justice Department officials. And I had told Haig, who by that time had come back and was a sort of chief of staff, that I would very much like to look to other things. A couple of things were actually offered to me, and he said, don't do that. I said, Okay, I don't care about... Then this new commission was being created, and I was asked would I like to be considered. I said, sure, sounds interesting.

Also, although at the time I think people had not realized it, they took all of the existing law as it conveyed powers and responsibilities to the chairman and commissioners of the Atomic Energy Commission and tried to split them, so that those things that properly belonged to a new regulatory commission would be created in law to that commission. In the process of this, one of the things I'm not sure that they fully recognized was that licensing, licensing would be the responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Among the licensing things, which people I don't think even focused on, was export licenses. And the export licensing business in the nuclear business is a very big matter. As a consequence, the regulatory commission became involved in the whole issue of international regulation. At the same time, there is in law a whole series of requirements for establishing agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These have to be negotiated and agreed to and approved as a basis for the issuance of licenses and so on.

That having been said, there was an interest on my part, and I said, sure. I remember going and talking to one of the young fellows, who I knew very well, in the personnel office. They called me and asked me if I'd come down. I went and had an interview and filled out all our papers and so on. And he said, “Well, we've got lawyers, and we have nuclear scientists. I guess we'll have another category: Washington Generalists.” As a matter of fact, most such organizations do have people with direct expertise, usually have a lawyer, and usually have somebody who is a generalist who understands the policy making process. Also, the commission had a direct interest in the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris, both of which had major safety responsibilities. This, of course, was one of the principal functions of the commission. In addition to which, what I did not know until later was that the old Atomic Energy Commission, and now it devolved upon the new regulatory commission, had a whole series of interlocking agreements with other safety organizations around the world. These agreements were constantly being upgraded and discussed, and regular meetings would occur between these organizations. So there was a kind of foreign-policy aspect to all of this, which has continued, by the way. So that's how I became involved.

*Q: You were doing this from '75 until when?*

KENNEDY: Until 1980, five and a half years, because my term expired. Mr. Carter had no interest in reappointing me; I was not a Democrat.

*Q: During this five and a half years, from your perspective, what were some of the major foreign-policy angles and problems that you had to deal with?*

KENNEDY: That I had to deal with?

*Q: Yes.*

KENNEDY: First, these were not problems that I had to deal with alone. I did have to agree to an agreement for cooperation that had been drafted by the State Department. I had very close relationships with those people, and still have the closest relationships with some of those people, and we became close friends. They had developed a cooperation agreement with Egypt, all on the prospect that Egypt would agree, as a Nonproliferation Treaty partner, Israel would agree, in the same context, and they would both have agreements for cooperation identical. I remember going over this, over a lunch one day in my office, and saying it looks fine to me, ultimately. Subsequently, unfortunately, the Egyptians did sign it; the Israelis never did. A small bone of contention with the Egyptians ever since, needless to say.

Beyond that, oh, lots of discussion about the whole licensing business, and lots of hearings and discussions over the developments, in the middle of that period, about 1977, of the major change in the Atomic Energy Act, the so-called Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which resulted in a major problem with almost everybody else in the world, because they claimed, and I think accurately so, that the United States had unilaterally changed the terms of the agreements that they had. And that was true. I don't think that's the sort of thing the United States ought to do. But, on the other hand, I also am mindful of the fact that the Congress does what it chooses, and so long as it's constitutional, if the president chooses to sign it, that's the law, and Americans have the obligation to live up to this law.

Now I, simply because I had been known rather widely in the international community even before I got in this business, was asked to speak frequently before big international meetings of these kinds of people. And so I undertook, not to sell the NNPA (the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act), but rather to explain it.

I remember, for example, being in Tokyo at a big international meeting. They had more meetings than you can imagine, scientific tourism. Anyway, a huge, huge meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum, and I was asked to make some remarks about the Nonproliferation Act, and so I did. I remember that the then-director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a long-time friend, came to me on the platform of a railroad station outside of Tokyo and said, “Dick, you have explained it so beautifully. Keep working at it, because they trust you. They believe you.” I thought that was one of the nicest things I'd ever heard.

*Q: Oh, absolutely, yes.*

KENNEDY: I had been negotiating with the Europeans over an agreement, which is now before the Congress, for many years. The British fellow was the senior civil servant in the European Community. This was later, this was when I was in the State Department. But he and I became fast friends. Our families got to know each other. I don't know whether

that's good for negotiations or not. I think so, so long as you're candid. I was in Tokyo, and the fellow there with whom I'd been negotiating for a considerable time had a little dinner for me and said he was leaving to become the consul general in New York, which is the equivalent of being an ambassador anywhere, for the Japanese, at least. In his car, he turned to me and he said, “I want you to know that I talked with (the British fellow, whose name I can't recall now), and he said, 'The one thing that you can count on,' and I am going to tell my successor, I want you to know this, 'the one thing that you can count on is you can believe Dick Kennedy. If he says what he says, he means exactly what he says. And he will live up to what he says. And you don't ever have to worry about that.'” And, again, I thought that was about the nicest thing that you can get. If somebody trusts you, the probability is you can probably get somewhere. But if they don't trust you, you'll never get anywhere.

So, during that time, we had that sort of thing going on. I went to the annual general conference of the IAEA and several of its board meetings, and developed a very close relationship with the people at the IAEA in Vienna, and subsequently the same at the Nuclear Energy Agency, the OECD, in Paris.

Now the other thing, I was invited to make a speech at a meeting of the American Nuclear Society and the Latin American Nuclear Society (they're big things), in Montevideo. En route, I thought I'd like to stop and see my old friend, Dr. Cavallo, who was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Brazil, then go on and, at the same time, accept a long-time invitation from Admiral Carlos Castromidero, a long-time personal friend, who was also the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Argentina.

When I inquired of the Department of State would they mind giving me some briefings, I learned that they were terribly upset that I would be going to Brazil, because we were having terrible difficulties with the Brazilians over their nuclear program at the time. I was fully aware, au courant with all of this. Bob Sayre, who was then the ambassador, wrote this scathing telegram (I remember, because he sent me a copy) back to the Department,

saying, “Mr. Kennedy is well-known to me and to my Brazilian colleagues. He has a full appreciation of the situation here, and of the necessity for dealing well with the press. And I can personally attest to the fact that there isn't a person in the press whom he can't handle perfectly.” These guys were just absolutely infuriated.

So I went, and I had a whole series of press conferences, and it all worked out very well. It all worked out very well.

Anyway, in the process of these meetings, I had an opportunity to discuss what was then, and remains, national policy, that we were interested in seeing the Argentines and the Brazilians bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, and actually to sign the NPT. Now I did this in a way that wasn't pejorative, something that the real policy makers couldn't do, and can't do today, either. They just don't know how. They go and beat on them.

*Q: You have to have a diplomatic victory.*

KENNEDY: It just doesn't get you anywhere, to go and say: You're wrong. My view was, look, I understand your position. Please understand mine. And then let's see if we can talk about the areas in which we agree, and see if there's some way we can expand those areas that we agree on. And let's forget about the things that we disagree about. Okay? And I found that, over the years, it paid off a lot.

So that's what I was doing in that length of time. But, most of the time, I was worrying about things like Three Mile Island.

*Q: That was a nuclear catastrophe that didn't quite happen, near Philadelphia.*

KENNEDY: Harrisburg. It was a major accident, which had no effect on the population, no effect on the environment.

*Q: As we're talking about nuclear nonproliferation and the other things that you were involved with during this period of time, from '75 until '81 or so, what was our attitude toward the Soviet Union? Were we, in this case, sort of on the same side, or not?*

KENNEDY: Essentially on the same side. In the nuclear nonproliferation business, we were essentially on the same side. Indeed, so much so that when Secretary Shultz met with Gromyko at the end of September, October '82, the two of them agreed that there should be a full-blown meeting on this subject. And Shultz asked me to lead this. I remember, I was still Under Secretary. We had the meeting in Washington. It was the first of a regular series of semi-annual meetings in which we alternated capitals, together with a series of smaller meetings that we had on the margins of the Board of Governors' meeting and the general conference in Vienna. So that was another four meetings, smaller but nonetheless substantive. But these others would be full-blown, three- or four-day meetings. At the time of the shootdown of the Korean airplane by the Soviets...

*Q: This was in '82...*

KENNEDY: Eighty-three? Anyway, the government decided they'd break off all relationships, essentially, just minimal contact. Shultz called me and he said, “I want those talks to continue.” So I got in touch with my Soviet friends, colleagues, and said, “Look, we're not going to invite you to Washington, and we don't want to be invited to Moscow. But we would like to continue those talks. We have a proposal. We will have them in what could be considered sort of international cities, Vienna. We will have the meeting in our embassy in Vienna. You pick one where you would like to have such a meeting in your embassy.” They picked Finland, which had some claim to international-meeting fame. So we had a meeting there. And we were the only real contact of that kind, on that level, during a period of probably 18, 20 months.

*Q: What was your attitude and impression while you were at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission toward Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, South Africa? These were countries that we were concerned...*

KENNEDY: Oh, there were a lot more in those days. From '75 to '80?

*Q: Yes, or other ones, too. What were our concerns?*

KENNEDY: My attitude?

*Q: Your attitude, yes.*

KENNEDY: My attitude was the attitude of my government, which was that we believed that it was important that all of those countries agree to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and that, if indeed they would, we would then be prepared to sit down and negotiate with them agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That was our basic philosophy and basic principle. And it was one which I fully espoused.

At the same time, as I mentioned, there was a major problem that arose because of the Nonproliferation Act, something that sticks to this day, by the way, I can tell you, a total mistrust that was built up because the United States did unilaterally change the terms of the agreements that existed. These are agreements approved by the Senate, authorized for signature by the President, and signed by the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State. These agreements are sitting out there. And the terms of the Nonproliferation Act changed the terms of those agreements. And these people said that's a unilateral decision obviating the agreement, and that's unacceptable. I could not disagree with that, because it happened to be true. What I tried to do was to say, look, you think that the agreement says this. Well, let me parse it, as a lawyer would, for you. I'll tell you that's not what you think it says. What you think it says is not what the fact is. What it does say is something

to which both of us would subscribe in basic principle. Now even though that's true, in substantial measure, it's also the case that we shouldn't have done that the way we did it.

I'll never forget, I was in Japan, I was still on the commission, and some of the senior people in the Japanese nuclear industry invited me to a private supper. They just wanted to talk about the Nonproliferation Act. I had become fairly familiar with it. They didn't understand it, truly. It became perfectly evident to me as we talked about it, they thought it said something totally different than what it said. So I said, “No, fellas, now wait. Let's just look at this, one paragraph at a time. See, you said it says so and so. But it doesn't. Let me show you exactly what it says. And let me tell you what that means in English. And then let's see if we can put that in proper Japanese, because you are misunderstanding it.” By the time we finished three and a half hours of this, and having almost no supper, I persuaded them that this thing was not the disaster they thought it was.

I remember also doing the same thing in a meeting in Brussels, at which I had been asked to speak. This was a meeting of the American and the European Atomic Industrial Forums. Again, I simply preached the doctrine: “I'm sorry. I think you are right to say that this was a unilateral change in the agreement, and you don't think that's the right thing to do. Well, I don't think so, either. But that is neither here nor there. It is the law of the United States now, and the United States must observe its law. Okay? Now you don't have to observe it, but we do.” After about 30 minutes of my speech, I got a note from David Fisher, who was then the director of international relations for the International Atomic Energy Agency and is now a professor in residence at the Monterey Institute, saying, “You have made a masterful, thoroughly persuasive case. I congratulate you, because you have made a silk purse from what otherwise would seem to be a sow's ear.” Well, that's what I was doing. I was preaching the doctrine of my government.

*Q: Did you have dealings with the Israelis?*

KENNEDY: The Israelis? Oh, yes.

*Q: Here we have sort of every control you might think of on them, yet we don't.*

KENNEDY: No, we don't. In those days, my relationships with the Israelis were essentially in the safety cooperation, in which we had very good relations. However, when I came into the State Department, I began to have regular relationships with the Israelis. All I can say is, they make it very clear that they are not going to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. They are not going to accept full-scope safeguards, until such time as they are persuaded that a comprehensive peace arrangement for the Middle East has been achieved. I accept that. I don't think any time ought to be wasted trying to do otherwise. What I would say is that, in the last year or so of my tenure, there were some regular discussions being held with the Israelis on the whole peace question. One aspect was what to do about the nuclear problem.

I was intrigued when, just a couple of months ago, Perez, just in a kind of almost offhand...

*Q: This is Prime Minister Perez of Israel.*

KENNEDY: Almost in an offhand way (but prime ministers don't speak offhandedly, publicly), during his discussions with President Assad of Syria, Peres said, “In the context of a comprehensive peace settlement, Israel could conceive of a Middle East nuclear-free zone, with all nuclear activities subject to IAEA safeguards.” I think that is probably an honest statement, and a rational and reasonable one, from the point of view of Israel.

Unfortunately, let me just say, unfortunately, during the time that we were having these discussions, I was instrumental, not alone, but I was instrumental in getting Syria to sign on to the NPT. Among other things, we said, of course, without that, the Israelis never will. I never said the Israelis will, but I said they never will without that. I think the Syrians may well have translated it slightly differently into Arabic.

*Q: One last question, and then I think we'll end this session. How good was our intelligence about the development of nuclear capabilities by other nations such as India, Pakistan, Israel, China?*

KENNEDY: Mixed. Mixed. There's intelligence and intelligence. Just because the stuff comes from the so-called intelligence agencies doesn't make it intelligence, as far as I'm concerned. I like to see facts. I recognize, and I know better than most, that, in the intelligence world, facts may be ephemeral. What is a fact today may not be tomorrow. What is one man's fact may be somebody else's surmise. But when you come to the point of saying this is the basis on which we should formulate and execute policy, I think you've got to be right, and not just surmising, because if you surmise and you are wrong, even by a smidgen, your policy will be challenged by the other guy as being based on a false premise. And if your policy is challenged on that basis, you're in bad shape. If it's challenged on the basis of substance, that's arguable. But if it's based on a false premise, that's not arguable.

*Q: So, dealing with nuclear matters, where you were looking over at stockpiles and all, you wanted to talk about India/Pakistan, Latin America.*

KENNEDY: Well, that came much later. That came essentially when I came to the Department of State. Between the NSC staff and coming to the Department of State, I was, for nearly six years, a commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where I certainly had a good deal to do with nuclear nonproliferation affairs, because the NRC, as an agency, was responsible for reviewing and approving export licenses having to do with nuclear matters. And so, when I came to the Department of State, Secretary Haig knew of my previous connection with this nuclear business, and was aware that I had a pretty wide acquaintanceship in the world of nuclear aficionados. And so he told me that he wished me, even though I was Under Secretary for Management, also to keep a watching brief on

the nuclear proliferation issues, which were, by and large, the responsibility at that time of the Oceans, Environment, and Science Bureau. So that's how I got involved in all of this.

When Secretary Haig left, Secretary Shultz asked me which I wanted to do, did I want to continue to be the Under Secretary for Management, or did I really want to continue to be the major factor in the nuclear business. He asked the question, he said, because he believed each of those was a full-time job. And I must say that, after considerable thought, I concluded that he was right, that keeping a watching brief actually involved a good deal more in that field than just looking after things. It involved being involved; involved, indeed, to the extent of being asked to appear before congressional committees on the subject.

I should add as well that, in September or maybe a little earlier of 1981, [appointment was 27 July 1981] I was nominated for and confirmed as the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the rank of ambassador.

To make a long story short, as I said, after thinking about it a while, I concluded that Secretary Shultz was absolutely right, that these two tasks were significant enough in their own way that they needed full-time attention. I thought about it long and hard, and finally concluded, partly because I was informally advised, not from Secretary Shultz but from someone who knew what his thinking was, that he had hoped that I would continue in the nuclear business, although Ken Damm, who was the Deputy Secretary, had urged me to continue as the Under Secretary. But Shultz hoped that I would continue in the nuclear business, principally because, from his association with Bechtel, he knew that I had been rather heavily involved in the so-called peaceful uses of nuclear energy for several years in the NRC, and he felt comfortable that I knew what I was talking about on the subject and knew what I was doing, and therefore he hoped that I would do this. That was one factor that led me to conclude that I would do so. So I undertook to be the Ambassador-at-Large for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear energy affairs.

*Q: What I would like to do, because there's a longer period on nuclear things, both the watching brief and the time when you were dealing with this, why don't we talk about the management side first.*

KENNEDY: All right.

*Q: This was between when and when? You came in when, and when did you move over?*

KENNEDY: Actually, during the transition, I came over to the Department. I had already served as a team chief of a transition team for the Reagan administration, from the day after the election until Christmas, looking after and putting together a full report on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the issues that the new administration had to think about and its relationships with that agency. Christmas Eve, I remember, Secretary Haig called me and asked me to come to see him, that he wanted me to be a part of his new State Department organization. I went over to see him the day after New Year's, when he came back, and it was at that time that he offered me the position of Under Secretary for Management, but also noted that he would hope that I would continue to take an active interest in the nuclear business. So, in the under secretary's role, I undertook to get myself read in, in these transition days, from the 1st of January up until the inauguration.

I shall never forget that one of the estimable young lawyers from the office of the legal director came to see me with this large volume, and said, “Mr. Kennedy, there is something that you should know. And that is that, at the same time that you will be undertaking your role as under secretary for management, you will also be presiding over the introduction of the new Foreign Service Act.”

And I said, “Well, that's very, very nice.”

And they said, “We think that it would be extremely useful for you if you were to take the time to kind of think about it. And we'll be prepared, after you've taken a look at this, to

come in and give you a briefing, number one, and, number two, do everything we can to answer any questions you may have."

Well, so it was. A very, very complicated piece of legislation.

*Q: Had the legislation already passed?*

KENNEDY: It had already passed, and it was coming into effect. At the time, I thought, as I read it, and I did, I took it home over a weekend, and I spent the entire weekend reading it from cover to cover and thinking about it, and the more I thought about it, the more concerned I got. And I remember asking them, "Do you fellas know what it is you've done here?" I became persuaded that they really didn't know. (This is in retrospect; I don't know.) But I was concerned that they didn't really understand that you couldn't really have it both ways. You couldn't have an up and out system without having an out. But they seemed to forget that, going along with the increased opportunities for promotion of the Young Turks, and all Young Turks have that sort of basic view of life...

*Q: Young Turks are essentially the middle-grade political officers who are waiting for those old codgers to move out of the way, until they become old codgers.*

KENNEDY: Exactly, the old codgers being 10 years their senior.

*Q: I did both.*

KENNEDY: Well, so have I. I know how that is. Of course, I'd grown up with it. As a military officer, that's the way it worked. In the military, there was a fundamental reason for this, I think. There are relatively few senior officers who continue in service much beyond the age of 60. In those days, (I think it's different now, I'm not sure, but I think so), the reason was the physical requirements of being an active senior officer. You might be a colonel, but you were expected to do exactly what the private did. If you were supposed to jump out of airplanes, you jumped out of airplanes. It's just the way it was. So it was not necessarily

quite the same. The mental acuity of the individual or his skills at group dynamics or whatever, that wasn't the question, you see.

But here, it seemed to me, that was the question, because what you were talking about were people who were not necessarily supposed to be professional tennis players or hockey players, you were talking about people who had acquired a great store of knowledge and experience. And I've always believed there's nothing like experience. I know the young people don't see it that way. I think I didn't, either.

*Q: What we're trying to do with this oral history is, in a peculiar way, to pass on experience.*

KENNEDY: Yes. Well, I thought that they really hadn't thought this all the way through. They were seeing one side of a coin. And I understood that. I could see where they could see a situation in which they were essentially blocked until the old codgers, as you put it, got out of the way. And so the thing to do was make sure that there's a way to get the old codgers out of the way.

Well, that's not necessarily the way to solve the problem. I thought that the problem could be solved in a different way altogether.

In those days (again, it's different, I think, now), American business, fairly early on, decided that Joe Doakes was not going to become a vice president of the corporation. But that did not imply to them that Joe Doakes therefore had to go. No, no. They made certain that Joe Doakes's talents were effectively employed, in the interests of the corporation. Meanwhile, Joe Doakes, if he was dissatisfied with the notion that he was not going to become a vice president, would leave and go somewhere else where he might have a better opportunity, or he would just stay where he was, continue to do his job, and grow old gracefully in the service. And, it seemed to me, everybody benefitted from such a circumstance. Old Joe

Doakes was no longer in the track that the up-and-coming young chiefs who wanted to be vice presidents were running.

But that isn't what they did.

Well, it became very clear that they didn't anticipate that you were going to have to make these people go out. And so, immediately, within almost a year, I think, proposals were coming forward, well, what we ought to do is take advantage of this piece of the Act that says we can delay. And I said, well, you know, that's okay with me. I understand, I do understand that problem. But you also have to understand that there's a cap on the total number of human beings. And if you do that, you can't keep feeding in at a rate that anticipated a level of attrition, if you're not going to have that level of attrition. Sooner or later, you're going to have the whole system just bulging and not working at all. This was a serious problem that they faced, a serious problem. I don't know whether they ever did solve it. But they certainly had not solved it by the time I left the under secretary's role.

There was another interesting thing, and I suppose some might say that I was taking a right-wing view of this. But I know that when Secretary Shultz first arrived, he saw the same thing that I saw. And that is that the American Foreign Service Association, an excellent organization, well motivated, is also a labor union. Again, you can't have it both ways. But that they tried to do, and I think they are still trying to do it. I don't think it's good for anybody to pretend you're something you're not. And that was the way things were being done. I said, gee, I don't think that's quite right. After all, I'd been in the NRC, where we had one of the toughest unions in the business, the National Treasury and something or other union, a very tough organization. We had to learn how to work with those people. And we had to recognize they had rights that we had to observe. Well, that's true, but the management couldn't be part of that organization. It would be a basic conflict of interest. And I said, “You know, what we have here is the most senior officers of this department, who are certainly management in the basic, never mind the specific, those are

the managers. They're the ambassadors and so on. Those are the managers. How can they also be members of this organization, which is basically a labor union?

“Well, they aren't really a labor union.”

And I said, “You know, come on, you have a whole bunch of bargaining rights. Isn't that a labor union?”

Well, anyway, that was another issue.

When Secretary Shultz arrived, he had been formerly Secretary of Labor.

*Q: He'd also been a labor lawyer, taught labor. Anybody who knew labor, from any point of view, he was it.*

KENNEDY: Initially, he took that view. I remember sitting in a meeting, and he just said, “This is wrong.” After I left that and was off doing other things, subsequently, he softened his view. I think he became persuaded, no. Ultimately, I think there was some suggestion that, as soon as an officer arrived at some level, he could no longer be an active decision maker in the AFSA. And that's okay.

*Q: Because there were certain things like getting insurance and things that tied into that.*

KENNEDY: That's right. And I realized that. My understanding is that some way was found to separate, which I think was good sense, good sense. First of all, it put the “managers” in the framework of, you know, you're not just one of the club, you're not in that club. You're above that club. That club works for you. And I think that was terribly important to the way the whole structure functioned.

There was something else that I observed. I remember being in London and being asked by the ambassador to come and meet with the country team. And you remember that the very beginning of the Reagan administration was not so different from the major efforts

being made in the last couple of years to cut the budget. Dave Stockman was all over my back. He was the director of the Office of Management and Budget. Dave Stockman was all over my back about, you know, “We've got to cut these. You've got a quota.”

And I said, “We don't accept quotas, Dave. We'll sit down and we'll see what can be done about tightening things up and seeing if there's some money that can be taken out.”

I remember then being in London, and we were making major efforts along this line. The Congress was supportive, by the way. Our budget committees were headed by the other party, but they were all for it. They were interested in cutting the budget. They thought that the Department of State's budget was too fat. And I said, “Well, I don't think so, and I'm going to tell you why.” And I ultimately was able to persuade them that that wasn't the case. However, it was also the case that I was able to tell them some that we were going to cut, because I did think there was some fat. And we had evidence that that was the case. Anyway, as I said, back in London, going all through this back home, and I remember I'd made a few remarks about what we were trying to do and the general direction that we were trying to focus. And that general direction, by the way, I said, “We've got to talk about investment. We've got to talk about the future. And we ought to talk about what it takes to get from here to there, because it's going change. And you can't sit here with an antiquated communications system. What does it take to bring this into the 20th Century? What does it take to bring our medical staff up to the level that I know they believe is important? All those things need to be answered. And then we'd see what it costs to do it. But we need to know what it is we ought to be doing in looking into the future. So I went through this with these people. Everybody thought that was great. Everybody was very appreciative, thanked me very much. And I said, “Well, any questions?” Everything was quiet.

All of a sudden, one guy gets up and he says, “Yes. We think that we deserve a substantial increase in pay. When are we going to get it?”

And I was taken aback, because here was a guy who I think was totally out of his world. He did not understand where things were in the United States. All he knew was he really wanted some more money. He probably thought he needed more money, but that really wasn't the case. And I thought, gee, you know, I think here is a potential problem. If these people stay abroad too long, they forget what life in the United States is really all about. They think everybody lives in a five-bedroom house with three servants, and their kids go to school at taxpayer expense. They think everybody lives that way. In fact, nobody does except them. I didn't think all of them were that way, but this guy was. He got a little hand, you know, people were clapping for him. And I thought that's kind of too bad, because here are these people who I had asserted for years were some of the best and the brightest, by all odds. No question in my mind. And it still is the case. These people are genuinely devoted to their task, and bring to it a level of competence and character that's simply unquestioned. And so I thought, gee, if that's the case, something is missing here, and it's kind of an orientation problem. If you stay away long enough, you lose the flavor of what your own society is all about. And that can somehow maybe affect your judgment on other matters. So I thought it would be useful to try to do something about that. I talked to the Director General of the Foreign Service. I knew Joan Clark, I've known her ever since. She's a lovely lady, very able. I talked to her a little bit about this, and she kind of, I think, agreed. The problem was what to do. And I think the Foreign Service Institute's a good place to begin.

Anyway, so the management problem was, at that point... Well, we also had, God love him, we had an increasing effort to try to create the pyramid of management. This was the deputy secretary's pap. He believed that everything should be focused and... And everything should go through under secretaries. You know, assistant secretaries don't talk to the secretary, they talk to under secretaries.

And I said, “Well, you know, I spent a couple of fruitful years at the Harvard Business School, and I taught some management. And I understood all those theories, and I'd read

all the books. But, my dear friend, this isn't that kind of an institution. This is an institution where the Secretary of State is the Secretary of State. He's not just a manager of a group of three or four subordinates, who in turn are managers of a group of subordinates. He's the manager of the policy process, and not just the process but its substance. And he ain't going to be able to do that if he's not able to talk to the people with whom the substance is lodged. It's sort of a contradiction, in a sense, in terms, if you're looking at simple management concepts. But it's not so difficult to comprehend if you realize that each of these people who are running bureaus particularly, in the regional context, these are people who are formulating and executing, on a daily basis, the foreign policy of the United States. And they must have, in my judgment, a personal and close interface with the Secretary. Otherwise, the Secretary is going to be left out, and they are not going to have the benefit, on a timely basis, of his judgments. And I think neither of those situations ought to obtain."

Well, I continued to press that view. Secretary Shultz operated that way. Secretary Haig did. He knew what John Holdridge thought, believed, and considered important.

*Q: John Holdridge being assistant secretary for EA.*

KENNEDY: East Asia, yes.

*Q: I think it's interesting you say Haig. You could understand Shultz, but Haig came out of the military, as you did. Could you talk a little about that.*

KENNEDY: Well, sure. As I think I may have mentioned earlier, I first met Haig when he and I were deskmates as young lieutenant colonels in the Army staff. In the Army staff, a young lieutenant colonel is an action officer, you know. He may be a battalion commander in the field, but he's an action officer in the Pentagon.

But Haig served for several years in the White House. And it gave him, as it did me, a totally different perspective on how things really work. And I think that's where he came

to this general view. To say nothing of the fact that, when he came in, he had personally picked all of the assistant secretaries. He knew them well and personally, and he wanted to hear their views. Haig always, always was somebody who had his ear open; he wanted to hear what people said. He may not agree with them, but he wanted to hear what they said, so that when he made his own judgments, he was making judgements based, hopefully, on the widest possible input on the issue.

Well, I thought that made good common sense. It was the way I ran my own office when I was in the NRC. I got to know everybody in the staff. Our roles were very different; nonetheless, I knew what they thought, and respected their judgments.

So, anyway, that was an issue. It changed when Jim Baker came. There, it was a small, very small, group of people, and there essentially was a gulf.

*Q: This was always troubling to me, just looking at it more from the outside. Some of these people were very good, but sometimes you had things like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait almost slipping under the radar of that small group, because they were concentrated on other things.*

KENNEDY: I don't know how it works now. I haven't any idea. From what I hear, it's not very well. But that's neither here nor there.

Anyway, to go back to other things in that management era. As I said, we had all these problems with trying to get organizational changes made. I remember one that we tried to do, and somebody from outside, but associated with AFSA, got to the Hill and essentially killed it. It only took about five years, and there it was. It came up and was implemented.

*Q: What was that?*

KENNEDY: It was putting together and tying together the whole security apparatus, which I thought was kind of a mess, with the counterterrorism operation. I said, what's the

difference? I mean, these are essentially two pieces of the same puzzle. Why shouldn't they be merged together? For one thing, it would give the security officers, who were constantly complaining bitterly that they had no opportunity for advancement and that they were left out in the cold (that happened to be true, by the way, and I want to comment on that), an opportunity to expand their profile, if you will. I thought that would be something interesting to them. It turned out, not really. A lot of them were policemen, and policemen they intended to be.

*Q: This, of course, is the thing. The man I'm interviewing now came out of those ranks, Tony Gillespie.*

KENNEDY: Yes, I know Tony.

*Q: Tony Gillespie had quite a different outlook. It's a personal thing.*

KENNEDY: Yes, sure. Well, you know, as I said, lots of guys are policemen, they want to be policemen until they retire, and they don't want to do anything else. I was always the guy, and most of the people around me were people who looked for new challenges, new ideas, you know, the broader approach.

Anyway, that fell by the wayside. I can't remember his name now. He had been the ambassador in Brazil, who I brought in to try to lead it.

*Q: Diego Asencio, by any chance?*

KENNEDY: No.

*Q: Tony Motley?*

KENNEDY: Before Asencio. Before Asencio or after. Before, I think. Well, you'd remember his name, he's one of the old hands.

[Ambassadors to Brazil 1907-1989: Irving B. Dudley, Edwin V. Morgan, Hugh S. Gibson, Jefferson Caffery, Adolf A. Berle, William D. Pawley, Herschel V. Johnson, James S. Kemper, James Clement Dunn, Ellis O. Briggs, Clare Boothe Luce, John M. Cabot, Lincoln Gordon, John W. Tuthill, C. Burke Elbrick, William M. Rountree, John Hugh Crimmins, Robert Marion Sayre, Langhorne A. Motley, Diego C. Asencio, Harry W. Shlaudeman, Richard Huntington Melton]

Oh, well, anyway. That didn't fly. I always thought it was a good idea. Subsequently, it was, in large measure, implemented, some years later.

*Q: What was the opposition to it of AFSA?*

KENNEDY: The opposition came from a former security chief, who somehow got the committee chairman to be concerned that what we were doing was going back to those bad old days when the politicos were running the security business. Do you remember?

*Q: I was thinking of Scott McLeod and that type of thing.*

KENNEDY: Yes, that's right. And I said, wait a minute. The chairman and I talked, and he said, “We're going to have a hearing, to see if there's really a smoking gun out there.”

And I said, “Mr. Chairman, if you really think that there is some smoking gun out there, I do not wish to pursue this one minute further, because I don't want the Department of State to have to go through another one of those exercises. It's not true. But to try to prove that it's not true, in the eyes of paranoids, is more than I want to undertake. So I'm withdrawing the whole thing. Just forget it. And I appreciate your time.” And that's what I did. I think it was unfortunate.

*Q: During the time you were in management, there was the obvious problem with AFSA, as you mentioned, but how did they act with you?*

KENNEDY: Well, we finally came to a kind of modus vivendi. As I said, I think, at the beginning, they thought that I was some sort of a right-wing character looking to do them in. That was not the case at all. I just thought we needed to be sure that we understood what each other's roles were. The problem was, they really wanted one of their own running things like the personnel business and the security business and all that stuff. Anyway, that's neither here nor there.

Something I did want to mention. I found, in my travels, that I was the only senior officer of the Department of State who had ever gone to the typing pool. I was the only senior officer of the Department of State who had ever visited the regional security offices (and I am talking about the chiefs of security, like this guy, whoever he was). They had never a seen a senior officer of the Department before. I thought that was very strange, you know, very strange, a very strange attitude about management. The same thing was true of the couriers. I said, “What do you guys do?”

They said, “Do you care?”

I said, “Well, I asked, didn't I? If I didn't care, I wouldn't have asked.”

So they came and told me how they did it. And I said, “Well, gee, that's wonderful.” So they made me one of the three extant honorary couriers, along with Dean Rusk. So I thought I was in good company.

And the same thing was true of the security guys. I went around. There were also other things. This was, I thought, part of what the management people did. There were two big transportation activities, one in New York and one in San Francisco. No one from the Department had ever visited them. When I came to New York, those wonderful little people, and also the passport offices, those wonderful people, they came and they were just...it was like God had come. They had little cakes and coffee for me and everything. And I was overwhelmed. The little thing. But just my coming to say hello to them, and

asking them about, you know, what they thought how things were going, they were just absolutely enthralled. I thought, God, this ought to be the sort of thing that people did on a kind of a routine basis from the Department. No. No.

The same thing was true abroad. I remember I was in Bonn one time, and I can't remember who, the political officer or somebody, I said, “Now, look, I'd like to talk to the communicators.”

“What do you want to bother with them for?”

I said, “Bother with them? How the hell do you suppose we get our information? You don't do it. They do it.”

And it seemed to me important to recognize the value of those people.

I had a secretary, absolutely wonderful person. She's now in charge of the presidential personnel office, Sharon Bisdee. She had been a Foreign Service secretary, and I learned a lot from her. She said, “You know, we were a kind of breed apart. We were tolerated, but not accepted.”And I said, “That's ridiculous. You're all part of a family.”

Not so, I found. And I thought it was a bit sad that some people, as I said, with enormous competence and brilliance would tend to sort of forget that all that doesn't amount to a row of beans if you can't get it done. And the people who do it are the people who need to be recognized for the hard work they do.

*Q: I remember working hard to get George Kennan, my ambassador, to come down to the consular section in Belgrade. It took me about six months. And it was just a matter of going down some steps rather than up some steps to go in there.*

KENNEDY: Well, you've got it perfectly. Again, I was in London, a huge establishment, and I said, “Gee, where is the consular office?” Because I saw lines of people. And these people were working themselves literally to death. I said, “Where is it?”

This guy said, “Gee, I don't know where it is. Downstairs someplace.”

I said, “Well, find out, because I want to go down and see them and talk to them for a few minutes, so they can explain to me how they're handling this huge influx of people.”

This guy looked at me like I was nuts. And I think that's too bad. I think it's too bad. That's again something that it seems to me the Foreign Service Institute can do, both at the beginning of the careers and then in the mid-career programs, a little refresher to remember who these people are and remember they work for you, and without them, you aren't much, unless you want to sit there and type your own cables every day, and then go up and do them.

*Q: There is a certain arrogance. It's not only arrogance, it's almost just not paying attention.*

KENNEDY: I don't think it was arrogance. I think there is some in every group of people. I mean, we all have some element of arrogance. There's no question about that. But I don't think, as a group, you would call these people arrogant. I think, insensitive. Now if you think of being insensitive, in the role that they play, it's almost an oxymoron, isn't it?

*Q: Could you talk about how the bureaus were managed. Did you have any feel about the various bureaus, ones were better than others or had problems or anything of that nature?*

KENNEDY: Well, on balance, my recollection, and this is a long time back now, but my recollection is, the best-managed bureau was EUR. But the regional bureaus were reasonably well managed. It seemed to me that what you have, and I've thought about it since, is an the existing structure which replicates an embassy abroad, so that all are

represented in the organization and management of the bureau, so that in fact the bureau just becomes another embassy in the whole chain of events. I never did think that that really made much sense. But to do something about it would take an awful lot of effort, I realize. It's a kind of an ethic. People have grown up that way. And they come into the Department in that way. They come as juniors in organizational elements and... this... all very familiar. They know how it works. But I'm not sure that that represents the... I'm not suggesting... I'm just suggesting that I wonder, and have always wondered, if that was the most effective way to organize the bureaus, as contrasted with the embassies. The embassies have their own problems. It was certainly not the only way, and I'm not necessarily certain that it was the best way.

But let me just say one example. In resource distribution, resources essentially were then, and I think still are, I see evidences of it now, resources are very often distributed, made available on the basis of regional bureau demands. Whereas, in fact, the regional demands may not be properly prioritized (I hate that word), never really arranged in order of priority in the total departmental context.

I'll give you an example. It's a small one. There were, and continue to be, as I understand it, a lot of problems in terms of resource availabilities for international organizations. Partly that's because of the Hill, partly it's because of, I think, a failure on the part of senior management in the Department to address that problem vis-#-vis the Hill, and make the case more effectively. But who am I to say. But, in any case, that situation did exist. At one time, there was a major, a really major argument over the allocation of resources between the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and the OECD (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).

*Q: Which is essentially European.*

KENNEDY: Yes. Well, I remember, on several occasions, making rather impassioned notes to the effect that the President of the United States had said some things, but they

seemed to have no relevance whatever. I mean, you know. The EUR Bureau took the view that the two pillars of security for the United States were NATO and the OECD. I smiled widely and broadly, and I said, “You know, there is nobody who would question, certainly not I, the preeminence of NATO. But to say that the OECD is in the same category as NATO, and above something like the International Atomic Energy Agency, is preposterous on its face.” They didn't think so at all, because the OECD was part of their bureau. Now, as I say, this is a problem. This took innumerable discussions, meetings, assistant secretaries coming out the kazoo around the table. To discuss what? Nothing that made sense to me, at least, and to most of the people at the table. But the system was such that the fellow whose responsibility the whole business was, ultimately, the assistant secretary for international organizations, had no control over things. All he was was responsible. I'm just suggesting I think that's a fundamental flaw in the whole concept, because it ultimately winds up a case of who is the strongest advocate, the most persuasive advocate. So you have a bunch of lawyers making impassioned statements to the jury, to determine where resources go. That's foolish, I think.

Well, so much for that. That's a fundamental concern I would have, and something that I believe... certainly not then. I attempted to do something along those lines, believing in the old theory: Small steps are usually the best way to go up a staircase.

I had a terrible time to create what I understand now is a basic recognized principle, and that is that all that host of pseudo bureaus (I say pseudo because they weren't big enough really to be bureaus, but they were being managed as though they were bureaus) had a central management core. It just seemed to me to make a great deal of sense. It probably, as I saw it, inevitably would result in a more effective management structure, more effective in the sense of resource allocations among all the things that are associated with the management complex, the A Bureau and all the others. But, oh, I'm telling you, the medics were among those who were just absolutely beside themselves over the notion that there would be some central management activity concerned with resource application and allocation, resource management, and so on for them. I mean, they had

to do it themselves. I mean, doctors know how to run the accounting system almost better than anybody, right? Well, you know, this was the sort of thing that I saw...

I, very early, recognized, although some felt differently, I early recognized that, in my judgment, major, I mean major, changes that would override existing structures, existing concepts that had grown up for the past 20 or 30 years, were unlikely to be successful, for one thing.

Now there's another thing that the Department has more than anybody that I know (except maybe the Defense Department between the three services, but that's gone way down; in the State Department, it's gone way up), individual bureaus, individual constituencies all have their supporters on Capitol Hill, who they assiduously court. There, too, I found you could be blindsided in a minute by somebody who didn't like your idea, who would go to his or her staffer up on the Hill, and the next thing you know, you'd have a hearing. What's the hearing all about? Well, the hearing's all about something that you had decided was a sensible thing to do, which the secretary was satisfied was the sensible thing to do, but Joe Doakes down in the trenches didn't think it was sensible, and he had his own constituency on the Hill. That's another thing that troubled me about the way the place functioned. And I think I see evidence that it's still doing the same thing.

*Q: It's somewhat like in the post-Civil War time, where the Ordnance Corps and the Cavalry Corps all had their power, and the secretary of the army or secretary of war really had to kowtow to these encrusted institutions.*

KENNEDY: All these panjandrums.

*Q: Just so somebody will understand, when you talk about the quasi bureaus, the smaller ones, what would be some of those?*

KENNEDY: I think, you know, I'm trying to think of some.

*Q: International Organizations, maybe?*

KENNEDY: Oh, no, no, no. I think that's a big one. That's a bigger one.

*Q: That's bigger. All right, well, what about Oceans and...*

KENNEDY: No, that's a big one, but that's all badly disorganized, just misarranged now, I believe. I think Human Rights, for example. I think, well, you know, in the management complex, the security people ran their own show, sometimes well, but other times not so well.

*Q: You mentioned the Medical Bureau.*

KENNEDY: The medical people. Now I don't have any trouble with their managing their own affairs. What I do have trouble with is their having their own management operations.

*Q: You're talking about basically having centralized accounting and that type of thing.*

KENNEDY: For themselves. For themselves. That's the sort of thing.

*Q: Was this '81 to '83 period part of the time when there was a tremendous push to make our embassies more secure?*

KENNEDY: Yes, there was some of that.

*Q: How did that impact on you?*

KENNEDY: Well, first of all, it resulted in something that I could see at the time was, I thought, very, very unfortunate. I mean, security is one thing. But, after all, the whole exercise is based upon the principle of conducting foreign relations. And I'm just not one of those who believes that you can conduct foreign relations if you aren't somewhere in the capital. And I mean somewhere reasonably in the capital, where you're down the street

from some of your neighbors, instead of out in the boondocks someplace with a moat and a wall around you, which suggests that you're conducting your foreign relations from the local branch of the Leavenworth Penitentiary. That did trouble me. It troubled me greatly.

I remember a well-known ambassador coming to me and saying, “Dick, these people...” ...talking about the buildings, the public, what do they call that?

*Q: FBO.*

KENNEDY: FBO, yes.

*Q: Foreign Buildings Operations.*

KENNEDY: You know, they were building this thing in Moscow, and they were so security conscious that there weren't going to be any windows. If there were to be windows at all, the windows would be on corridors outside, but nobody in the building would have a window. He didn't think, and I must say, I didn't think, that, you know, having spent a few years in the Pentagon in the nether reaches where you didn't have any windows, that was necessarily going to be the most productive sort of working environment. And I figured there must be some other way to deal with the problem, which I understood. I understood... But I thought there might be some other way to deal with it.Well, that did trouble me. For one thing, it also entailed a huge commitment of resources.

Well, you know, for example, the embassy, as I remember it, in The Hague was a delightful older building. It was located in a beautiful location on a little park. Its facade was attractive, consistent with the entire community. I don't know what's ever happened, I got out of that business, but I understood that it was seriously considered it was just going to have to move, because it was too close to the street. Well, you know, what can I say? You know, you do have the situation in Oklahoma City.

*Q: We're talking about a bombing.*

KENNEDY: Yes, you know. So, you know, I understood that, but at the same time, I just wondered if there wasn't a knee-jerk reaction, which (a) consumed huge amounts of resources, and (b) resulted in facilities that seemed not really in keeping with the mission of the facilities.

*Q: Did you get hit with the discrimination problem? Was that at your level, or was that more in Personnel?*

KENNEDY: I only remember that there was a class-action suit, which I think had been put forward well before my tenure. I didn't have much to do with it. It was essentially handled by Personnel and the director general. I must say also, however, that I had the feeling that there probably was unintentional discrimination. I don't mean discrimination; it's the wrong way to say it. I'm trying to figure out a proper way to put it. Let me just say, I didn't think that women, as a general matter, had the same level of opportunity that their male cohorts had. On the other hand, you know, that was common throughout the society. How to deal with that? You know, there were all kinds of ways. But there also was concern about other minorities. I remember this. I never had that problem, because I didn't care what they looked like; it's what they did. Some of the best, it's my recollection, were certainly of minorities. And I think, by and large, those people were recognized for their enormous competence. What more can I say?

Let me just say what I did think. There was this kind of failure to recognize the contributions. It had nothing to do with minorities. It had to do with your place in the pecking order.

I'll give you some examples. Visiting a very large embassy in one of our closest and longest-time friends in Europe, I said to the political officer who was asked to show me around a bit, “You know, I'd like to talk to the security people,” because I was Under Secretary, and they worked for me. He didn't have any idea where they were or even who they were. That didn't trouble me all that much, but when I asked him what about the

consulate section, he didn't know how to get there. I wouldn't cite that as an example if I thought it was unusual. It wasn't.

For example, there were, very early on, all kinds of things, letters coming to the deputy secretary and so on, passed immediately by him to me, with conversation, suggesting that somewhere out there was a serious problem in the internal workings and relationships among the security people. I decided that was serious business, because, after all, they were at the beginning of the food chain, and if there's something wrong there, you may have big troubles later. So, among other things, I took the opportunity to go out and meet with these people. I was the only senior officer of the Department of State who most of those people had ever seen, much less talked to.It's kind of a cultural problem. I think it's wrong.

*Q: Oh, there's no doubt about it, no.*

KENNEDY: I think it's wrong. I do know, because I had the great good fortune to have some of them, at one time or another, work for me, young Foreign Service secretaries, who I considered utterly indispensable, were in that crowd of administrators. I think that's wrong, too. It's a different kind of discrimination. It's a cultural problem.

*Q: I agree with you, it's a cultural problem. What about your relations with Congress? In the long run, you had to get resources, and resources came from Congress.*

KENNEDY: There, I found relationships were really pretty good. I got to know the committee chairmen very well. We had our differences, but we understood them. And I was, on a number of occasions, commended for knowing what I was talking about. That seemed to have been something refreshing to them, because under secretaries normally didn't. They frequently would come up and blow smoke on the table. But these guys are too smart for that. I knew that from years and years of experience; they're too smart for that. So you ought to know your stuff, and if you don't know it, say you don't. I didn't have any problem with that. I thought the relationships were pretty good, really. I would

guess that that's the case now. And I hope Mrs. [Secretary] Albright's going to continue developing those kinds of relationships.

But, as I say, there is this problem of individual and separate constituencies. Now that always exists. I understand that. But you have to be very careful. I remember, on many occasions, having people say, what we ought to do is go up and talk to so and so. I said, “No, no, I'm sorry. The secretary of state has said these are his priorities. Now I may not like them; I may think there are other priorities. But, as far as I'm concerned, those are the priorities, and I don't want to hear anything more about it.” I know that that was not the general case. I know for a fact it was not the general case. That's a question of discipline. Of course, I grew up in an area where discipline was the name of the game. If you didn't like it, shoulder your rifle and get on with it.

*Q: What about communications?*

KENNEDY: In the human aspect or in technical aspect?

*Q: Well, let's talk about the technical aspect, and then we'll talk about the human.*

KENNEDY: Way behind. Way behind.

*Q: Was this part of the problem...*

KENNEDY: Resources.

*Q: That resources were put in the bureaus, and they were thinking of their things and not the general overall...*

KENNEDY: A good deal of it could be laid to that. A good deal of it could be laid to that. And, oh, I struggled mightily on this. That was another thing I used to do. Everywhere I went, I would go by to see the communicators. Again, most of them had never seen anybody but their own boss. Nobody paid any attention to them. Hell, the place couldn't

function without them. And I thought that they ought to know there's somebody out there who recognizes them, not just the local communicator. But, anyway, again, it's a cultural problem. It's because so many of these people don't think, for two minutes a day, how important those people are to him or her. They don't think about it. And they ought to. They ought to wake up in the morning and say, Thank you, God, for the blessings you've given me in terms of the superb support you've given me." If they did that, then I think the communications people would have the kind of support that they need. I'll bet you that, if you went to the average DCM and said, "I've got $200,000 to spend. How do you want to spend it?", he'd say, "I'd like two more political officers." He'd never say, "I want better communication equipment." I don't think so. See, that's what I'm talking about. That's the essence of management. And I do know that many, if not most, senior Foreign Service officers think they're the best managers in the whole world. In some cases, that's true, but certainly not in all, one of the reasons being, they just don't think of their management job in terms of all of the things that it takes to make the product come out.

*Q: As far as management went, was there any particular role that the White House and the White House staff would play?*

KENNEDY: Oh, yes, in terms of the personnel business. They liked very much to get into that. And I don't think anything is ever going to change that. Beyond that, well, you know, the OMB people were always all over you about money.

*Q: That's the Office of Management and Budget.*

KENNEDY: Yes, I used to talk to David Stockman, who sometimes said one thing, on which we would have a gentleman's agreement, and then did something else, which annoyed me, to say the least, because I didn't work that way. But, by and large, early on, for two reasons, one, Haig was a pretty strong advocate... I remember, I don't think the Department ever gave him credit. He and I had long talks, and I said, "You know, I'm persuaded that there really ought to be an effort made to get salary enhancements. It's

been too long.” The previous administration, as I recall it, essentially ignored this. Haig had been president of a great big company, United Technologies, so he understood that you had to make sure that salaries and wage levels kept moving along, or you sooner or later got into big trouble. So he finally wrote a letter to the president, recommending that the president give serious consideration to approving, for OMB and so on, instructions to do so and so, some modest increase, not a big one, it was a modest increase. And he got a very strong rap across the knuckles from senior White House staff for making any such proposals, when the president was committed to the proposition that you had to tighten up government and reduce its costs.There was another thing, which has plagued everybody since. It plagued me later, in my other incarnation. Stockman, very early, said that the effort was on reducing the outlays. There was a difference between budget and outlays, as you know. The big drive here was to reduce outlays. One of the ways to do that, obviously (and, geez, I knew this back from the days of the Eisenhower administration), was to put off payments, so that you just didn't pay your bills this month.

And one of the ways to do that was in terms of the international organizations. For example, and I don't know about all of them, but the IAEA (with which I became intimately familiar as governor), by its statute and the agreement of the member states to the statute, was due payment for the year's dues, if you will, at the beginning of the year. Well, that was sort of sensible. I mean, after all, they've got to have the money in the bank to pay for the operations that year. Stockman came up with the notion, well, now what we'll do is we'll kite those payments off into the next fiscal year. Remember, fiscal years then were in July. So we would kite these payments that are due in January off into the next fiscal year, you see, six months or a little more later. It didn't sound bad.

I did go up to the Hill. I've forgotten the name of the wonderful man who was the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the House. He said, “Well, tell me, Mr. Secretary, how's this going to work? I mean, are we saving any money here?”

I said, “No, sir. We're not saving a nickel. Mr. Chairman, I think what you ought to think of this as is a check-kiting scheme. You put the money out there, you sign the check, but you know the check's not going to come due for some time. In the meantime, you've got a float. That's what's going on here. It isn't going to save you a dime. Sooner or later, you're going to wind up having to pay that bill.”

He said, “That's what I thought, and I'm not exactly sure why we're doing this.”

And I said, “Well, it's perfectly clear why we're doing this, and that is, to readjust the rate of outlays.”

I tried to do my best to be loyal to the administration. But it didn't make any sense, I didn't think.

And it hasn't since, of course. It made it much more complicated when they changed the fiscal year by three more months. So, as a consequence, under the best of circumstances, we can't pay our bills until the end of the year, not the beginning of the year when they're supposed to be due. That's a real problem. It's a problem that runs to this day. You see, in the IAEA, we've never really gone into arrears, but we're in arrears every year, until the end of the year. I knew it very well and tried to figure out all kinds of things that could be done internally in the IAEA to accommodate this little problem. They're not allowed to borrow, and we wouldn't want them to have authority to borrow.

Well, anyway, we just had this problem, and it gave them a fit, and still does. It still does, because when we started doing it, others started doing it, you see. During the early days of this, before the breakup of the former Soviet Union, guess who was prompt in their payments and prompt in notifying the rest of the board of governors that that was what they were doing? The Russians. The Soviets said, “Look at us. We paid our bills.” Of course, three years later, they weren't paying them at all. Anyway, that was a problem. That was a problem, and that arose out of the White House complex.

*Q: How did the patronage side of the White House, ambassadors and this sort of thing, impact on you during this time?*

KENNEDY: How did it impact? Well, Bill Clark, God love him, was the deputy secretary and a longtime personal associate of the president and Meese. He was very close to Ed Meese. And so we had our little committee to consider nominations and proposals for various ambassadorial posts. Although I was a political appointee, Clark was astute enough (and I was not) to put me in the position of arguing for, as opposed to White House proposals, Foreign Service officers for these posts. I did it as faithfully as I knew how. In some cases, one in particular I remember, I went to... for an ambassadorial post. “And I have to tell you, I have information, and I don't think I would want to recommend him.” I was overruled. The director general and everybody else said this is the man we're proposing. I said okay. Well, he got a job later. But that's neither here nor there. His problem was simply that he was pursuing the cultural bias of his particular bureau, to the detriment of some serious concerns that ran beyond the immediate concerns of his bureau.

Anyway, how did it work? By and large, it worked pretty well. There weren't too many deadheads. Fortunately, the president had a lot of very good and powerful friends. I remember many of them, because I took a personal interest in each one of them, trying to be sure that they got whatever they needed to try to do their jobs. I subsequently met many of them in their posts. They were most gracious, and some of them turned out to be among our most able people. I... As a matter of fact, there were screams and hollers all over the place about the number of non-career people. I looked at the numbers. It was interesting that, in previous administrations of another party, the numbers were greater, but there weren't any screams.

*Q: The Kennedy one was rather high.*

KENNEDY: Very high, very high. You didn't hear any screams about that, that I can recall.

*Q: There were good PR ones. You put in Reischauer and Galbraith and a few other people like that, and it caught the imagination.*

KENNEDY: But the imagination... You're suggesting that the interior of the State Department was lacking in imagination, or what?

*Q: I'm talking about the media and all. It depends on how it gets translated.*

KENNEDY: Oh, the media, well. No, the media, on this issue, couldn't care less. The media, on this issue, I can tell you for a fact, was fed directly from the interior of the Department, AFSA among others.

Well, to go back to what we were talking about. I think the record was pretty good. Obviously, mixed; it's always that way. I think the record was pretty good. I do remember a lot of those people were very able people, very able people, for the most part. Well, you had a couple of exceptions. Wilson, who was such a nice man. He really was a nice man.

*Q: He went to the Vatican.*

KENNEDY: Yes, really a nice man. He was really a nice man, but, sort of maybe like the present one, tended to maybe get bored with life on the Hill and looked for other things to do. And you ought not to do that.

*Q: The problem being that he started his own personal negotiations with Libya.*

KENNEDY: But, other than that, he was a nice man, a very nice man. I can only think of a couple who did not measure up. But the rest of them did extremely well. Price, for example, was outstanding.

*Q: His first name is?*

KENNEDY: I can't remember. [Charles H. Price II, 1981 AE/P Belgium; 1983 AE/P Great Britain] He was originally in Geneva. And then he moved to Brussels. And then, from Brussels, he went to the United Kingdom. He was truly an outstanding person. There were many of them who were very able.

*Q: Did you find yourself head to head, or nose to nose, with people in the White House on some of the appointments?*

KENNEDY: No.

*Q: Was there a certain cleaning up process on both sides when some appointments came up that really weren't suitable? We're not talking about the ones that went through, but the ones that didn't go through.*

KENNEDY: I don't recall... I had a very good relationship with the White House personnel people. Ben James, who was there at first, was an old friend from back in the Nixon era. A whole lot of these people were old friends and colleagues from my own days in the White House many years before.

*Q: So you could call on your friends. This is the way the government works.*

KENNEDY: Sure. Certainly.

*Q: What about, for you, the change between the man with whom you had been working for so long, Alexander Haig, and then, when he left, George Shultz came in. Could you talk about both, for you personally, and any feel for the change in management style and all that.*

KENNEDY: Well, personally. As I think I mentioned earlier, early on in my tenure in M, the question of who should be our representative to the IAEA arose, because Jerry Smith, who had been there, had resigned in August of the previous year, and there had been no

governor appointed. I remember, oh, I was just about to say his name [Thomas O. Enders or George Southall Vest], excellent ambassador, called and said, “Dick, I still haven't got a governor. I really need somebody.” So I said, okay, well, I've got to sit down and figure this out. One thing I didn't want was to see some political appointee who didn't know anything going over there to host dinner parties. So I talked with Haig, and he said, “Well, why don't you do it?”

I said, “Well, can I?”

He said, “Sure.”

Well, it went through. Nobody gave me any problem about that at all.

However, there came a time, when I was out of the country at an IAEA meeting, when a budget proposal was shafted by OMB in my absence. This caused some people... to go to the Washington Post (something with which I became extremely familiar), indicating how I was obviously derelict in my duties, traveling in Europe. Anyway, well, we straightened all that out. I could never have asked for a boss who was more supportive. And the nice thing was, most of the Department understood that. There's nothing that gives you that confidence that you can do what you need to do, that works better, than when you know that the boss is standing there. If you need him, call him. They knew that.

*Q: Oh, yes, clout is clout.*

KENNEDY: They knew that. There were forays run against it from time to time, but it only took a little telephone call or a little quiet word to say, “Do you really want to pursue this further? Let's, you know...” And that was the end of it.

*Q: The IAEA, where did it stand sort of in the order of battle?*

KENNEDY: Second to the United Nations. In the international organizations, totally aside from NATO. NATO's a thing of its own; I think emasculated at the moment, but that's

neither here nor there. It was an institution that, by and large, the United States created. And the United States contributed something on the order of 26 percent of its annual income. The United States provided its first director general, but then it was agreed that nuclear-weapons states would probably no longer occupy the position of director general. So the Russians and ourselves stood aside. From the time of the second director general, after the American left, who, by the way, had been the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which was one of the most powerful committees in the... [House?], after he left, the Americans assumed the position of deputy director general for administration. But, in fact, he was the first among equals among the deputy directors general. We retain that position to this day, having gone through a whole series of successors.

Where did it stand? Well, as I said, the United States created it. Of the international institutions, it is recognized to this day as one of the best managed, most effective, a very high-ranking institution, indeed.

*Q: You were there, including the time you were also in management, from when to when?*

KENNEDY: From 1981 to 1993, 12 years. I became, in fact, the dean of the governors...

*Q: Did you see a change...*

KENNEDY: Oh, yes, of course. It grew dramatically. As additional states became members, safeguards were explored. The problem... for the IAEA. There were all kinds of major things that occurred during that time. China became a member, and then China became a member of the NPT.

*Q: NPT being the Nonproliferation Treaty.*

KENNEDY: France, which was a member of the IAEA but not a member of the NPT, also became a member of the NPT. And, for the first time, all five declared nuclear-weapons states were members of the Nonproliferation Treaty. This had a great effect upon the

IAEA. The IAEA was not an NPT organization. The IAEA was created before the NPT. It was created essentially because Eisenhower saw this as part of his big concept for Atoms for Peace. It had two fundamental roles: one, facilitating the flow of technical information among states for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and, two, providing the safeguards system that was supposed to assure against misuse of these materials.

All kinds of things occurred over that period. Israel became a huge problem. Indeed, it caused the United States to leave the organization, to stop payment of its dues.

*Q: Why was that?*

KENNEDY: Because... circumstances. Israel's credentials were refused at the general conference. And I can't remember offhand now the year, early, 1983 maybe, maybe '82. A new director general was elected, a director general who has just now announced his retirement. This was a traumatic exercise, because there was a great tug of war between the developed and the developing countries for the job. The same situation may be building up even now, as we speak, for this year. But we'll see.

I became a very close to the then director general. When he comes to town, we always have a quiet dinner together, if he's alone, just my wife and he. If he's with his wife, of course, she's there. And, in Vienna, we always had a quiet little dinner or cocktails or something together, totally privately from all these other activities going on. Actually a wonderful man, outstanding person, a former foreign minister of Sweden. These are the kinds of people, by the way, that you see governments put forward as candidates.

Well, back to the organization. In 1981, Israel undertook what some people have humorously called the ultimate in nonproliferation activity by bombing the Osiraq reactor in the research facility in Iraq. This was met with essentially universal condemnation, a major effort in the United Nations, calls on the United Nations ultimately for expulsion of Israel from United Nations-related activities.

The IAEA, by the way, is not a United Nations activity. It is a United Nations-affiliated activity. There is a relationship agreement between the IAEA and the United Nations, but it is not a United Nations subsidiary. It is independent.

Credentials are handled by the so-called general committee. You know how those organizations function, huge bureaucracies, in the conferences, to facilitate their operations. They generally don't come forward with their report until almost the last day of the conference. So the country that may or may not have its credentials approved has been sitting there participating in the meeting all this time, which was the case in 1982.

The general committee was unable to arrive at a conclusion, and came up with a tie vote, which meant that they were making no recommendation, and therefore the credentials presumably were to be approved. There was a ballot vote. The ballot vote also came out tied, with the consequence that the president of the conference announced that Israel's credentials were approved, because a tie vote meant approval.

Shortly after making this announcement, a delegation rose and requested that its vote be counted, it having been reported absent previously.

The legal advisor, having been asked by the president what do we do now, sought out a whole lot of precedents and so on, and, as I wrote in my short piece on the subject, inexplicably cited a number of precedents, which many, many people found irrelevant to the circumstances, and said that they could count the vote, even though the decision had been announced. But he voted no, which meant there was one vote negative in total. So the credentials were denied.

The United States, true to its word, got up and left the hall. We were not alone in leaving the hall. A number of other delegations, I remember the British in particular, but several delegations, six or eight maybe, also left, because they thought the ruling was so bad.

The United States, however, not only left the hall, we left the agency. The board of governors always meets during the week immediately after the general conference has concluded. They met, and our local representative was instructed not to participate. So our chair at the table was vacant. This threw a shockwave around the community, and the governments. And I had many, many visitors from abroad, coming to see what could be done. At this point, there was clearly a nexus between this activity and what was going on in the U.N. and elsewhere. I negotiated something with Senator Kasten, which would be acceptable to him. And then I remember having a meeting in New York at the Four Seasons, with Tom Brokaw sitting over there, with the director general, who flew in from Stockholm, where he was at the time. He flew in for lunch; I flew up from here [Washington?] to have lunch with him. We stopped payment. This was in September, you see. We stopped payment, and we remained not participating in agency activities until February, which was the next board of governors' meeting. And we worked something out where the chairman of the board, with the acquiescence of the board, made it clear that Israel's rights and privileges and membership were not infringed, which is true, because the rejection of credentials applied only to that meeting, which was long over.

However, that problem continued to plague us. My wife always remembers my having been singled out by the Syrian and the Iranian ambassadors as the Great Satan, in their speeches, being supportive of Israel's continued membership. Totally aside from our relationship with Israel, there was a fundamental principle involved, and that is the question of unanimity, or universality, of membership, which was a basic tenet of policy of the United States.

Anyway, to make a long story short, that plagued us for many years, many years, until the movement to the peace process...

*Q: You're talking about between the Palestinians and Israelis.*

KENNEDY: Right. Took on substantial meaning and motion, and therefore, first, the question of Israel's membership no longer arose, and, subsequently, the president of the conference noted that it was his view, from consultations, that it was the desire of the conference that Israel's right to receive technical assistance from the agency should be totally restored. This was not, by the way, a consideration of rights and privileges of membership. They had stopped getting technical assistance, which is not a right and privilege of membership. But they'd been stopped from doing that ever since 1981. So that was restored. So that whole picture turned around.

The same thing happened with South Africa. To make a long story short, after many, many more meetings than I would like to recount, and I learned to know and love the foreign minister, who was about as tough a character as I ever met...

*Q: Was it Botha?*

KENNEDY: Pik Botha was really something else. Anyway, many, many meetings and great effort on the part of all parties, and the South Africans finally coming to the realization that they really ought to do something about this whole business, they agreed to a full-scope safeguards agreement. They signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and delivered it personally to me in my office. The ambassador came over, and he said, “I must deliver this personally to you.”

I said, “I'm not the guy who usually does this.”

He said, “That's all right. I am instructed, you are to be the person receiving it.”

I said, “Okay.” I thought that was an honor, actually.

As a consequence, South Africa took its place in the agency once again, from which it had been essentially excluded for 15 years or longer, and now has been seated on the board of governors, unseating, essentially, Israel or Egypt.

Well, those were the kinds of things. And, of course, Iraq. Here, again to make a long story short, the Gulf War uncovered that the Iraqis were engaged in a covert operation to enrich uranium, by a process that the United States had given up very early on because it was so inefficient. But, anyway, they were doing it, clearly trying to get high-enriched uranium for weapons' purposes, all this in violation of their NPT requirements and of their safeguards agreement with the IAEA. So... the IAEA was roundly and soundly condemned in many quarters for not having discovered this. That also was a sort of cultural problem. There was created a special commission, under Rolf Ekaus in New York, to supervise the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

And there was, for a considerable time, a tug of war between the special commission, on the one hand, and the IAEA, on the other, as to who had responsibility for the nuclear business. Ultimately, a modus vivendi was established, as reasonable men will do, although not all the men in this case were necessarily reasonable, I can assure you. Some of the Americans certainly were not. They agreed, and the Security Council agreed, that the IAEA would be responsible for the nuclear business, and that, if the special commission recommended certain actions, the IAEA would undertake them. So that worked out.

As a consequence, the IAEA also sought to improve the safeguards system. I remember, on my own account, essentially, forcing decisions to be taken, which were kind of being put off, to more effectively describe the limits and extent of things that were already in the IAEA's charter and statute, which actually showed that the secretariat had the right, with the approval of the board of governors, to undertake special inspections outside the normal routine covered by the safeguards agreement.

That process continues to this day, and, indeed, even as we speak, in Vienna, a team, led by Norm Wolf of ACDA, is discussing what is called '93 + 2, '93 being what I told you we had done in the board of governors; the + 2 were additional add-on things. It was supposed to have been completed by '95 (obviously, '93 + 2), but it obviously has not.

They are still discussing it, as I said, even as we speak. This is a question that will arise this spring.

Those were the big things going on.

*Q: What about Chernobyl?*

KENNEDY: The [April 26, 1986] accident was at the RBMK reactor, built by the former Soviet Union, in Ukraine at a location called Chernobyl. It was a very serious accident, probably the most serious accident in nuclear history. I won't go into all of the reasons for it.

But the IAEA had a series of special meetings to see what could be done in terms of ascertaining what the problem was, and what actions needed to be taken in mitigation, because, of course, there was radiation exposure that extended over wide areas. Europe was in a panic. Most of this panic was unnecessary, but it's scary business, you know. As a consequence, the IAEA undertook to see what needed to be done, had teams established, asked for assistance from member states, and, in the summer of that year, conducted a big symposium. I mean, huge. And I headed a delegation of Americans, probably 30 or 40 people, scientific types, to come together to hear and discuss what this accident was all about, as best people knew it at that time. It was a very interesting exercise.

I remember being in a room, listening to discussion and seeing stuff up on the big boards and the screens and stuff, when I was tapped on the shoulder and asked could I please excuse myself, the head of the Soviet delegation would very much like to have a consultation with me. I said, “Fine.”

As I walked out, I walked right through the doors and straight into a battery of cameras and lights turned on. Somebody said, “Mr. Ambassador, could you please give us your view of how this conference is going?”

And I said, “Well, yes, I would be pleased to. I'm quite disappointed, because I'm afraid that our Soviet colleagues either don't know or are unwilling to say what really took place. And the only people who are telling us anything of any consequence are the fire fighters, about what they did. And that's all very interesting, but as to the technical composition of the accident, what actually occurred, we're getting little or nothing. And I'm quite disappointed about this. Excuse me, I've got to go.”

By the time I got to see the Russian, who was a minister, he had gotten this word, and he was very upset.

I said, “Well, I'm sorry. I just told the truth.”

“Well,” he said, “... Moscow.”

I said, “I'm sorry about that, you know. If Moscow doesn't want anybody to know, that's too bad. But there it is.”

Well, late in the day, the next day, all of a sudden, all kinds of things began coming out. They had been instructed not to say anything. But they knew that they were now caught. You know, the world news was publishing what I'd said.

It was kind of fun, actually. I was staying, as I always did, at the Hilton Hotel, and ABC and NBC and CBS were all there. Each of them had a suite on a different floor. And I would, early in the morning, eight o'clock, go downstairs, sit out on the terrace, and have a coffee with them. I'd go sequentially, one to the other, and give on-camera interviews with the guy in New York, you see. I couldn't see him, but I could hear him. It was three o'clock in the morning, and they were recording this interview for the morning news.

Well, that was a very serious thing. It continues to this day. The IAEA continues to have symposia, looking to ways to mitigate the effects. They're working on improving these reactors. They're not going to shut them down. I mean, a lot of them they can't, because

they're district heating, lights, you know, electric power for plants. They can't shut them down until they get some kind of replacement power. So the IAEA has gone through a major exercise, engaging people from all around the world, to try to improve these machines. What more can I say? It was a major effort on the part of the IAEA.

*Q: Why don't we stop at this point. I want to thank you very much.*

End of interview